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WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 1983

For many years, the international community has been moving towards standards of protection for refugees which are humane and progressive. But the fact is that conditions for refugees in much of the world are more difficult today than a year ago. In parts of Asia, Africa, and the Americas, nations have pushed small groups of refugees and asylum seekers back across international boundaries, notwithstanding their fate on the other side and are treating refugees within their borders with a harshness not generally exhibited in the recent past.

U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES
25th ANNIVERSARY ISSUE

U.S. Committee for Refugees: 25 Years of Concern

Twenty-five years ago, the U.S. Committee for Refugees described the refugees of concern like this:

They are the waiting people of our time—more than two million refugees living a shadowy half-existence... They are the refugees of mid-century Europe, Algeria, Palestine, Tibet, China. They are the flesh and blood symbols of the upheavals of the past two decades, escapees from the horrors of war, revolution, persecution. They are not far different from many of our own ancestors who came to the United States for the same reasons that have brought today's refugees to a dead-end in a camp in Austria, a barracks in Italy, a tent in Gaza, a shack in Hong Kong.

USCR was established in 1958 to inform the public about world refugee issues and populations like those described above. It set itself the tasks then of consulting regularly with government leaders and United Nations officials; stimulating research on refugee problems; and working closely with American voluntary agencies. Although created at government encouragement, USCR has always been privately supported. For a time in the 1970's it was closely associated with the American Freedom from Hunger Foundation.

On January 1, 1982, USCR and the American Council for Nationalities Service were formally merged under the laws of the state of New York. The continuing nonprofit corporation is ACNS; however, the distinctive USCR name and program of public information and advocacy regarding the world's refugees continue.

A particular role in its first year was to further American participation in the UN's World Refugee Year, July 1, 1959–June 30, 1960. With its distinguished board members and numerous national figures and celebrities, USCR commenced an advertising campaign and prepared teaching kits for social science classes and fact sheets on lesser-known refugee situations. A series of exhibits, lectures, concerts, and other public events also commemorated the year.

The year 1961 saw the first issue of the *World Refugee Survey*, then and annually since then a review of the status and fate of refugees around the world. Newsletters and pamphlets on refugee situations have supplemented this publication, including, in recent years, issue papers on Cambodian and Afghan refugees and issue briefs on matters of refugee protection.

Site visits inaugurated with a tour of Middle Eastern countries by Rev. Francis B. Sayre, first chairman of the board of USCR, have been followed by staff visits to Thailand and Malaysia, Sudan, Uganda and Rwanda, and Pakistan and Austria to learn first-hand of circumstances of refugees and the agencies dedicated to assisting them. Published reports based on such visits are provided to governments and the public.

USCR has continued and recently enhanced its advocacy efforts. Correspondence with government officials in the U.S. and abroad, as well as with other refugee-oriented organizations around the world, seeks to assure attention to refugee problems, equitable and humane treatment of refugees in asylum countries, and safety of refugees in the ultimate resolution of their situations.

Throughout its existence, USCR has cooperated closely with UN programs in the refugee field. The committee supported UNHCR efforts in 1961 to make meaningful observance of the 100th anniversary of the birth of Fridtjof Nansen, League of Nations high commissioner for refugees, who gave his name to the Nansen Passport for Stateless Refugees. Both the high commissioner for refugees and the director of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees have addressed meetings of the USCR board, and USCR has distributed publications and other materials of both agencies in the U.S. More recently, USCR cooperated with UNHCR in developing a public service announcement for radio and television and an accompanying information pamphlet for nationwide distribution.

All of these activities reflect a sentiment of an early USCR publication: "Once the conscience of man is aroused, great deeds can be accomplished." For some of those refugees whose plight was identified by USCR in its founding year, satisfactory resolution has been found. This twenty-fifth anniversary issue of the *World Refugee Survey* records solutions for some more recent refugee problems and points the way to resolution of others.

World Refugee Survey 1983

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

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Terms Frequently Used in the 1983 Survey

1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees

These two international legal instruments, adopted within the framework of the United Nations, govern refugee status on the universal level. Both provide for cooperation between signatories and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, including the determination of refugee status. The *Convention* was adopted by a conference of plenipotentiaries of the UN in 1951 and entered into force in 1954. It was intended to respond to a felt need, after World War II, to replace previous ad hoc agreements adopted in relation to specific refugee situations with a new international agreement which provided a general definition of who was to be considered a refugee.

That definition, referred to frequently throughout this *Survey*, terms a refugee a person who,

> *[a]s a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.*
>
> *In the case of a person who has more than one nationality, the term "the country of his nationality" shall mean each of the countries of which he is a national, and a person shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of his nationality if, without any valid reason based on well-founded fear, he has not availed himself of the protection of one of the countries of which he is a national.*

In addition to the basic definition covering who is, who is not, and who has ceased to be a refugee, the 1951 *Convention* contains provisions defining the legal status of refugees and their rights and duties in their country of refuge. These include rights to personal status; acquisition of property; and access to courts, employment, housing, education, public relief, and social security, largely in accordance with the rights of nationals or aliens generally in the country of refuge.

The 1951 dateline came about at the request of governments, which, at the time the *Convention* was adopted, wished to limit their obligations to refugee situations known to exist then or those which might arise subsequently from events (e.g. World War II) that had already occurred. Further, each contracting state was to declare, at the time it acceded to the *Convention*, any geographic limitations it would apply with regard to its obligations under the *Convention*.

States were also permitted at the time of accession to declare reservations to articles of the *Convention*. No reservations by signatories, however, would be permitted with regard to the general definition or articles pertaining to nondiscrimination on the basis of race, religion, or country of origin; freedom to practice religion; access to courts of law; protection from expulsion or return; facilitation of assimilation and naturalization; or numerous administrative articles.

Article 33, the prohibition of expulsion or return, often referred to as "nonrefoulement" and noted in numerous papers in this *Survey*, states:

> *No contracting state shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.*
>
> *The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.*

In later years, and with the emergence of new refugee situations, it was felt necessary to make the provisions of the 1951 *Convention* applicable to more recent refugees. As a result, a *Protocol* was prepared; it was opened for accession and entered into force in 1967. The *Protocol* is an independent instrument and states which did not ratify the *Convention* may be signatories to the *Protocol* (as, for example, the U.S.). Nevertheless, the *Protocol* binds signatories to the same substantive obligations as under the *Convention*, but without the 1951 dateline of the earlier instrument. Specifically, the *Protocol* defines a refugee as the *Convention* does with the omission of the words "As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and . . ." and the words ". . . as a result of such events." The *Protocol* continues that its provisions are to be applied by signatories without any geographic limitation, except that limits of obligations declared by *Convention* signatories also apply under the *Protocol*.

The 1951 *Convention* and/or the 1967 *Protocol* (as they are referred to in this *Survey*) have been acceded to by more than 90 states (see box on page 4). In 1982-3 the Peoples Republic of China, Guatemala, and El Salvador joined the signatories.

Country Reports on the World Refugee Situation

These yearly reports, prepared by the Bureau for Refugee Programs/Department of State for submission to the U.S. Congress, include data on and analyses of refugee situations in over 90 areas of the world. The reports focus on refugees receiving some kind of international aid and are based on information from U.S. diplomatic missions and international agencies. They are referred to in the text as *Country Reports* or State Department reports.

Refugee Act of 1980

This act, also known as Public Law 96-212, is the first comprehensive legislative attempt by the U.S. to set national policy and administrative procedures for assistance, including domestic assistance to refugees. The act's objectives are "to provide a permanent and systematic procedure for the admission to this country of refugees of special humanitarian concern to the U.S. and to provide comprehensive and uniform provisions for the effective resettlement and absorption of those refugees who are admitted."

The act defines a refugee as

> *. . . any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion; or in such special circumstances as the president after appropriate consultation (as defined in section 207(e) of this Act) may specify, any person who is within the country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, within the country in which such person is habitually residing, and who is persecuted or who has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular group, or political opinion. The term "refugee" does not include any person who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.*

The Refugee Assistance Amendments of 1982, Public Law 97-363, were signed into law in October 1982. They reauthorize funds for the domestic refugee resettlement program under the Refugee Act of 1980. Because this reauthorization was only to last one year, subsequent reauthorization of the act will be required.

1982-The Year in Review

Roger P. Winter

A year ago, USCR summarized worldwide developments this way:

The situation for refugees is more difficult in much of the world than it was a year ago. The important issues of refugee protection valued by the international community seem to be under assault in many areas.

It is disheartening to report that this observation is still valid today, conditions for refugees having been exacerbated by further deterioration in international standards regarding refugee treatment and protection. In reviewing some of the incidents of 1982 that give rise to this conclusion, the following examples can be cited:

Djibouti—On February 16, the government forcibly repatriated a number of refugees back to Ethiopia. Some observers report that similar incidents occurred in November and December. Repeated inquiries by USCR on these actions were not answered by Djibouti authorities, nor were inquiries to Ethiopia on the fate of those returned.

Thailand—In May and June, Thai officials forcibly repatriated a number of hill tribe refugees back to Laos. Thai authorities have not responded to repeated inquiries by USCR, nor have Lao authorities answered inquiries on the fate of those returned.



This Cambodian woman at Ban Kaeng camp, Thailand, is one of many Indochinese facing an uncertain future. UNHCR

Hong Kong—On June 2, the government instituted a "humane deterrence" policy designed to discourage Vietnamese refugees from seeking haven in Hong Kong. Recent media reports indicate authorities will consider forcible repatriation of refugees if flows into Hong Kong continue. USCR has expressed concern to the Hong Kong government on the Colony's policy.

Uganda—On October 2, persons affiliated with the Uganda Peoples Congress, the president's party in Uganda, instituted a mass displacement of 80,000 people. Some of those displaced were refugees from Rwanda who had sought safety in Uganda since 1960 and were presumed to be securely settled. Displacement was effected by beatings and destruction of homes. USCR and Cultural Survival, Inc. conducted a fact-finding mission to Rwanda and Uganda to focus attention on this little-known tragedy.

Lebanon—In September, over 700 Palestinian refugees in two refugee camps were massacred, precipitating massive international revulsion but limited concrete action to close the "protection gap" that exists for these refugees.

Mexico—In late October, 2000 Guatemalan refugees were attacked and evicted from a camp at Rancho Tejas. This action was taken by "local authorities" without the approval of the national government. USCR has been in communication with the government of Mexico on this matter.

United States—The U.S. and many other resettlement countries reduced refugee resettlement opportunities, actions which help assure long-term detention of refugees in camps in first asylum countries of Southeast Asia.

United States—Salvadorans who could be granted temporary safe haven in this country continued to be returned by U.S. authorities to their strife-torn homeland, including some whose fears of persecution appeared to many to be well-founded. Haitian asylum seekers continued to be detained in the U.S. until courts ruled the U.S. government action illegal.

United States—Throughout most of the year, U.S.

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Pakistan continues to provide asylum to large numbers of Afghan refugees. UNHCR

Immigration and Naturalization Service officials in Thailand and elsewhere in Southeast Asia operated in a fashion which USCR believes inappropriately denied refugee status to Cambodians and others without regard to the personal and practical results of these actions. USCR has cooperated with many concerned individuals and organizations in attempts to restore procedures for handling refugee applications in which our citizenry can take pride.

• • •

While such distressing events were occurring worldwide, there were also some positive developments in 1982:

China—The Peoples Republic acceded to the U.N. *Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees*, thus binding itself to international refugee protection standards. Guatemala and El Salvador also joined the signatories in 1983 (see box below).

Thailand—The international community, in cooperation with the Royal Thai government, initiated an anti-piracy program in the Gulf of Thailand in an effort to combat violent attacks on Vietnamese boat refugees. This program replaced an earlier bilateral effort supported entirely by the U.S.

Pakistan, Sudan, and **Somalia** continued to offer asylum to very large numbers of refugees with few negative restrictions, notwithstanding the tremendous burden this has imposed on their own populations and resources. Their efforts have been facilitated by significant levels of assistance by the world community.

United States—In August, two legislative proposals which USCR believed would lead to harmful restrictions on refugee admissions to the U.S. were defeated in the U.S. Senate. USCR actively participated in efforts to convey the negative implications of the two proposals to citizens and senators alike.

United States—While continuing to reduce its program of refugee admissions to this country, the U.S. continued its major financial support of international organizations dealing with refugee relief and protection.

• • •

The events listed above suggest a negative balance with regard to international standards of humane refugee treatment and protection in 1982. In this time of worldwide economic and social disruption, it is easy for U.S. officials and the American public to lose sight of our vested interest in supporting and promoting such standards.

For us at USCR, these are human rights matters, touching on the value of the individual and what is an acceptable quality of life around the world. USCR continues its efforts on behalf of refugees on the premise that the American people, although confused about immigration issues in general, are very willing to respond to others whose human rights are threatened. Further, USCR holds that forthright, positive action by the U.S. is central to international progress on refugee protection and treatment, and that refugees the world over will benefit if the government of this country will catch the spirit this nation's people are prepared to exhibit.

Signatories to the UN Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees

Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany (Federal Republic of), Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guatemala, Holy See, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mali, Malta, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peoples Republic of China, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principie, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Surinam, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Signatories to the *Convention* Only: Madagascar, Monaco, Peru.

Signatories to the *Protocol* Only: Swaziland, United States.

The Definition of "Refugee": Restrictive versus Expanding Trends

Gilbert Jaeger

The core definition provided by the 1951 United Nations *Convention relating to the Status of Refugees* and the 1967 *Protocol* is that a "refugee" is an alien who fears persecution in his country of origin on account of a threat to specific aspects of his human rights and is not protected by his country of origin. Particularly in the industrialized countries of North America and Europe, but also elsewhere, the general definition recently has been felt to be too broad. While discussion of changes in nations' laws may be preliminary, national authorities concerned with refugees, and with immigrants in general, have undoubtedly become more rigorous with respect to admission, decisions on asylum requests, and determination of refugee status.

On the other hand, a series of developments has taken place in recent decades where it was felt that the definition provided by the *Convention* and *Protocol* was too restrictive. In one continent, Africa, a wider legal definition has been adopted. At least in practice in several other parts of the world, the concept of refugee has been interpreted generously to enable the international community to deal more effectively with refugee problems.

After World War II, the large numbers of Eastern European refugees led to a call for a general description of refugee.
UNHCR

• • •

The UN definition, which is, in effect, also the U.S. definition as embodied in the Refugee Act of 1980, is, in fact, very restrictive. Mere unwillingness, for instance, to reside in one's own country is not sufficient: it must be owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted. But again, just any "well-founded fear" is not enough: it must be for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

It is difficult, in fact, to envisage more restrictive wording, as is reportedly contemplated in certain circles. The first requirement, that the refugee should be alien, is undisputed. A possible way to further restrict the definition might be to replace "*is* outside any country . . . " by "*has left* any country . . . " This would exclude from refugee status the "réfugié sur place" who was already physically outside his country when events occurred there preventing him from returning and compelling him to seek asylum and refugee status. The difficulties entailed by such changed wording can easily be illustrated by reference to a current refugee situation: it would mean that while Afghans who left their country after December 1979 would be recognized as refugees, those Afghans who were already in another country in December 1979 should be refused asylum and returned to their home country.

Again to make the definition more restrictive, one could think of dispensing with "political opinion" or "nationality" or any of the other bases for persecution. But any suggestion of this kind would meet with considerable opposition and fierce protest from all circles dedicated to the defense of human rights in a number of countries, and certainly in the U.S.

A basic fact should be kept in mind: the U.S. is a party to the 1967 *Protocol* and thus indirectly to the 1951 *Convention*. A unilateral change in the wording of the U.S. law is possible technically but would not be in accord with the position of the U.S. as a contracting state. A change in the international definition normally should precede a change in the U.S. definition (or any other signatory state's), and a consensus among all or some of the more than 90 contracting states may not be easy to achieve in the near future: the 1951 *Convention* has been in existence for several decades, and, whatever its shortcomings, new states accede to it every year.

• • •

As formal changes in the definition are perhaps easy to imagine but certainly difficult to put in place, those states which appear to have some objections to the definition are resorting to a number of restrictive practices. These practices, which concern the arrival and temporary admission of asylum seekers/refugees, as well as their handling after arrival, and specifically the interpretation of the refugee definition, willfully undermine the international commitments of *Convention* and *Protocol* signatories.

The most radical restrictive practice with respect to arrival is, of course, its physical prevention—the interdiction at sea of vessels carrying asylum seekers, for example. Inasmuch as interdicted vessels fly the flag of the interdicting country or the flag of a country with which an ad hoc ar-

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He was a senior official of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees from 1952 to early 1979, serving from 1972 as director of assistance and director of protection.

rangement of interdiction has been made, as is the case of the U.S. with Haiti, for example, such a measure might still be fitted within the mazes of international law. Whether it corresponds to the spirit of international refugee law, however, is an obvious question to which an obvious "no" can be served.

The fact that persons on board interdicted vessels are interviewed to assess their possible entitlement to asylum does not help. Common sense indicates that bewildered fugitives aboard a boat overpowered on the high seas by terrifying members of an army or police force are not about to react normally to questions on their refugee status. Such procedures are far removed from the basic requirements for determination of refugee status recommended in October 1977 by the UNHCR Executive Committee, including the representative of the U.S. They are also very remote from the conclusions on protection of asylum seekers in situations of large-scale influx adopted by the same Executive Committee, including the U.S. representative, in October 1981.

Politically, interdiction at sea sets an example which could have far-reaching consequences, particularly because it is based on an arrangement with the country of origin. With the example of the U.S. and Haiti, who could now object to an interdiction arrangement between Sweden and Poland by which Poles would be prevented from crossing the Baltic Sea? Fortunately Sweden is unlikely to indulge in such a practice. And who could object to an interdiction arrangement between Indonesia and Vietnam?

Another restrictive practice is the detention of aliens after arrival. This is common to the U.S. and other asylum countries, although the length and other modalities of detention vary greatly. It should be recalled that detention as a penal measure is prohibited by Article 31 of the *Convention*, which expressly permits illegal entry. Administrative detention is permissible under the UN agreement. If, however, "administrative" detention should merely be verbal subterfuge for a kind of penal detention, on account of its modalities and duration, it would be incompatible with both the letter and the spirit of the *Convention*.

Restrictive practices can also be applied in the procedures for granting asylum or for determining refugee status. To determine that a person does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted on account of his religion, for example, would be difficult in cases where there is a systematic and violent persecution of a specific religious community—for example, of the Baha'i in Iran—involving destruction of religious buildings and physical elimination of people. But the determination is more subjective where some kind of religious activity is tolerated, though not welcome; where places of worship are not systematically destroyed, but only on occasion; and where members of the community are harassed in a sporadic though persistent manner, but are not physically eliminated.

In 1959, thousands of Tibetans like these in Nepal fled to neighboring countries.

There is, therefore, considerable opportunity for states to be restrictive in their determinations for all cases where the fear of being persecuted is not clear and obvious. Individual elements can play a decisive role in each single case—the speaking capacity, intelligence, let alone appearance of the asylum seeker; the training, intelligence, and (in)human approach of the interviewer. However, one should not neglect the overall approach—understanding or restrictive—of the authorities concerned.

According to prevailing international theory, " . . . [I]t is hardly possible for a refugee to 'prove' every part of his case and, indeed, if this were a requirement, the majority of refugees would not be recognized. It is therefore frequently necessary to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt." The quotation is from the *Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of*

Refugees, prepared and issued by UNHCR at the request of its Executive Committee, following a U.S. initiative. Despite this international principle, the doubt is considered in many cases to be a negative element and leads more often than not to negative determination of refugee status and to refusal of asylum.

• • •

We should perhaps examine one or two problems in interpreting the definition of the term "refugee" which may be of special relevance to the prevailing international context. One problem is the interference of economic motives with the fear of persecution.

Economic oppression, not only through active measures against an individual or a group but also if it should proceed from a policy of neglect, is considered a serious violation of human rights. Freedom from hunger, the right to work, and the right to an adequate standard of living are specific rights, formally recognized by the *International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights*. If economic oppression or deprivation takes place, or may be legitimately feared on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, it would qualify the person concerned for refugee status according to the *Convention*, as well as the U.S. definition.

Economic oppression and deprivation are unfortunately rife the world over. In a number of countries, they affect the population as a whole or its overwhelming majority (often with the exception of the privileged old or new class at the top and possibly of a more or less significant buffer group—the middle and lower middle classes—in between). In such cases, economic oppression and deprivation are not related to any of the five bases of persecution specified by the general definition and would not qualify the oppressed and deprived for refugee status.

In countries which are more stratified socially or in societies segmented through ethnic or religious cleavage, economic oppression and deprivation may strike a specific group—whether through active measures or resulting from a policy of neglect. In such circumstances, any member of that group may individually qualify for refugee status, particularly if the economic oppression and deprivation are tantamount to destitution or otherwise of a serious nature.

Attention should also be given to economic oppression and deprivation not as a major cause of refugee status but as one of the "cumulative grounds" which would qualify one for such status. If a person has left (or does not wish to return to) his country for religious or political reasons, but in addition feels discriminated against in the economic field, the case should be considered in its totality, and the request for recognition of refugee status cannot be discarded because economic motives are involved.

• • •

Another matter of interpretation is refusal of military service or, rather, sanctions or fear of sanctions for refusal of military service as a constitutive element of refugee status. This question has been elaborated upon extensively in the *Handbook*. Without repeating this long analysis, one may quote:

> *Where . . . the type of military action, with which an individual does not wish to be associated, is condemned by the international community as contrary to basic rules of human conduct, punishment for desertion or draft evasion could, in the light of all other requirements of the definition, in itself be regarded as persecution. (Para. 171)*

At the same time as the *Handbook* was drafted, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on the "Status of persons refusing service in military or police forces used to enforce apartheid." The operative paragraphs of this resolution read as follows:

> *The General Assembly . . .*
> *1) Recognizes the right of all persons to refuse service in military or police forces which are used to enforce apartheid;*

2) Calls upon Member States to grant asylum or safe transit to another State, in the spirit of the Declaration on Territorial Asylum, *to persons compelled to leave their country of nationality solely because of a conscientious objection to assisting in the enforcement of apartheid through service in military or police forces;*

3) Urges Member States to consider favorably the granting to such persons of all the rights and benefits accorded to refugees under existing legal instruments;

4) Calls upon appropriate United Nations bodies, including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies, and nongovernmental organizations, to provide all necessary assistance to such persons.

It is also worth mentioning that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has adopted a "Recommendation on the right of conscientious objection to military service" in October 1977.

On the basis of available material, we may conclude that the right of conscientious objection is considered in a large number of democratic countries, albeit not in all, a fundamental human right. Further, a broad perception in democratic countries is that there is considerable difference between military service by consent, instituted according to democratic legislative process and called upon to defend the way of life of a democratic society, on the one hand, and on the other hand, military service in a dictatorial or quasi-dictatorial regime called upon to defend institutions and policies unrelated to accepted human rights standards or, even worse, utilized for internal or external aggression. Finally, the right to refuse military service on account of its illegitimate political purpose—specifically when the forces are used to enforce apartheid—is formally acknowleged by the UN General Assembly; such refusal qualifies an individual for the grant of asylum and refugee status.

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It is not easy to assess why asylum countries have admitted refugees in an increasingly restrictive manner in recent years. First of all, this restrictive attitude is not universal: there are quite a number of countries in Africa and Asia which continue to open their frontiers rather generously to new refugees. The reticent, let alone negative, attitude characterizes the industrial countries (including the U.S.), Southeast Asia, Central America, and a few countries in other areas.

The current explanation is that there are today too many asylum seekers/refugees, and that the international institutions and current international legal instruments were not meant to deal with such large numbers. This is inter alia the basis for endeavors to deal within the UN framework with resolutions on "Human rights and mass exoduses"and on "International cooperation to avert new flows of refugees."

It is not easy to assess why asylum countries have admitted refugees in an increasingly restrictive manner in recent years. The current explanation is that there are today too many asylum seekers/ refugees and that the international institutions and current legal instruments were not meant to deal with such large numbers. The facts are, however, that all contemporary movements of any significance have been massive movements.

The facts are, however, that all contemporary refugee movements of any significance have been massive movements: for example, Armenians from the Ottoman Empire (1915); Russians and others from the USSR (1918); Jews and others from Germany and Austria (1933); and Spanish Republicans (1939). It is precisely the occurrence of these situations which led to the establishment of the institutions of international protection and assistance—the High Commissioner of the League of Nations for Refugees (1921) and the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (1938)—and to the conclusion of the first international legal instruments relating to refugees—the arrangements and conventions of 1922, 1924, 1926, 1928, 1933, 1936 and 1938.

A parallel series of developments can be witnessed after World War II. Refugees from Central and Eastern Europe (1945 to the present); Palestine (1948 to the present); Algeria (1954-1962); Hungary (1956); Rwanda (1959-1970s); Cuba (1959 to the present); Haiti (1960s to the present); Angola (1961-1970s); Sudan (1965-1972); Ethiopia (Eritrea 1967 to the present); Ogaden and Tigray (1970s to the present); Czechoslovakia (1968); Cambodia (1970 to the present); Philippines (1970s to the present); East Pakistan/Bangladesh (1971); Burundi (1972 and thereafter); Vietnam (1975 to the present); Laos (1975 to the present); Burma (1978); El Salvador (1979 to the present); Afghanistan (1979 to the present); Chad (1980-1982); and Uganda (1981 to the present); to quote only the major refugee flows which come to mind, all pertain to the mass exodus category. It is also these situations which prompted the international community to establish or expand the post-war institutions—the International Refugee Organization, UNHCR, UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees, and the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration; and to conclude the post-war international legal instruments—the 1951 *Convention* and the 1967 *Protocol*, the OAU *Convention* of 1969, and others.

The estimated 10 million refugees the world over (of whom probably 7 million are still in need of permanent solutions) is a large number, frightening if we realize that it results from so many infringements of fundamental rights and freedoms. Relatively speaking it is not larger, however, than the 3 to 4 million refugees of the early twenties, all concentrated in the Northern Hemisphere, at a time when the population of the world numbered about one-third of its present figure and when the standards of living were considerably lower than they are in the early eighties.

Admittedly, a special situation prevails in traditional immigration countries—the U.S., but also Australia and Canada. These countries largely have accepted refugees through "third country resettlement" procedures. The fact that, on account of the crises in the Caribbean and other Latin American countries (and of the Southeast Asia crisis, as far as Australia is concerned), the traditional resettlement countries have been confronted directly with unsolic-

ited asylum seekers right on their doorstep has undoubtedly created a perception of a new worldwide phenomenon of mass exodus. But asylum seekers are only a tiny fraction of the total number of today's legal and illegal immigrants. The numbers alone, therefore, are not conclusive justification of such a restrictive behaviour.

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The reasons for the restrictive attitude of a number of asylum countries should probably be related to the difficulty of providing solutions to refugee crises: local solutions in the country of arrival are not feasible or are increasingly difficult to achieve on account of unemployment, underemployment, lack of arable land, ethnic incompatibilities, national and international security considerations, or any combination of these factors. "Regional" solutions also are not feasible or are difficult for similar reasons. Furthermore, the rapid succession of new crises requires an increasing amount of funds to tackle even the emergency phase, since the previous crisis often is not solved when the next one occurs, and since the emergency phase lingers on in the absence of readily available durable solutions.

Awareness of these objective difficulties is compounded by a psychological factor, by the fear that large-scale influxes will continue to occur due to the collapse of peaceful coexistence among nations at least at the regional level. An increasing number of refugee situations are caused by conflicts between nations or by internal conflicts exacerbated by foreign intervention, as, for example, the refugee situations of Cambodia, Laos, Afghanistan, and Chad. It may also be feared legitimately that further massive refugee situations will result from the evident difficulty experienced in many nations to control or contain internal tensions (whether fanned from the outside or not) due to economic, social, ethnic, and political factors within an overall context of demographic pressure: such would be the case of Ethiopia, the Philippines, Vietnam, or El Salvador, for example.

The influx of boatloads of Vietnamese refugees into Thailand in 1979 created an international asylum crisis.
U.S. NAVY PHOTOGRAPH

These are the negative aspects of international refugee developments. In fact, with one or two exceptions (notably the Palestinian refugee problem), refugee situations of the past as well as present refugee crises have been and continue to be solved through voluntary repatriation, local integration, and third country resettlement.

One wonders finally, then, whether the restrictive attitudes of some nations today should not be ascribed to a kind of collective psycho-historical fatigue, rather than to new hard facts. The subject deserves to be analyzed further.

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As a result of developments which started in the late fifties and may be perceived still today, the international system of protection and assistance no longer concerns only refugees as defined by the *Convention* and *Protocol* (or the Statute of UNHCR, or the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act), but also displaced persons who are outside their own country on account of some kind of man-made disaster.

The internationally acknowledged description of these "externally displaced persons" is to be found in the OAU *Convention* governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa of September 1969. The OAU agreed on a dual definition of the term "refugee:" the definition of the 1967 *Protocol* and a wider concept—

> *The term "refugee" shall apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality. (Art. I.2)*

While technically only valid in those African states which have ratified or acceded to the Organization of African Unity *Convention*, this dual definition is applied in practice in many parts of the world. A number of UN General Assembly resolutions have for all practical purposes enlarged the scope of UNHCR to include these displaced persons.

The trend perceptible in the U.S. and elsewhere to view the concept of "refugee" represented by the *Convention* and *Protocol* as too broad is in sharp contrast, then, to the universal trend of extending the refugee concept to include displaced persons. This extension has been made in order to enable the international community to deal more effectively with the problems of today in their real scope and dimensions.

Indeed, there is no doubt that the existing major refugee situations in Africa and Asia, and to some extent also in Central America and the Caribbean, could not be dealt with adequately within the restrictive framework of the definition contained in the *Convention* and *Protocol*. The wider concept of "refugees and displaced persons" provides the international community with a sound and safe basis to tackle these problems. Otherwise, many of today's refugees would remain as regards protection and assistance in a kind of helpless and dangerous twilight which could only further increase local, regional, and international tensions.

Determining Refugee Status: Towards a Coherent Policy

Robert P. DeVecchi

The passage of the Refugee Act of 1980 was hailed as a significant and positive step towards articulating a comprehensive, coherent, and generous national refugee policy. In particular, the legislation provided the means to assist those refugees deemed to be of special humanitarian concern to the U.S., including their resettlement—if necessary—in this country.

One of the most significant aspects of the Refugee Act of 1980 was the inclusion in the legislation of a specific article indicating who might be considered a refugee in the eyes of the U.S. For the first time in our history, language was adopted which defined a refugee, no matter where that person came from. This definition (which is now contained in Sec. 101(A)42 of the Immigration and Nationality Act) conforms largely to, although in some respects is more generous than, the definition contained in the United Nations convention of 1951—*Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees*—and the 1967 protocol to it.

This certainly appeared to be a marked improvement over the previously used definition, which had evolved from, and reflected the problems of, the cold war and continuing instability in the Middle East: that definition, by and large, limited the status of "refugee" to persons who had fled communist countries or certain areas of the Middle East.

The key words in the language as contained in Sec. 101(A)42 are as follows:

The term refugee means . . . any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality . . . and who is unable ***or*** *unwilling to return to . . . that country because of persecution* ***or*** *a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . .*" (emphasis added).

It is especially significant that the U.S. definition of a refugee specifically uses the connective "*or*" in two critical places, rather than what would be a more restrictive connective, "*and.*" This is of importance in the continuing debate as to whether or not in adopting this definition of a refugee the intent of Congress was to enable this country to act with compassion or to restrict our ability to act.

The way the definition now stands, an applicant should be granted refugee status if that person is determined to be *either*:

(1) unwilling *or* unable to return because of persecution. (Note: This usually refers to past persecution, prior to flight);

or

(2) Unwilling *or* unable to return because of a well-founded fear of persecution (Note: This usually refers to the future; what, based on the applicant's story and other significant information known to the interviewer, would befall the applicant if he were returned—willingly or unwillingly—to his country of origin.)

The essential and overriding fact is that a refugee need not meet *both* criteria.

This does not mean, of course, that the U.S. is bound by law to accept for resettlement any and all who successfully meet this definition. Freedom of choice is clearly incorporated in the Act. The U.S. reserves the right to accept for resettlement only those it deems to be of special humanitarian concern. In other words, there is no inconsistency in our saying that a particular person is indeed a refugee, but not entitled to resettlement in this country merely because



of it. He or she must fall within accepted criteria, priorities, or guidelines as being of special humanitarian concern. Even then, this country is not required to admit all of special humanitarian concern within the limits set forth.

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The Refugee Act established an annual "normal flow" of 50,000 refugees for admission to the U.S., with any numbers in addition to this to be agreed upon in consultation between the executive and legislative branches of government. This Act was signed during a period of intense refugee activity, especially involving the outflow of refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. It was generally assumed that the "normal flow" figure would be insufficient at least for the near future. With this in mind, the administration developed a new series of "priorities" delineating which Indochinese refugee applicants for resettlement in this country would be of special humanitarian concern and

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in what order of priority. These replaced a category system which had been in effect since 1977. The priorities adopted stressed, as had the earlier categories, not only those who in one way or another had been closely associated with the former regimes in their home countries and the U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, but also those with relatives already admitted to this country—that is, cases of family reunion and unaccompanied children.

The basic procedures which have applied to Indochinese refugees since 1977 have followed the same general pattern.

Before 1980, Indochinese might be presumed eligible for refugee status. These Vietnamese were among the 36,000 in Pulau Bidong camp in Malaysia in 1979. UNHCR

An overall annual ceiling figure is agreed to, on a fiscal-year basis, through consultations involving the executive and legislative branches. Refugees in first asylum countries who wish to be considered for admission to the U.S. are interviewed by U.S. embassy refugee officers and voluntary agency staff specially contracted for that purpose. Those who meet one of the priorities of the U.S. and whose eligibility has been verified are then presented to an official of the Immigration and Naturalization Service for final approval.

Until the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, this last step primarily involved having an INS inspector determine whether or not the applicant was excludable from admission to this country under existing law. However, with the passage of the 1980 Act, INS instituted an additional step in the process—that is, the applicant had to satisfy the INS inspector that he or she was indeed a bona fide refugee, as defined in Sec. 101(A)42 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In other words, an applicant could meet one or more of the program priorities established by the U.S. government and not be excludable under any provision of the law, but could be determined not to be a refugee and, therefore, disqualified for resettlement in the U.S. INS claimed it was no longer possible to confer "categorical eligibility" as refugees on all those Indochinese who had fled their homelands and were in refugee camps. Rather, each case had to be determined on its own merits, regardless of whether or not the applicant qualified under one of the priorities for admission established by the U.S. government.

The import of what seemed to be, at first blush, a minor modification of existing policy, or even a liberalization of it, was sudden, unexpected, and devastating. In early 1981, INS officers in Southeast Asia began to institute a case-by-case determination on whether or not an applicant met, in their view, the definition of a refugee as contained in Sec. 101(A)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. It should be noted that the Refugee Act of 1980 does not specifically require or even mandate such review. But, by the spring of 1981, it had become accepted practice in the processing posts of Southeast Asia.

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Thus began a bitter and protracted dispute involving refugee policy—a dispute which is still unresolved today. There are elements of traditional inter-service rivalries (the State Department versus the Justice Department and INS); the ability of an administration to enforce policy decisions (the White House condemning Vietnam for its internal oppression and occupation of Cambodia versus INS saying persons from these countries were not refugees at all and could return to their homelands without fear of persecution); and reducing a program by indirect administrative manipulation (the U.S. ceiling figure for admission of Indochinese refugees for FY 83 is 64,000. In mid-fiscal year, it was estimated that no more than 35,000 would actually come). The list could go on, but suffice to say those who have suffered the most and for whom these esoteric debates and struggles are matters of life and death are the refugees themselves, who have neither voice nor power.

By the spring of 1981, the number of applicants being rejected as not meeting the definition of a refugee was rising to alarming proportions. The term "economic migrant" became the latest buzz word to characterize those who "failed" the test. The irony of the use of that term to anyone familiar with its use by the Nazis in the 1930s was, alas, overlooked by those who would not or could not remember the past.

The policy cleavage became increasingly wide in the field —especially between State Department refugee officers and INS inspectors. It became clear that a strong hand from Washington was needed. Following high level consultations between Justice and State, an exchange of letters

took place in which the administration agreed in principle to suspend the case-by-case determination process and return to a policy of presumptive eligibility at least through the end of FY 81 (September 30, 1981). At the same time, most all the cases in the field that had been rejected or deferred pending resolution of the policy questions were reviewed and accepted for admission as refugees to the U.S.

In a determined effort to resolve this issue once and for all, the secretary of state, in consultation with the attorney general, established a special refugee advisory panel which was mandated to carry out an evaluation of the refugee situation in Southeast Asia as well as to review all aspects of the U.S. program, including the processing of refugee applicants.

Among the many findings contained in the panel's report, submitted in the fall of 1981, are several observations and recommendations on the issues surrounding the application of Sec. 101(A)(42) and the definition of who is and who is not a refugee. They merit quotation in full.

The panel is of the view that, as far as the Indochinese refugees are concerned, it is proper to maintain the current presumption that all those who have fled to date and are available for resettlement are refugees within the meaning of the Refugee Act. Accordingly, subjective intent on the part of any individual refugee now in a camp and available for resettlement need not be determined by the Immigration and Naturalization Service as a precondition for entry to the U.S. This presumption, however, must be periodically reviewed to determine its continued validity.

The panel is of the belief that most people fleeing from Vietnam are unwilling to return, and they would face persecution on the stated grounds were they to do so. Moreover, they are unable to return as Vietnam will not accept them back. They are, therefore, entitled to refugee status. The same conclusion was reached as to the Hmong people of the Laotian highlands. The panel was less certain of the validity of this conclusion as to lowlanders and to many fleeing severe economic conditions in Cambodia. It believes the presumption as to these two latter groups should be reviewed after empirical data are available as to the impact of humane deterrent policies now in force in Thailand.

ASEAN countries of first asylum, largely in response to requests of the U.S. and other third countries, have been granting asylum to people fleeing from communist Indochina without attempting to distinguish between those who were primarily motivated by political factors and those primarily motivated by economic or "pull" factors. The ASEAN countries have done this in large part because they have assumed that countries of resettlement like the U.S. would continue to operate on the presumption that all granted first asylum had refugee status. Thus, any reversal of U.S. screening procedures on that key point would not only be regarded as an act of bad faith, but it might result in upsetting the progress which countries of first asylum are hopeful of achieving in reducing refugee flows through measures of humane deterrence.

In any event, the panel believes the State Department is the proper U.S. government agency to determine the prevailing political situation in the nation of origin of the refugees, and to review the same from time to time; its conclusions as to presumption of refugee status should be binding on INS. When the presumption of refugee status is not reached, INS must then review each refugee on a case-by-case basis, and its conclusions shall be final in these cases. If an individual is refused refugee status, he should in no case be forcefully repatriated. Arrangements for voluntary repatriation must be in place between UNHCR and the countries of origin, or some other holding operation be established.

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As has been noted previously, however, the agreement to suspend case-by-case determination of refugee status and to continue operating on the basis of presumptive eligibility was to last only through the end of FY 81. In the consultation held in the fall of 1981 between the executive and legislative branches of government to establish refugee admissions ceilings for FY 82, a tacit agreement was reached whereby case-by-case review would once again be instituted in 1982.

This decision was confirmed when, on February 26, 1982, "Revised INS Processing Guidelines for Indochinese Refugees" were transmitted to the field by State Department telegram. Included in these guidelines were a legal opinion of the Refugee Act of 1980 prepared by the assistant attorney general, Office of Legal Counsel, and a letter dated September 8, 1981, from the attorney general to the acting commissioner of INS. These revised guidelines reaffirmed that "final determination as to refugee status and definition compliance as well as overall inadmissibility is to be made by the attorney general through his delegates in INS."

The revised processing guidelines stated that determinations of refugee status "are to be made on a case-by-case

basis." At the same time, it was recognized that in case-by-case processing there was room for considerable discretion "in the means by which determinations are made." For example, "commonly known circumstances can be applied to people falling within particular groups." If it was established that a particular country persecuted all persons with particular political views, it would not be necessary to prove the fact in each case, provided the individual was part of the group and had a well-founded fear of persecution.

It was recognized that political persecution could take "the form of economic reprisals, such as denying individuals the opportunity to work." If a country treats illegal departure as "a political act and punishes that act in a harsh and oppressive manner," the person could be considered a refugee. If a person were to be "persecuted, as opposed to legitimately prosecuted, upon return for the act of leaving his country," the guidelines state, "he would still qualify as a refugee, notwithstanding the fact that he left for economic reasons."

These Cambodian children live in the Nong Samet encampment, formed when Thailand closed its border. Camp residents receive international relief but have no access to resettlement in third countries. DAVID MORTON WORLD FOOD PROGRAM

The guidelines specifically charged INS inspectors in the field to be familiar with the UN *Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status.* This handbook goes into detail on the subject of how to determine well-founded fear of persecution and, while it is not conclusively binding on U.S. officers, is as authoritative a piece as exists on the subject.

INS was also charged in the revised guidelines with according "substantial weight" to the views of the Department of State, in particular the annual country reports on conditions in the countries of Southeast Asia.

Finally, it is important to recall the words of the attorney general in his letter to the acting commissioner of INS regarding case-by-case determinations. The words are: "Although the Act (Refugee Act of 1980) does not in terms prescribe case-by-case determinations, individual interviews *would seem the most appropriate way* to determine whether a fear of persecution is well-founded" (emphasis added). Thus, there was and is no legal requirement or mandate for case-by-case determination.

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In any event, INS began once again to implement a case-by-case determination of refugee status in Southeast Asia in the spring of 1982, with the introduction of the new processing guidelines. The results again were devastating, both as regards articulation by the U.S. of a coherent, rational refugee policy to countries of first asylum and resettlement, and determination in a decent, humane way the fate of thousands of innocent persons. The rates of rejection of otherwise qualified applicants under Sec. 101(A)42 have varied from post to post, week to week, and INS office to INS office to such a degree as to make a mockery of the policies of the administration, the intent of Congress, and the will of the American people.

Nowhere was this tragic situation more glaringly apparent than in the fall 1982 processing of some 21,000 Cambodian refugees in Thailand who otherwise qualified under the priority system for admission to this country. All had been in refugee camps in Thailand, some for as long as three years. All had professed, for one reason or another, fear of and unwillingness to return to Cambodia, occupied by 180,000 Vietnamese troops and under a puppet communist regime imposed by Hanoi. All had suffered under Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge. The Cambodian authorities had repeatedly thwarted UN efforts to establish a secure voluntary repatriation program. In short, these refugees could not go back even if they wanted to, which they most decidedly did not.

In spite of these objective conditions, the number of applicants who were rejected as not meeting the definition of a refugee grew to startling proportions—over 50 percent of the applicants for many weeks. Terms like "economic migrant" were used to describe anyone who said he had left Cambodia in 1979 because he was starving to death. "Intending immigrant" was the phrase invented to describe a survivor of Pol Pot who found his or her only living relatives in the U.S. and wanted to join them to rebuild their shattered lives. Of the applicant who had seen his family killed before his eyes by the soldiers of Pol Pot, INS interviewers found "persecution suffered under the previous regime was not germane."

Such people were not refugees in the eyes of the United States of America. "What are we, then," was their plea—to which there was and is no decent answer.

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In late fall of 1982, a delegation of high ranking INS officers from Washington visited Thailand in preparation for a trip by the attorney general. The Cambodian refugee processing crisis was high on the list of problems, and from this visit, two significant events took place.

First of all, a detail of 15 INS officers was assembled in Washington and dispatched to Thailand to expedite the processing of applicants. Secondly, a series of instructions was issued by the INS Central Office to officers in the field

responsible for interviewing applicants. These rank among the most eloquent, sensible, decent, and clear instructions ever issued by a bureaucracy, public or private.

The key cable in this series was entitled "Standards for Determination of Well-founded Fear of Persecution." It poses an impeccable test for determining whether or not a person should be considered a refugee under Sec. 101(A)42. In sum, it asks the rhetorical question, "Would I want to go back if what the applicant says is true?" It goes on to say that if the interviewer would feel uncomfortable in sending the person back, then the doubt about an applicant's eligibility for refugee status should be resolved in favor of the applicant.

Thanks to the work of the enhanced INS team and the guidelines provided to them, a major catastrophe was averted. Even so, more than 8,000 of the 21,000 Cambodians under consideration remained rejected as not being refugees in the eyes of the U.S. government. Most have been returned to their original camp, where they face at best uncertain futures.

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This situation has not been unique to Cambodian refugees. During 1982, the number of Vietnamese boat people in first asylum countries being rejected as not meeting the definition of a refugee began to be more and more noticeable, especially in Hong Kong. In early 1982, some 20 percent of the applicants there were being rejected. By the end of the year, the rate had gone to 60 percent. In this regard, it should be recalled that the only applications presented to INS were those which qualified for the U.S. program under its own priority system. The rapid growth of the "rejection rate" reflected not on any substantive change in the "quality" of the refugee cases being presented as much as on a subjective change in attitude on the part of the interviewing officers.

By the spring of 1983, the situation had improved somewhat. There are efforts being made to achieve greater consistency in application of Sec. 101(A)42 and to adhere to the spirit of the INS guidelines whereby the benefit of doubt is accorded the applicant. The State Department's *Country Reports on Human Rights in the Countries of Southeast Asia for 1982* once again stress that, for example, those who are caught in the act of flight from Vietnam are subject to execution for organizers or from three to 15 years at hard labor. If Vietnam persecutes would-be escapees in this manner, what would it do to persons who succeeded in fleeing and were returned against their will? Likewise, the *Country Reports* make clear that the Vietnamese-imposed regime in Cambodia views with deep suspicion those with relatives in third countries. Recent border incidents involving heavy ground fighting and the flight of thousands of "free Khmer" border settlers into Thailand make increasingly academic and remote any prospects of a safe, orderly, and verifiable repatriation program.

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It is evident, however, that more than two and a half years since the passage of the Refugee Act, application of the section concerned with the definition of a refugee—101(A)42—continues to pose a vexing problem.

To some, it should be seen as a generous, expansive, and enabling piece of legislation, permitting an administration to respond flexibly and with compassion to refugee crises. To others, it should be a means whereby refugee admissions can be limited and controlled, through the rigid, subjective application of a type of "refugee means test."

It is evident that more than two and a half years since the passage of the Refugee Act, application of the section concerned with the definition of a refugee continues to pose a vexing problem. To some, it should be seen as a generous, expansive, and enabling piece of legislation. To others, it should be a means whereby refugee admissions can be limited and controlled, through the rigid, subjective application of a type of "refugee means test."

However one interprets it, it is clear, at least as far as its application in Southeast Asia, that Sec. 101(A)42 is a powerful weapon and, as such, one that needs to be applied with judiciousness and care. The most hopeful development has been the INS guidelines developed in late 1982. If applied, they could serve as a model of how Sec. 101(A)42 was intended to be used. They alone, however, will not suffice. There must be closer monitoring of the administration of refugee programs to eliminate inequities and arbitrary decisions wherever possible. There must be a review or appeal procedure whereby decisions can be re-examined and, as appropriate, overturned. Lastly, there must be the political will and strength on the part of whatever administration is in power to reconcile policy differences between the Departments of State and Justice. Conceivably, such responsibility should devolve on the Office of the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs.

Unless and until these competing factions are harnessed, the U.S. will continue to present to the world a refugee policy in disarray. To countries of first asylum we say, "We reserve the right to brand many to whom you have opened your doors as not being refugees." What message does that convey? To our partners in resettlement, we say, "Do more, take more," but then we reject many whose closest relatives are in our land. Why should other nations do more? Why should they take those we have rejected? To the refugees, we say that yesterday's victims of communist brutality are today's economic migrants. "Go back home," we say, "to your communist country. You have no reason to fear the regime we denounce."

Until these contradictions are resolved, the U.S. will not have articulated a decent, coherent refugee policy in which all Americans can take pride.

Repatriation: A Troubled, Favored Solution

Joseph Cerquone

The desire of exiles to return home is a deeply rooted one. Evidence of the wish for repatriation exists in documents as old as the Bible, where passages refer to people fearing death in the "wilderness" of their refuge and speaking of the attraction of going home.

In modern times, repatriation has achieved institutional prominence as well. When it is undertaken voluntarily, it is considered the most favored "durable solution" to refugee problems worldwide, notably by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, but by nations as well.

As a solution to refugee situations, repatriation has occurred to a considerable degree. Since 1975, for example, some two million refugees, the majority in Africa, have returned of their own choosing to their homelands.

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The predominance of Africa as a setting for repatriation can be attributed to two factors: first, the continent often has had most of the world's refugees; secondly, the factors that led some of those refugees to leave their homelands have been eradicated. In several instances, refugees returned home en masse to new nations after struggles for independence from colonial rule had been waged successfully.

A recent example of repatriation in this form is found in Zimbabwe, formerly White-ruled Rhodesia. Over a one-and-one-half year period that ended in 1981, about 250,000 refugees went home to resume their lives. Transport to Zimbabwe and care until their war-torn country was restored was provided to many by the international community.

These repatriates to Zaire in 1979 were temporarily housed in a transit center at Dilolo, Zaire. UNHCR

Post-colonial Africa, however, has been marked by prolonged periods of instability and struggles that have not been clear-cut. Broadly speaking, African has fought African, and the resolutions to their differences have seemed, if not unattainable, at least distant. Aware of these conditions, many African refugees have chosen to remain in exile, and the prospects of massive repatriation have diminished in recent years.

To compensate for the decline of repatriation in Africa, some national and international agencies have suggested projects to tide over refugees in asylum countries. Others continue to call for attacks on the "root causes" of refugee flows, saying that this is necessary if the flows are ever going to end.

In the middle of the quest for solutions is UNHCR, promulgating repatriation, but noting how hard it is to carry out. "Voluntary repatriation is usually . . . difficult to achieve since it presupposes that the root cause (of refugee flows) . . . has been resolved," Kallu Kalumiya, a UNHCR legal advisor and protection officer, told attendees at a 1981 conference on African refugee questions sponsored by a Detroit, Michigan, foundation. Resolving those causes, UNHCR adds, is up to the world community, not an international organization such as itself.

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To be sure, repatriation does occur spontaneously in Africa. Thousands of refugees, for example, returned to Zimbabwe unaided by international institutions. However, the number of such returns is difficult to estimate compared to those that have taken place under formal programs coordinated by UNHCR.

That agency has assisted in repatriations in Africa—in Algeria in 1962, and later in Angola, Guinea Bissau, and Mozambique, to name a few—for two basic reasons. Its statute, adopted by the UN General Assembly over 30 years ago, upholds voluntary repatriation as the primary solution to refugee problems. Also, conditions in ravaged home countries have often been poor enough to discourage potential returnees, and repatriation without UNHCR's help would be difficult.

UNHCR has assisted in several ways. It has raised funds and coordinated giving by nations for repatriation programs; it has also served as a channel through which arrangements are made to determine that repatriations are indeed voluntary and that refugees are provided with the means to return home and to survive and be safe once they are there.

According to High Commissioner Poul Hartling, UNHCR's experience in repatriation programs has helped to identify factors conducive to refugees' returning to their homes. For example, Hartling told the UNHCR Executive Committee in 1980 that refugees must be adequately in-

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formed about conditions in their homelands, and, as UNHCR is not in a position to guarantee the safety of returnees, assurances should be provided by home countries that returning citizens will not be harmed.

African nations themselves have also affirmed voluntary repatriation as a solution to refugee situations. The Organization of African Unity Refugee Convention of 1969 outlines guidelines for implementing repatriations, including provisions that countries of origin should grant returnees the rights and privileges of citizens; that repatriates should not be penalized for having fled; that formal appeals should be made for returnees through a home country's media, as well as OAU; and that refugees should be given assistance in resuming their lives by their home government as well as by the international community. Later conferences, notably one in Tanzania in 1979, have seconded resolutions such as these.

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The international assistance African nations have called for through OAU was necessary in Zimbabwe. Basic facilities there had been damaged, and large portions of rural land, where most of the population had lived, were destroyed. Livestock had died and remaining animals were diseased, and farm production, after two seasons of drought, was diminished. The destruction of schools was so extensive that even after the conflict in Zimbabwe ended, children remained in Zambia and Mozambique temporarily in order to receive their education.

In late 1979, Zimbabwe asked UNHCR to coordinate a $140 million program that would allow for the return of refugees and provide them with sustenance until the next major harvest could be reaped in April 1981.

Returnees to Chad arrive at N'Djamena in 1981. UNHCR

The UNHCR programs undertook to transport refugees home and to provide them with basic necessities: materials for shelter, utensils, and implements and seed for farming. Additionally, care was provided to orphans and the handicapped, and efforts were begun in agricultural training and land and water development.

There were other components of the repatriation effort. For example, bilaterally funded programs addressed the restoration of health facilities, roads, and water systems, as well as the repair of over 200 primary schools.

Today, the repatriation of refugees to Zimbabwe is considered a success: a way was found to bring a large number of people back home, care for them, and help them reestablish their lives. The process was aided by the eagerness of the refugees. "People wanted to return home," a Zimbabwean official commented. "There was the excitement of building a new nation. People were interested in participating (in the building)."

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Since that program was concluded, there have been other organized repatriations in Africa. During a five-month period that ended in February 1982, 150,000 persons—most of whom were living in Cameroon—made their way back to Chad. Many of the needs were the same as in Zimbabwe, though on a smaller scale, and again UNHCR assisted.

Yet, there were differences between the two countries' experiences. Zimbabweans had fought for "majority rule." In Chad, the conflict which spurred the refugees' departure had been between northerners and southerners of an independent country, and though the fighting ended in Chad, the uncertainty of the refugees over conditions at home did not. Reportedly, some people remained in Cameroon, for example, waiting for conditions in their homeland to stabilize. The eagerness that characterized the Zimbabwe experience was absent. An amnesty, issued in July 1981 by the Chadian government, was needed to reassure refugees.

Observers contend that refugees' uncertainty about conditions in their homeland may become a barrier common to future repatriation efforts, as political instability in African nations, rather than struggles for independence, provoke refugee flows.

"Refugees can return after the defeat of a colonial power, but there are few instances of that left (in Africa)," Barry Stein of the Refugee Policy Group in Washington, D.C., states.

Disagreement, if not uncertainty, is part of discussions about conditions in Ethiopia. Ethiopian authorities, who have achieved a poor human rights record since attaining power in a 1974 Marxist revolution, according to the U.S. State Department, ask for would-be repatriates' trust; meanwhile, various Ethiopian sources outside the country are suspicious about the treatment refugees receive upon their return home. Indeed, despite an amnesty for the hundreds of thousands of refugees who have fled to Somalia and other asylum countries, and the establishment of a formal, UNHCR-assisted repatriation program, few refugees have gone back to Ethiopia.

According to representatives at the Ethiopian embassy in Washington, D.C., the low numbers are the result of a "campaign" by an assortment of refugee advocates who have discredited reports of improved conditions in Ethiopia. Embassy spokesman Tanene Eshete said that the campaign is ill-advised. "There is no reason to mistrust us," Eshete asserted. As an example of his government's good intentions, he noted that people who are considered by the government to have committed crimes against the state have come under the amnesty issued by Ethiopia.

But such assessments are not shared by everyone. According to Professor Bereket Habte Selassie of Howard University, author of *Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa*, there is no reason to believe that conditions in Ethiopia have improved and are attractive to would-be returnees when refugees continue to leave Ethiopia in sizable numbers. Selassie's view is seconded by Osman Ali, editor of the journal *Horn of Africa*.

"The main reason there is a problem with repatriation (in Ethiopia) is that there is nothing to protect the people," Ali charged. "The constitution has been suspended. It is legal for there to be instability and torture." Other factors also discourage repatriation, Ali noted. Under post-revolution land reform, Ethiopians are being assigned to land refugees have left, and returnees are being directed to sites other than their former homes.

According to embassy spokesman Eshete, this redistribution of the population will continue, as land reform is a basic goal of the revolution. "People can use land, but they can no longer own it," the spokesman said. "All land now belongs to the Ethiopian people. If refugees don't return because of the redistribution, they'll never return. (Refugees' interest in having their land returned) is an impossible demand." He noted that his government has established orientation centers for returnees where briefings are held on the reforms brought by the revolution.

Rhodesians repatriated to Zimbabwe in 1981 build new housing. UNHCR

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The modest results of the repatriation program in Ethiopia have contributed to some re-directing of efforts to achieve solutions to refugee problems in Africa. Already, for example, the U.S. is funding self-sufficiency programs for refugees from Ethiopia in Somalia; it is hoped that such efforts will provide refugees the wherewithal to care for themselves during extended periods in exile.

Supporters of self-sufficiency programs say the approach is practical.

"Whether people are going to repatriate is a lesser issue than whether their needs are being met," according to Joseph Kennedy, director of Africare, a private, nonprofit development agency. While Kennedy believes that repatriation is a "viable concept," he noted that organizations

such as Africare "have come down on the side of self-sufficiency" projects in countries of asylum because the need for them is so great.

Others maintain that repatriation would be feasible and solutions such as self-sufficiency projects in first asylum countries unnecessary if the causes of refugee problems were addressed.

"The cold, hard truth is that the refugee is a product of politics," *Horn of Africa* noted two years ago. And, according to the journal, the political causes behind refugee flows are not being addressed, largely because African nations use international aid to further non-humanitarian causes and because donor countries "find in the relief crisis a fertile ground for gaining influence" over regions such as the Horn. According to the publication, the result is "a chaotic and even self-defeating effort to ameliorate the human calamity, with the refugees and the displaced the obvious losers. . . ."

Repatriation has been suggested as a solution for Ethiopians like these, now living in a shanty at Dar el Naem in Sudan.
UNHCR

Horn of Africa notes the "weakness" of the UN as contributing to refugee problems, a reference, perhaps, to the agency's lack of involvement and influence in politics. Still, such criticism appears not to change UNHCR's perception of its role.

"The UNHCR (neither can nor should) try to tackle any of the so-called 'root causes' of refugee problems," High Commissioner Hartling told the UNHCR Executive Committee in October 1982. Hartling said that as a humanitarian organization, UNHCR "has to remain outside of any political fight" in order to be effective.

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As time goes on, large-scale repatriations in Africa may be missed sorely. Instability in Africa is expected to increase, not only because of regional political turmoil, but also because of world economic conditions. While it was technically not a refugee situation, the forced exodus of illegal immigrants from Nigeria in February 1983 illustrates the fragility of developing nations and their susceptibility to the detrimental effects of large migratory flows. Should economic conditions worsen, will one of the safety valves of African refugee flows—the traditional welcome asylum countries have extended refugees—be closed off?

The conventional view is that there have been no involuntary repatriations in Africa. However there are reports that Djibouti harassed and began to force back Ethiopian refugees to Ethiopia last year. The State Department and UNHCR acknowledge one incident of forced repatriation, yet both agencies say that it involved a small number of refugees who were mistakenly rounded up by Djibouti authorities in a sweep of suspected illegal immigrants.

UNHCR and voluntary agencies are in agreement that the best "durable" solution for a refugee community is to enable it to return to its country of origin, when the cause of the original exodus no longer exists. It is for this work that UNHCR has received funds from a range of donors to embark on pilot schemes to enable refugees to return voluntarily from Somalia and Sudan to Ethiopia. Reports from a wide variety of sources indicate that only a very small percentage of the refugees have returned so far.

The recent relaxation in Addis Ababa and the end of major fighting in the Ogaden has led governments to believe that it may be an appropriate time to develop a repatriation program for refugees to return from Djibouti to Ethiopia.

Consequently a tripartite commission was set up involving UNHCR and the Djibouti and Ethiopian governments and held its first meeting January 31 to February 1, 1983, to discuss a voluntary repatriation program. There was some secrecy surrounding this commission: UNHCR staff were discouraged from talking to refugees about it, and the official report on the meeting was not released until March. By then La Nation, *the Djibouti paper, had launched a vitriolic attack on economic refugees suggesting that they were about to be returned to Ethiopia, and Ethiopian and Somali radio broadcasts confirmed this. Reuters issued an incorrect report suggesting that the repatriation program was to begin in 15 days (this was the target date for planning the food that would be required for such a program), and there was considerable fear induced among the refugees and alarm raised internationally.*

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The tripartite commission's agreement appears to be reasonable, emphasizing the voluntary nature of any repatriation and proposing ways of implementing it.

However, refugees in the camps in Djibouti argue that it is flawed in "the assessment by the governments of Ethiopia and Djibouti that the condition which previously led to the exodus of the refugees is no more present and that the safety of the returnees is assured once they are in their country of origin."

Among the wide range of refugees that I met, not one stated that he wished to return to Ethiopia, while many expressed great anger at this suggestion. The reasons for not wishing to return were varied: memories of the savage fighting in their homeland and the loss of relatives; fear of reprisals locally, whatever the policy of central government; land reform and property confiscation in Ethiopia; previous

Djibouti is mentioned in a completely different context with regard to repatriation. In early 1983, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and UNHCR forged an agreement under which an unspecified number of refugees could be voluntarily repatriated. Details of the program were expected to be worked out during an April meeting in Addis Ababa among the three participants.

If the program does get underway and proves successful by any measure, there is no guarantee that it or any other repatriation program undertaken in Africa will be the final chapter in a nation's refugee history. For example, tensions in Zimbabwe increased early in 1983, as President Robert Mugabe and opposition leader Josuah Nkomo were at odds. Whether disruptions there become strong enough to produce refugees once again remains to be seen.

However, though lack of guarantees and complexities are part of repatriation in Africa, there is solace to be drawn. If the longing of the refugee for home lies on familiar ground —the human heart—so, too, does the answer to refugee flows.

As the first UN high commissioner, G.J. van Heuven Goedhard, said over 25 years ago, "The only true solution is world peace." In 1983, it would seem, the hope for achieving that peace cannot be pinned squarely on voluntary repatriation, self-sufficiency projects, the UNHCR, or African governments, but, instead, on each one of us.

Repatriation to Ethiopia Considered

droughts and the current famine in Wollo; conscription of their children into the army to fight in Ogaden or Eritrea; and the continuing conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia.

Apparently in the census of 1982, 200 families indicated that they might be prepared to return. This is a very small proportion of the refugee population, and there have been no recent efforts to determine if any of these 200 families still wish to return.

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The tripartite commission met again in Addis Ababa on April 15-16, 1983, to consider the voluntary repatriation program. In its report, it "noted with regret and rejected categorically a certain campaign of systematic distortion of facts regarding the efforts deployed by the two governments and UNHCR to seek durable solutions to the problems of refugees in Djibouti . . . " and among other points "noted with satisfaction that both UNHCR and non-governmental organizations have free access to the returnees and their settlements." The UNHCR report continued:

> *Members of the commission agreed that various means of information would be put in action as soon as possible. These means include the production of written or audio-visual information, the utilization of radio and television communications, visits to refugee camps by Ethiopian officials and traditional leaders from the areas of origin of the refugees. Representatives of groups of refugees who have expressed an intention to repatriate may also be authorized prior to their final departure to visit the sites where they will be settled.*
>
> *The government of Djibouti and UNHCR will jointly register Ethiopian refugees who have, of their own free will, decided to return to their country of origin. Registration forms will be completed for each head of family and single adults. Returnees will be issued identity cards certifying their eligibility for assistance under the program. This registration process will start without delay.*

However, as the details of the assistance program have not been agreed yet, it will not be possible to disseminate good information on the program to refugees without some considerable delay.

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Voluntary repatriation programs are difficult to implement even in the most favorable circumstances. When there has been a decisive event, such as a change of government, they become possible but are fraught with complexities. It is crucial that neither direct nor indirect pressure is put on refugees and that confidence and trust are established over a substantial period of time. This has not happened in Djibouti where refugees have been harassed and are, at present, unwilling to return to Ethiopia.

Returning refugees recognize that it is only their own government that may be able to offer them protection, and it is false to pretend that it is otherwise. If international attention is focused on an area, if independent observers are present, and if a government is sensitive to international opinion, a government may be influenced over the protection it offers its own citizens. Nevertheless, a government is sovereign within its own borders.

The current plans for a repatriation program should be reviewed. The program should not commence until the following recommendations are implemented and the program is redesigned:

(1) The commissaires should be instructed to cooperate in every way with UNHCR and there should be a presence of senior UNHCR protection staff in Dikhil and Ali Sabieh camps.

(2) Rations should be guaranteed to refugees and the main services should be linked to the health and education facilities in the refugee camps. US AID, World Food Program, UNHCR and other donors should review their food aid plans for 1983-84 to ensure that it meets the needs of the actual refugee population.

(3) Independent parties (e.g., voluntary agencies working in Djibouti) must give advice on voluntary repatriation and refugees and voluntary agency staff should have the opportunity to visit the areas of possible resettlement. Refugees should be carefully consulted at every stage and their views should be taken into account in planning or halting any proposed program.

(4) Returnees should be exempt from military service for a period of time.

When these recommendations are implemented, a long-term voluntary repatriation program could be developed by providing assistance for reconstruction of towns such as Aysha and to enable refugees to become self-sufficient. Funds should be sought to train health workers and teachers from among the refugees to assist returnees and the local population.

The Djibouti authorities should allow individually registered refugees, with bona fide refugee cards, to remain in Djibouti and seek employment.

Alan D. J. Phillips
British Refugee Council
May 1983

Palestinian Refugees: Defining The Humanitarian Problem

Howard Adelman

There are two distinct, though related, problems concerning Palestinians. The first is a conflict for sovereignty between Jews and Arabs over one area: which group will or should control all or parts of a territory and its residents? The second is a refugee problem. A series of displacements of Palestinians has resulted from the 1947-8 and 1967 wars between Israel and her Arab neighbors, Jordan's civil war in September 1970, and the struggles among Christians, Moslems, and Druze, Palestinians, Lebanese, Syrians, and Israelis in Lebanon from 1975 to 1982. Those uprooted by this 35-year-old struggle need a place where they can plant roots and where they can be citizens of a state which will assume responsibility for their protection.

Palestinian children at Ein-Hilweh camp, Lebanon, walk rubble-filled streets. UNRWA

None of the solutions of the sovereignty problem will necessarily solve the refugee problem, although some will likely be more beneficial than others. At the same time, resolution or lack of resolution of the refugee problem will have an impact on the sovereignty dispute and prospects for peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors.

Without in any way detracting from sovereignty as the central problem for Palestinians at present, this paper focuses on the refugee issue. Who are the Palestinian refugees? How many are there? What is their condition? What role has the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) played? Is it feasible to address the Palestinian refugee problem independently of the issues of sovereignty?

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The United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees (the predecessor of UNRWA) gave the following definition of a Palestinian refugee eligible for relief: "A person normally resident in Palestine who has lost his home and his livelihood as a result of the hostilities and who is in need." UNRWA subsequently referred simply to those "eligible for relief" and amended the definition to require a minimum of two year's residence in Palestine prior to the outbreak of conflict in 1948. A further amendment included the children of such persons as well.

This is a welfare definition of people in need and is

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inadequate to define legally and politically any refugee, let alone a Palestinian refugee. It encompasses Jews who fled the West Bank as well as Arab residents from the border villages in the West Bank and Gaza who were not uprooted, but who lost land, homes, or jobs.

A good part of the dispute over the number of Palestinian refugees displaced by the 1947-8 war stems from this overbroad definition. There were also difficulties in obtaining reliable counts, due to such factors as illiteracy and fraud to obtain extra aid, including passing infants from family to family and non-registration of deaths. False declarations were also made; deception was easy since there was no way to distinguish refugees from the indigenous population of many of the areas to which they fled.

Since the status of many Palestinians has altered two or even three or four times following the 1947-8 war—as a consequence of the 1967 Six Day War and as a result of the defeat of the Palestine Liberation Organization by Jordan in 1970, by Syria in 1975-6, and by Israel in 1982 in Lebanon—the application of the term refugee becomes even more complicated.

Furthermore, there are different uses of the term "Palestinian" itself. In 1947, a Palestinian was any resident of the British mandate territory, whether Christian, Muslim, Jew, or Druze. There were Samaritans, Armenians, and Greek Orthodox residents who were not Arabs and certainly not Jewish. In current usage, a Palestinian is someone who is ethnically an Arab, thereby excluding Jews, Armenians, and others, even though the Palestinian refugees of 1947-8 referred to Jews and other non-Arabs. Further, this ethnic Arab Palestinian group now defines itself as a distinctive national group, so that "Palestinian" has come to mean the particular nationality of a segment of Arabs indigenous to the territory which made up the British mandate territory. Thus defined, they include Bedouin who are or were residents or descendants of residents of the old British mandate of Palestine.

We will have to clarify the definition of refugee, adopt a reasonably reliable method of calculating numbers, and employ both in tracing the distribution of the Palestinian refugees over time, taking into consideration the shifts in meaning and reference of the term Palestinian over the period.

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We shall use a political and not a welfare definition. Refugees are uprooted people who lack the protection that a state grants its citizens or those eligible to apply for citizenship. The status of an individual as a refugee ends when that individual establishes new roots and acquires the citizenship of a state which accepts primary responsibility for his protection.

The definition provided by the UN *Convention* and its subsequent *Protocol* requires that a refugee be outside his homeland. It further specifies that the cause of the uprootedness must be a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Our definition does not restrict the cause of uprootedness to the narrower grounds of persecution. Further, it includes those uprooted from one part of their homeland to another part (i.e., in-homeland refugees) where they become stateless (as in the Gaza Strip) or where the state of which they are citizens is not in a position to guarantee their protection (as in the West Bank after 1967).

To be a refugee under this definition, therefore, one must be both uprooted *and* lack a state which provides protection. When Arab Palestinians outside their homeland have become citizens of a state which provides for their protection, they cease to be refugees, although they do not cease

TABLE 1
Distribution of Non-Jewish Palestinians—1948

Ex-homeland Arab Palestinian Refugees			
In Lebanon	84,000		
Syria	69,000		
Jordan-East Bank	84,000		
Iraq	5,000		
		242,000	
In-homeland Arab Palestinian Refugees			
West Bank	261,000[1]		
Gaza Strip	167,000[2]		
		428,000	
Total for future projections			*670,000*
Other Arab Palestinian Refugees			
Returnees to Israel	42,000		
Indigenous Uprooted	1,500		
		43,500	
Total Arab Palestinian Refugees Produced by the 1947-8 War			*713,500*
Non-Arab, Non-Jewish Palestinian Refugees		18,000	
Total Non-Jewish Palestinian Refugees			*731,500*
Non-Refugee, Non-Jewish Palestinians			
In Israel	128,500		
West Bank—indigenous	460,000[1]		
Gaza Strip—indigenous	80,000		
		668,500	
Total Non-Jewish Palestinians in 1948		1,400,000	

Notes to Table 1

[1] cf. "Palestinian Immigration and Israeli Land Expropriation in the Occupied Territories," *Journal of Palestine Studies* (III, 1) 1973, p. 110.

[2] The 6,000 who arrived in Egypt in the Kantara camp near the Suez Canal were transferred to the Gaza Strip and are included in the Gaza totals.

TABLE 2

Distribution of Arab Palestinians—May 1967

Status	Place	Population Projected from 1950	Documented Population	Estimated Migration
Ex-homeland Refugees	Lebanon	132,000	126,000	6,000
	Syria	133,000	130,000	3,000
	Iraq	10,000	9,000	1,000
In-homeland Refugees	Gaza Strip	322,000	227,000	95,000
Total Refugees		597,000	492,000	105,000
Stateless Citizens	Gaza Strip—indigenous	154,000	149,000	5,000
	Lebanon	30,000	30,000	
	Israel	332,000	301,000[1]	31,000
	Jordan			
	West Bank			
	former refugees	504,000	249,000[2]	255,000
	indigenous	868,000	642,000[2]	246,000
Total Estimated Migration				642,000
Residents of Other Countries	East Bank	162,000 (former refugees)	530,000	368,000
	U.S., Latin America, Europe		22,000	
	Libya		4,500	
	Kuwait		125,000	
	Saudi Arabia		18,000	213,000
	Other Gulf States		13,500	
	Egypt		30,000	
		2,667,000	2,606,000	581,000
Unaccounted for			61,000	61,000
Total Estimated Migration			2,667,000	642,000

Notes to Table 2

(1) Israeli figures list 306,000 non-Jews, but some of these are not Arabs. The estimated number of Arab Israelis, 301,000, includes Christians, Druze, and Muslims.

(2) These figures total 891,000. The U.S. mission to Amman provided a figure of 930,000 West Bank residents, but this figure includes non-Arabs. The extrapolations from the Nov. 18, 1961, census yield a figure of 975,000 West Bank residents. This suggests 45,000 residents migrated from the West Bank between 1961 and 1967. Israelis suggest a figure of only 800,000 (M. Nisan, "The Palestinian Features of Jordan" in *Judea, Samaria and Gaza*, ed. by D. Elazar.)

to be Palestinians, nor do they necessarily cease to have national political aspirations.

There are thus three basic types of Palestinian refugees: ex-homeland (those now in Lebanon, for example); in-homeland stateless (those in Gaza, part of historical Palestine); and in-homeland state refugees (those in the West Bank after 1967 who were originally uprooted from Israel and who carry Jordanian citizenship). These three types do not include Arab Palestinians who are stateless indigenous residents of the Gaza Strip who were never uprooted, nor citizens of Jordan indigenous to the occupied West Bank even though Jordan cannot provide them legal protection, because they also were never uprooted. We also do not include one small group of Arab Palestinian refugees displaced within their homeland in the 1947-8 war, but who remained and became citizens of Israel (thereby ending their refugee status): the 950 Maronite residents of Kafr Bir'im and the 500 Greek Catholic residents of Iqrit on the Israeli-Lebanese border.

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In 1950, UNRWA listed 957,000 registered refugees. In the analysis that follows, we will use our political definition of refugees, and will conclude that by 1950 there were 310,000 Arab Palestinian refugees.

Everyone agrees, including UNRWA, that the 957,000 figure is overstated, but the actual number of Palestinians, in particular, Arab Palestinians, displaced by the 1947-8 war is much debated. Figures used by partisan groups have ranged from a low of 550,000 to a high of 950,000. The only method by which an accurate count may be obtained, we suggest, is through the use of census tract figures.

Even here, disputes are possible. The key discrepancy, however, is between the figure provided by the Israeli Bureau of Statistics in 1949 of 626,000; a figure of 770,000 provided by Janet Abu-Lughod, a demographer openly identified with the Palestinian cause; and a figure in between of 710,000, provided by the Israeli scholar Rony Gabbay in his monumental 1959 study, *A Political Study of the Arab-Jewish Conflict: An Arab Refugee Problem.*

The discrepancy between Abu-Lughod and Gabbay can be easily explained: Abu-Lughod includes in her figure 42,000 Arab Palestinians who returned to Israel in 1949-50 following the armistice agreement and approximately 18,000 non-Arab, non-Jewish Palestinian refugees. Setting aside these numbers, the resultant figure of 710,000 Arab Palestinian refugees who did not return to Israel coincides with that of Gabbay.

The discrepancy between the 710,000 figure and the 1949

Israeli census tract figure comes about because of differences of opinion concerning the proportion of refugees in the population of the West Bank who became Jordanian citizens. The Israeli report suggests the number to be 217,000; Abu-Lughod/Gabbay would place it at 301,000. The *Statistical Abstracts of Jordan* for 1948 suggests a figure midway between these two—261,000 in-homeland Arab Palestinian refugees on the West Bank in 1948. Further confirmation of this figure may be provided by still another source, *The Journal of Palestine Studies* (III, I) Autumn 1973. It reports 280,000 refugees in the West Bank in 1948; the difference of 19,000 between the Jordanian abstracts figure and the Palestinian journal figure may be almost fully explained by the approximate number of non-Arab, non-Jewish Palestinian refugees used by Abu-Lughod. Therefore, we use the Jordanian figure of 261,000 Arab Palestinian refugees in the West Bank. This yields a total population figure of 670,000 Arab Palestinian refugees in 1948 who did not return to Israel.

The next question is where the refugees went after the 1948 conflict. Here, most sources abandon systematic methods and revert to UNRWA figures which they admit are unreliable. We will apply UNRWA *proportions* to our own figure of 670,000. The result is 242,000 ex-homeland Arab Palestinian refugees of whom 84,000 were in Lebanon, 69,000 in Syria, 84,000 on the Jordan East Bank, and 5,000 in Iraq; as well as 428,000 in-homeland Arab Palestinian refugees, of whom 261,000 were on the West Bank and 167,000 in the Gaza Strip (see Table 1).

Virtually all of the 18,000 non-Arab, non-Jewish Pal-

TABLE 3

Distribution of Arab Palestinians—December 1967

(assumes no increase since May 1967)

			Population Shifts			
Status	**Place**	**Population[1]**	**Internal Migration**	**West Bank to Other Countries**	**Gaza to Other Countries**	**Totals**
Ex-homeland Refugees	Lebanon	126,000		60,000		186,000
	Syria	130,000		10,000		140,000
	Iraq	9,000		12,000		21,000
In-homeland Refugees	Gaza Strip					
outside camps		58,000				
inside camps		149,000				207,000[2,3]
Migrants	Gulf States, Egypt, Libya and abroad	213,000		34,000	20,000	267,000
Stateless Indigenous	Gaza Strip	149,000				149,000[2,3]
Lebanese Citizens		30,000				30,000
Jordanian Citizens	East Bank	530,000				
former East Bank refugees (162,000)						
former West Bank refugees (60,000)			102,000			
former West Bank indigenous (308,000)			8,000			640,000
Excluding Jerusalem	West Bank					
indigenous - outside camps		489,000				
- inside camps		9,000				
East Jerusalem						
indigenous		53,000				
former refugees		13,000				
Former Refugees	West Bank					
outside camps		63,000				
inside camps		48,000				675,000[3]
Israeli Citizens		301,000				301,000[3]
Others in Israel or the Occupied Territories		51,000				51,000[3]
		2,421,000	110,000[4]	116,000[4]	20,000[3]	2,667,000

Notes to Table 3

(1) Population remaining of the May 1967 population, less migration.

(2) *Israeli Digest* records 356,000 refugees and residents in Gaza according to the 1967 Israeli census. See also Appendix IV, Oesterreicher, Msgr. John M. and Anne Sinai, eds., *Jerusalem*, New York: John Day, 1974.

(3) Our total Arab Palestinian population of the West Bank, Gaza and Israel is 1,383,000 (356,000 + 301,000 + 675,000 + 51,000). Israeli abstracts record 1,385,000 non-Jews registered after the war in Israel and the occupied territories. Our figures, though apparently lower, are in fact higher since Israeli figures include non-Arabs. The discrepancy is to be found in the figure of 61,000, now reduced to 51,000, most of whom are nomadic Bedouin. This remaining discrepancy may be a result of overestimating the population growth based on birth rate. Further, since individuals not only left but also returned, some discrepancy is to be expected.

(4) UNRWA records indicate a total flight of 255,000 Arab Palestinians, 230,000 from the West Bank and 25,000 from Gaza. Our figures indicate 226,000 left the West Bank and 20,000 left Gaza.

TABLE 4
Distribution of Arab Palestinians—1970

Place	1970 (Pre-Jordan Civil War)					1970 (Post-Jordan Civil War)						
	Refugees	Stateless Migrants	Occupied	Citizens	Total	Refugees Ex-Isr.	Ex-Jor.	Stateless Migrants	Occupied	Citizens	Total	+ −
Lebanon	207,000[1]			33,000	240,000	207,000	50,000			33,000	290,000	+ 50,000
Syria	155,000				155,000	155,000	32,000				187,000	+ 32,000
Iraq	24,000				24,000	16,000					16,000	− 8,000
Migrants[2]		146,000		94,000	240,000			154,000		112,000	266,000	+ 26,000
Israel				340,000	340,000					340,000	340,000	
Jordan												
East Bank (Ex-Ref.)				360,000	710,000[3]					285,000	610,000	−100,000
Ex-West Bank				350,000						325,000		
West Bank			620,000						620,000			
Jerusalem			50,000		670,000				50,000		670,000	0
Gaza			364,000		364,000				364,000		364,000	0
Totals	386,000	146,000	1,034,000	1,177,000	2,743,000	378,000	82,000	154,000	1,034,000	1,095,000	2,743,000	0

Notes to Table 4

[1] "There are now 17 Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon with a population, as estimated by camp leaders and others on the spot, of totals of 140,000 to 150,000. The Lebanese Survey and UNRWA statistics give totals of 106,440 and 96,000 respectively in 1971." "According to the Lebanese survey, 11,500 Lebanese, of whom 5,500 come from southern Lebanon and 3,300 Syrians are living in Palestinian camps." The source is Sirhan, Bassen, "Palestinian Refugee Camp Life in Lebanon," *Journal of Palestine Studies* (IV, 2) Winter 1975. This means that only about 50,000 to 60,000 were left in the camps prior to the refugees fleeing from Jordan to Lebanon.

[2] **Migrants:**

To	Pre-1970	Post-1970	+ −
U.S.	7,000	25,000	+18,000
Libya	5,000	5,000	
Gulf States	15,000	15,000	
Saudi Arabia	20,000	20,000	
Egypt	33,000	33,000	
Kuwait	140,000	148,000	+ 8,000
Latin Amer. & Europe	20,000	20,000	
Totals	240,000	266,000	+26,000

[3] This represents a net figure. Between 1967 and 1970, an estimated 30,000 ex-West Bankers moved back to the West Bank occupied by Israel at the same time other West Bankers left the occupied territories.

For support of these figures, cf. Nabil A. Badran, "Arabic Census of the Palestinian People toward the End of 1969." *Education and Modernization in Palestine*, 1918-1948, Part I, Palestine Monograph No. 63. See also, Badran, *The General Picture of the Present State of Palestine Education*, Beirut: PLOPC, 197, p. 2 and Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, "Educating a Community in Exile," *Journal of Palestine Studies* (II, 3) p. 97.

estinian refugees were resettled and became citizens of other countries. Jewish Palestinian refugees were absorbed by Israel.

What happened to the 670,000 Arab Palestinian refugees who did not go back to Israel after 1948? The 261,000 who went to the West Bank and the 84,000 who went to the East Bank became Jordanian citizens following Jordan's occupation of the West Bank in 1948 and its annexation in 1950. Of the 31,000 Christian Arab Palestinian refugees who fled to Lebanon, about half obtained Lebanese citizenship.

In sum, of 713,500 Arab Palestinian refugees produced by the 1947-8 war, 43,500 became citizens of Israel, 345,000 became citizens of Jordan, and 15,000 became citizens of Lebanon. This left 310,000 Arab Palestinian refugees without status. Over half of these (167,000) were still in their homeland in the Gaza Strip. The rest were divided between Lebanon and Syria, with 69,000 each; 5,000 others were in Iraq.

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The total Arab Palestinian population grew from 1,382,000 in 1948 to 2,667,000 just prior to the 1967 Six Day War as a result of a high birth rate. We project growth of the refugee population from 310,000 to almost 600,000, though the actual figure might be slightly less since a few of the refugees who emigrated, primarily from Gaza, became citizens of other countries.

Between 1950 and 1967, the major population shift occurred as a result of migration: almost 100,000 refugees and indigenous people moved from Gaza and 500,000 from the West Bank; three-quarters of the latter group moved to the East Bank (see Table 2).

As a result of the Six Day War, an additional quarter of a million Arab Palestinians migrated, primarily out of the West Bank (see Table 3); almost all of this new group of refugees carried Jordanian passports. But the major result of the war was a shift in focus from the refugee problem to the issue of sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza.

After the Jordanian civil war in 1970, an estimated 100,000 Arab Palestinians left Jordan—one-half to Lebanon, almost one-third to Syria, and the balance to the U.S. and Kuwait. The result was a third group of Arab Palestinian refugees, which, like the second group, carried Jordanian passports. The distribution of these refugees in 1970 is contained in Table 4.

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A series of conflicts involving Palestinians, Syrians, Israelis, and Lebanese affected the refugees in the 1970s. These culminated in a military operation by Israel in 1982, by which time the Palestinian population had grown to over four million individuals.

The distribution of Palestinian refugees in December 1982 is represented in Table 5. If we divide them between those who left in 1947-8 and those who left Jordan (the West

TABLE 5
Distribution of Arab Palestinians—December 1982

	Refugees			Non-Refugees			Totals	
Place	**Ex-homeland Ex-Israel**	**State-less**	**State Ex-Jordan**	**State-less**	**Indig-enous**	**Citizens or Resettled**	**Documented population**	**Projected from 1970[1]**
Lebanon								
homeless	40,000		20,000					
in camps	32,000		16,500					
settled	96,500		20,000			50,000	275,000	432,000
Syria								
in camps	46,000		15,000					
settled	143,000						204,000	278,000
Iraq	9,000		12,000				21,000	23,000
Migrants[2]						850,000	850,000	398,000
Jordan								
ex-refugees						500,000		
ex-West Bank						473,000	973,000	915,000
Israel						505,000	505,000	507,000
Jerusalem					68,000		68,000	74,000
West Bank								
ex-refugees							712,000	926,000
indigenous					712,000			
Gaza								
ex-refugees		217,000					457,000	542,000
indigenous				240,000				
Arrested or Under Arms				30,000			30,000	
Totals	366,500	217,000	83,500	270,000	780,000	2,378,000	4,095,000	4,095,000

Notes to Table 5

[1] Projections assume no migration.

[2] Differences between documented populations and projected populations are assumed to represent migrants as follows:

From Lebanon	157,000
Syria	74,000
Iraq	2,000
Israel	2,000
Jerusalem	6,000
Gaza	85,000
Total	**540,000**

Migrants to various countries are as follows (both documented and projected populations—which assumes no migration—are shown.)

	Documented	**Projected**
To Kuwait	320,000	221,000
Egypt	55,000	49,000
Libya	25,000	7,500
U.A.E.	210,000	23,000
Quatar		
Oman		
Saudi Arabia		30,000
Other Countries	240,000	67,500
Total	**850,000**	**398,000**

The difference between total documented and projected migrant populations above and the derivation of the figure 850,000 may be explained as follows:

Projections assuming no additional migration	398,000
Migrants	+540,000
Total	938,000
Returnees to Jordan	−58,000
Under Arms	−30,000
Documented Population	850,000

TABLE 6
Palestinian Refugees Worldwide—1982

	1947-8	**1967-70**	**Subtotal**	**Total**
Refugees				
Ex-homeland				
In Lebanon	168,500	56,500[1]		
Syria	189,000	15,000[1]		
Iraq	9,000	12,000[1]		
	366,500	83,500	450,000	
In-homeland				
In Gaza Strip (includes 1947-8 refugees and their offspring)			217,000	
Total Refugees				667,000
Migrants				
Palestinian refugees in the Gulf States, Egypt, and Libya who never held Jordanian passports[2]			199,000	
From Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq	115,000	38,000	153,000	
from Gaza			85,000	
Total Migrants				437,000
TOTAL				1,104,000

Notes to Table 6

[1] These carry Jordanian citizenship.

[2] Estimate at 50 percent of the population of migrants as of 1970 projected to 1982, i.e., 50 percent of 398,000 (see Table 5).

Bank) in 1967 and (the East Bank) in 1970, the breakdown is shown in Table 6.

The maximum number of Palestinian refugees of all types worldwide is calculated to be, therefore, about 1.1 million, of whom almost one million lack citizenship; 437,000 have resettled beyond the countries of first asylum; 217,000 remain within their homeland in the Gaza Strip; 366,500 of the 1947-8 refugees and 83,500 of the 1967-70 refugees who carry Jordanian citizenship remain in countries of first asylum—an estimated 109,500 of them are still living in camps in Lebanon and Syria, while 60,000 are homeless in Lebanon as a result of the 1982 conflict.

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Since 1945, the in-homeland stateless Palestinian refugees, who make up about half the population of Gaza, have been moving from poor camp housing to new housing projects or houses built by the refugees on land they purchased. In 1981, for example, 1,300 moved into new homes. Since there has been virtually full employment throughout the period, conditions now exist for the Palestinians to use their earnings to improve their own physical circumstances, in contrast to the early period of occupation of Gaza by Israel when most new housing for the refugees was constructed by Israeli housing authorities. Those remaining in the camps continue to live in crowded slum housing.

Though the Palestinian refugees in Gaza need not fear for their physical safety, small-scale demolition of houses (seven in 1981) and deportations from the Gaza Strip (fewer than ten per year since the 1973 war, most of whom were infiltrators) continue for "incitement or for security reasons." Between 1970 and 1982, about 30 percent of the stateless Gaza refugees opted for emigration as a way to find employment and to resolve their political status.

In the West Bank and Jerusalem, the situation is somewhat different since almost all of the refugees obtained Jordanian citizenship and, in the past 15 years, have emigrated to the East Bank, to Gulf States, or abroad. In effect, time has solved the refugee problem of the West Bank (though not the political situation of the indigenous population).

The overwhelming majority of ex-homeland Arab Palestinian refugees who have not resettled in other Arab states or abroad are in Syria and Jordan. In Syria, it is estimated that 25 percent still live in camps, though the camps, in effect, have become slum housing for Palestinians and poor Syrians. Emigration from and resettlement out of camps within Syria is underway and should resolve the physical problems of the Palestinian refugees, though, again, not their political status.

Palestinian refugees clear rubble from Ein el Helweh camp, Lebanon, under the UNRWA self-help repair program, fall 1982. UNRWA

It is the condition of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon that is acute. Though there is no shortage of food or emergency supplies, 60,000 were left homeless as a result of the conflict in the summer of 1982. After their camp homes were destroyed, they took shelter in apartment garages, store fronts, unfurnished apartment buildings, or shelters they built from scrap. In south Lebanon, the camp grounds have been cleared of debris, an infrastructure of water and sanitary facilities is under construction, and the erection of new concrete homes has begun; hospitals and schools that were destroyed will need to be rebuilt. The 12,000 refugees who fled to Lebanon's Beka'a Valley are reported to be living in poor conditions with inadequate resources.

The health situation, though very far from ideal, has not

deteriorated as badly as once feared. Paralytic polio and typhoid have not become epidemic; three cases and seven cases respectively were reported in August 1982. However, gastro-intestinal disorders continue to plague the homeless Palestinians, and health care problems of the refugees are exacerbated since Lebanese hospitals charge for treating Palestinians.

The problem of physical protection for the Palestinian refugees remains. In addition to the well-publicized Shatila and Sabra camp massacres, a series of assaults on Palestinian refugees by local Lebanese has occurred. In February 1983, UNRWA reported finding 15 bodies over a two-week period near Ein el Hilweh camp in Sidon. Other refugees have been intimidated. Threatening leaflets signed by a group calling itself "Lebanese Unité" have ordered Palestinians in Adloun, Sarafand, and other villages of the Zahrani district of Sidon to return to the camps.

In addition, an estimated 2,500 of the 5,000 Palestinians

detained by the Israelis were still in military camps in March 1983. It is unclear how many of them were involved in the conflict with Israel, but if any who were not involved remain, their continued detention encumbers the reconstruction of their lives and the lives of their families. Reportedly, still another 500 Palestinians were arrested in the Beirut area by the Gemayel government. The Red Cross only recently has been allowed to visit a small number of the detainees in Beirut.

Even more pressing than matters of shelter and health care of physical and legal protection is the problem of the permanent political status of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. At the time of this writing it appears that a reconciliation of Yasir Arafat and King Hussein might make it possible for the estimated 56,500 who were Jordanian citizens to be allowed to return to Jordan. Though even more problematic, it might be possible to convince Lebanese authorities to provide legal resident status for the estimated 96,500 who have settled into Lebanese life but who have not yet been allowed to become citizens, in return for a concerted effort to resettle abroad a large number of the remaining 72,000 homeless and camp refugees. An estimated one-third of these are already under Syrian protection, and consideration ought to be given to resettling them in that country.

If the traditional countries of resettlement would take in about 50,000 refugees, a profound impact could be made on the problem. Canada, for example, could take its usual 10 percent share of a refugee population in need and resettle 5,000 Palestinian refugees at a cost comparable to about two years of its annual contributions to UNRWA. The Palestinians could be restored to a productive life and future, as well as have the protection of a state.

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UNRWA is an educational, health, and welfare organization; it does not have a mandate to protect the refugees. Its efforts have been crucial to the improvement of health and the large advances in education of the Palestinians. Excluding the emergency funds raised for 1982, almost 60 percent of its over one-quarter billion dollar annual budget is spent on education; 16 percent on health; and 24 percent on relief services. In effect, the bulk of UNRWA funds is used by the Health, Welfare, and Education Ministries of the Jordanian government with respect to its citizens of Palestinian descent, and of the Israeli government for Palestinians and their descendants who once lived in what is now Israel. Over three-quarters of the UNRWA budget, then, subsidizes the health, welfare, and educational needs of citizens or working residents who live within the jurisdictions of these governments, which are very capable of caring for such individuals without such international aid.

In contrast to UNRWA, the UNHCR does have a mandate to provide protection to refugees, under its Article 10. Although UNHCR has a presence in Lebanon, heretofore it has not extended its mandate to include Palestinians because it does not see its responsibilities extending to populations covered by other UN agencies, in this case, UNRWA. Given the controversial nature of the Palestinian problem and the intercommunal conflicts within Lebanon, as well as its own scarce resources, it is unlikely that UNHCR will assume an active role. In terms of their need for protection, therefore, the Palestinians are in an abyss.

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A realistic assessment of the numbers of Palestinian refugees defined in a broad legal sense clearly indicates that the problem is manageable. When one focuses only on that portion of the refugees who are in very dire straits, the problem is not only manageable, it is soluble. For humanitarian reasons, for the physical safety of the individuals, for the stability of Lebanon, and for economic savings within a relatively short time, it is imperative that Western governments take initiatives to resettle a portion of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. This response addresses the needs of a very vulnerable population and, although the long-standing political problems will have to be addressed by other means, such a solution would benefit the refugees, save the funds of donor nations, and perhaps even make a small contribution to the problems of peace in the Middle East.

Refugees in Uganda and Rwanda: The Banyarwanda Tragedy

Roger P. Winter

Although advances in communications technology are widely heralded as evidence of progress by the world community, major events of dramatic impact continue to occur virtually unnoticed. In October 1982, tens of thousands of people in southwest Uganda were uprooted and forced to flee their homes. Their plight is little known by the public due to the isolation of the areas involved, but its causes are familiar scourges of mankind—greed, hatred among ethnic groups, hunger for power, and short-sighted politics.

In earlier times, the lines on maps demarcating the suzerainty of national governments in East Africa were of limited significance; such is not the case today, even where those boundaries bear little relation to peoples' patterns of habitation. Thus it is that people with common roots and often common language and culture can be found within the boundaries of several nation-states. Such is the case in the multinational area west and north of Lake Victoria.

The area of particular interest for this account is that near the border between northeast Rwanda and southwest Uganda, largely the Kigezi, Ankole, and Toro districts. The people of this account are often described as "of Rwandan origin;" although there are many distinguishable groups included in this description, the term "Banyarwanda" encompasses all the uprooted subjects of this report.

Many Banyarwanda have lived in what is now Uganda from colonial days. Many, and certainly their children, are Ugandan citizens under the provisions of that nation's constitution. Others came to Uganda in the early 1960s, when intergroup warfare in Rwanda caused thousands to flee. A large portion of these refugees, who were assisted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, lived in refugee settlements, at Nakivali, Oruchinga, and the Fort Portal area; some gradually integrated outside the settlements, often at the urging of the Ugandan government.

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Anti-Banyarwanda sentiment is not new in Uganda, although it has varied in intensity for decades. Ugandan leader Milton Obote ordered the registration of all Rwandan refugees in 1969, in what many believe was a first step towards their expulsion. The takeover of the Ugandan government by Idi Amin in 1972 precluded implementation of the expulsion. At least partially in reaction to Obote's actions, many Banyarwanda welcomed the arrival of Amin and identified with his government. After Amin's flight from the country in 1979, this identification provided a basis for some again to promote anti-Banyarwanda sentiment. Steps were taken by Obote and others to ensure the Banyarwanda, who are largely supporters of the moderate official opposition Democratic Party, were not allowed to vote in the elections of 1980. Notwithstanding allegations of impropriety, those elections resulted in the return of Obote to the presidency and control of the government by his party, the Uganda People's Congress (UPC).

More than 40,000 head of cattle belonging to refugees were in danger in the poor pastures of Northeastern Rwanda. UNHCR

Since that time, the anti-Banyarwanda sentiment of the UPC has been expressed quite openly. Some officials have blamed atrocities of the Amin regime on the Banyarwanda and have accused them of being in the forefront of illegal anti-government activities since the elections. (Most knowledgeable observers, however, dismiss these assertions as attempts to make scapegoats of the political opposition for the barely functioning economy and massive inflation.) The Banyarwanda's Catholicism is also a factor causing friction in their relations with the UPC.

By early 1982, it was obvious to close observers that a major action against the Banyarwanda by the UPC and its members in the government was imminent. In late spring, UNHCR's representative in Uganda's capital protested impending government action to force many Banyarwanda (whether refugees or not) into the refugee settlements established in the 1960s. This protest, apparently accompanied by pressure from other international sources, averted the confrontation. The threats and inflammatory rhetoric of the UPC and government officials continued, however.

Nevertheless, what happened next took many international observers, including UNHCR, by surprise.

In late September 1982, coincidentally just after release by Amnesty International of its report on human rights violations in Uganda, officials of the government and the

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UPC, including cabinet-level ministers and members of Parliament, signaled the initiation of a large-scale, centrally orchestrated displacement of Banyarwanda. Affected were those who had always lived in Uganda as well as refugees who had arrived in the sixties, citizens and non-citizens alike. Beginning on October 1, teams of local officials, members of the "youth wing" of the UPC, and special police attacked Banyarwanda homes. Mud walls were pushed in and corrugated metal roofs stolen, destroying the houses or rendering them uninhabitable. Even homes on the perimeter of the long-established refugee settlements were destroyed. Still today, the contrast between the lush Uganda countryside where many Banyarwanda resided and the devastation wreaked upon their homes is shocking.

Intimidation of the people, accompanied by beatings and a number of killings, precipitated large-scale displacement. By October 2, Banyarwanda were streaming from their homesites, some into the established refugee settlements and some across the border into Rwanda. Generally, they were unable to bring any belongings with them and local non-Banyarwanda inhabitants were prevented by the eviction teams from providing water or food to those in flight.

Most who entered Rwanda crossed a small bridge over a branch of the Kagera River connecting Merama Hill, Uganda, and Kakitumba, Rwanda. Caught largely unprepared, officials of Rwanda arranged for trucks to transport the refugees to hastily erected camps. Those who fled to the established refugee settlements within Uganda waited in fear for that government's next actions. By the beginning of November, the potential displacement was so large that Rwanda closed its border.

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In October, UNHCR appealed to the international community for financial assistance; the U.S. made a substantial contribution and the World Food Program responded with needed food stuffs. However, much credit for averting disaster is due to the fortunate presence of skilled voluntary agency personnel from Catholic Relief Services and Oxfam (U.K.) in Rwanda at the time of the crisis and the capable reaction of the Rwandan Red Cross, as well as the constructive response of the Rwandan government. Food and shelter were rapidly supplied, and two refugee camps were established to house the 44,000 refugees who crossed the border before it was closed. One at Mehega initially held approximately 13,000 cattle herders, along with 50,000 head of cattle. Another at Kanyinya initially held some 30,000 agriculturalists; it constituted the third largest "city" in Rwanda.

Preliminary reports indicated that 55 percent of the new arrivals were women, 45 percent men; 60 percent were under 16 years of age; 40 percent were adults, including 15 percent elderly.

The threat of measles, which caused the death of a substantial number of children between the ages of five and ten, was brought under control by various health authorities and Medicins sans Frontieres, a French voluntary medical service agency.

Enormous numbers of cattle died due to lack of forage, and beginning in late January, many of the herders at Mehega moved to the Lake Nasho area in the south with their remaining herds. The refugees at Kanyinya were moved to a tented camp at Kibondo. The numbers then remained relatively stable, although small numbers of refugees continued to move back and forth across the border at isolated points.

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A physical tragedy, then, was avoided, but the spiritual and legal tragedy remain. These thousands have lived in structured camp facilities for over half a year. They have lost their lands and possessions. The conditions under which the refugees live in Rwanda are crowded and difficult, and there is little constructive activity to occupy the months. Traditional family roles have been disrupted: women no longer have a hearth to maintain, and extended family relationships cannot be maintained in the regimented living situation. Most have been expelled from the only homeland they have ever known.

Rwanda's ability to maintain the refugees even in these marginal conditions is tenuous. A small country, it is the most populous in Africa on a person-space measure, and its ability to meet refugee needs from its own resources is limited. The environmental devastation wrought by refugees' cattle is substantial on land which regenerates exceedingly slowly. The nation's ethnic balance is delicate, and

the political problems created by the presence of this large refugee population is significant. Yet Rwanda is in some ways a captive in this situation: it is landlocked and largely dependent on transit through Uganda for a large portion of its imports and exports.

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Most of the 35,000 newly displaced Banyarwanda who remained in Uganda fled to existing refugee settlements and joined an equal number who had been in the settlements since the 1960s. Although the majority arrived in October and November, others in smaller numbers continued to arrive for months thereafter. Those at Merama Hill did not join a pre-existing settlement: they are encamped within several hundred yards of the bridge to Rwanda, having arrived at the border just after it was closed by Rwandan authorities. The numbers in each settlement as of early February 1983 were as follows:

	1982 Arrivals	*Existing Settlement*	*Total*
Nakivali	14,700	16,000	30,000
Oruchinga	11,200	7,000	18,200
Fort Portal area	4,500	12,000	16,500
Merama Hill	4,500	—	4,500
Total	34,900	35,000	69,900

UNHCR's representative in Uganda vigorously protested the displacement to government officials and received some international media attention. It was rumored he was to be ordered expelled by Ugandan authorities, but, in any event, his term of duty ended in February. The position remained vacant for several months at a critical time.

For the displaced Banyarwanda still in Uganda, life is quite difficult. The system of supply is weaker than it is for those now in Rwanda, although there is less regimentation to life in the Ugandan settlements. Physical deterioration of the land is substantial. The education of most children has been disrupted, a tragedy for many that may never be fully rectified.

However, the most notable of the settlements' characteristics is fear. As one expert on refugees in Africa noted in March, "I have never seen a group of refugees more afraid for their safety." Ugandan internal security police are routinely present in the settlements, and UPC officials hold key positions in settlement administration. The international presence is exceedingly limited: although there are personnel in Mbarara town, there are no representatives of UNHCR, UNICEF, or international voluntary agencies present on a full-time basis in the settlements, and no U.S. agency is represented. The most effective "outside" presence at the settlements is that of the Roman Catholic Society of Missionaries of Africa, also known as the White Fathers. Their constant helping presence was disrupted in early 1983, perhaps temporarily, because of difficulties with the government. Oxfam (U.K.) has provided medical assistance at Merama Hill.

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At the time the displacement began in October 1982, President Obote was out of the country. Upon his return, he issued public statements (characterized by some as being primarily for international consumption) calling for reinstitution of the rule of law in connection with treatment of Banyarwanda. However, actions taken by the government or which the government has failed to take cast doubt on the credibility of those statements. Official statements characterized the displacement as "a local misunderstanding which led to some fighting between a group of refugees and some of the indigenous inhabitants of the area. In the aftermath of the fighting, some refugees fled the area in fear. The government of Uganda acted swiftly to restore law and order in the area and ensure the security and welfare of refugees."

In fact, on-site observers, including this writer, confirm the absence of constructive actions by the Ugandan government. Official representatives of Rwanda and Uganda did meet at Gabiro, Rwanda, in late October and agreed to an initial plan to resolve the crisis. The agreement provided, in part, that the parties would expedite voluntary repatriation to Uganda from Rwanda of those who had crossed the border, that each government would undertake a census of the displaced within its territory, and that Uganda would examine the matter of compensation to those who had suffered financial and property loss. However, there was no noticeable follow-through on the part of Uganda. In actuality, a team appointed by the president traveled throughout southwest Uganda in a "mopping up" operation which resulted in additional displaced Banyarwanda fleeing to refugee settlements, particularly to those at Fort Portal. Government officials have openly discussed declaring some areas inhabited by Banyarwanda as new national parks in order to force further displacement of large groups.



The government has taken no steps to punish the evictors, even though they are well known, nor those who have taken possession of the land, homes, cattle, and other belongings of the displaced Banyarwanda. Nor has it moved to compensate the displaced for their losses. The conclusion of most observers, including myself, is that,

whether or not the president initiated the displacement, the government countenanced the harsh treatment of this group which is part of the political opposition.

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Uganda re-entered discussions with Rwanda and UNHCR at Kabale, Uganda, in early March 1983. That it did so may be due to constructive pressure from certain governments, particularly Western European; the international embarrassment caused to the Ugandan government by the divergence of its statements and actions; the very useful intervention of the UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Ceullar; and the facilitative efforts of UNHCR.

A joint communique issued on March 11 committed the two governments to certain actions intended to lead to a resolution of the Banyarwanda tragedy. In many respects, this agreement elaborates on the provisions of the one reached by the same parties five months earlier. It again provides for a census of the displaced remaining in Uganda and sets forth a framework for the two governments to decide who among the displaced will ultimately be accepted by the governments for settlement in each country. It, too, makes no reference to compensation by Uganda for those who have suffered material loss. Ominously, the agreement anticipates a category of aliens among the displaced "who are neither Rwandans, nor Ugandans, nor refugees."

The provisions of the agreement on balance seem to favor Uganda at Rwanda's expense, but, coupled with the announcement by Uganda on February 21, 1983, that it would provide additional land to relieve overcrowding in the current refugee settlements in Uganda, the agreement represents progress.

At this writing, future actions are uncertain for several reasons. Preeminent among them is the validity of President Obote's expressed desire to resolve the matter. Equally important is his ability to meet commitments: it is clear that major elements of the UPC have profited without penalty from the displacement; the situation will be infinitely more difficult to rectify than it would have been to prevent.

Warning signs were sufficient in 1982 that many close observers considered a major upheaval in this corner of Africa imminent. Vigorous action by UNHCR in May 1982 at least postponed it.

At the core of the question are both the interest in and machinery of the international community to prevent refugee tragedy, subjects beyond the scope of this record. My own conclusion, however, is that of all the refugee situations of recent years, this of the Banyarwanda was among the most preventable.

Activity now must focus on preventing long-term lack of resolution. This can best be achieved through continued worldwide public attention to the pace and equity of progress by the parties involved and specific pressure by agencies of the international community, particularly financial assistance agencies and donor governments. Tying future assistance to progress in resolving this matter, in some terms, will likely be the single most effective way of moving towards resolution, as it might have been towards prevention.



A temporary camp was erected in the Kagera National Park in northern Rwanda. UNHCR

Soviet Jewish Emigration: The Closing Gate

Abraham Karlikow

In the period September 1968 through the end of 1981, a total of 259,619 Jews were permitted to depart from the Soviet Union—not quite 12 percent of the Jewish population listed in that country's 1970 census.

Such movement was unprecedented in Soviet history. That it took place represented a radical shift in the official Soviet attitude toward Jewish emigration. It is clear from the figures since mid-1981, however, that the days of movement at such a scale are over. The Soviet government is closing the gates on Jewish migration.

When the Soviet Union does allow Jewish families to emigrate, it is usually for family reunification purposes. HIAS

Some comparative statistics tell the tale. In the 72 months from the founding of Israel in 1948 through the end of the Stalin era in 1953, a total of 18 Jews were permitted to exit. Between 1954 and 1964, the Khrushchev period, there were 2,418 departures, an average of 18 per month. From the early Brezhnev years up to the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict, there were 4,498 departures, or an average of 150 per month. A 15-month hiatus until September 1968 followed, and then came the beginnings of the Soviet shift that allowed over one-quarter of a million Jews to leave the USSR.

It was, curiously enough, a Soviet initiative that allowed the first trickle of movement: the Ministry of Interior office that deals with migration, the OVIR, approached Jews who previously had expressed interest in departure to ask if they still wished to leave. The trickle of exits was to increase, decrease, and then become a small torrent by 1979, the peak year of 51,320 departures. The numbers dropped steadily thereafter: in 1982, for example, the monthly average fell to 224; in January 1983, only 81 Jews exited.

Chart 1 presents the rise and fall in Soviet Jewish emigration over the past 17 years.

One can only speculate on the motivations leading the Soviet government to open and shut the gates to emigration. However, experience instructs that to understand the present Soviet attitude, one must examine the past. A combination of factors appears to have been at work, in varying levels of intensity, with consequences for overall policy. These factors include the general trend to liberalization or increased harshness inside the Soviet system itself, providing the framework for the drive demonstrated by Jews in the USSR to seek to emigrate; plus (and some consider this to be the dominant factor) the international situation as reflected in the degree of detente between East and West, and particularly between the USSR and the U.S.

Given the record, it appears that the Soviet authorities consider Jews in the USSR pawns and hostages to Soviet-U.S. relations, their freedom of movement to be traded off as needed for commerce or other advantage. The history of the Jackson-Vanik legislation, whereby the U.S. grants trade and other preferences as a function of human rights and emigration assurances, doubtless has reinforced this view. Perhaps coming into play in some Soviet thinking, too, is the belief that Jews "control" the U.S. government and its actions, a holdover from anti-Semitic concepts propagated by the czarist regime which is still rooted in the Russian psyche.

To all of this must be added the indubitable, if not very measurable, effects of a campaign by Israel and Jewish communities around the world, carried on since the mid-1950s, to bring the pressure of public opinion and of governments upon the USSR so that it would permit emigration. The most recent example is the March 1983 World Conference on Soviet Jews in Jerusalem, attended by well over 1,000 Jewish delegates from 32 countries and with substantial support from non-Jews.

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Even the briefest historical review leads one to appreciate why the impulse to leave is so powerful among Jews in the USSR. The October Revolution of 1917 that released Jews from their territorial ghettos under the czars promised equality and an end to anti-Semitism, but these were not fulfilled. Jews in the USSR got little help and even saw their neighbors look on with some satisfaction during the Nazi holocaust years: even today the USSR denies the unparalleled tragedy that befell the Jewish people. The "Black Years" from 1948-53 were characterized by the murder of Jewish actors and writers, a campaign against Jews as anti-patriotic "cosmopolites," and a barrage of anti-Semitism on an unprecedented scale, culminating in

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the infamous "Doctors' Plot" whereby Jews were charged with seeking to kill Stalin.

The dictator's death and the "thaw" of the Khrushchev years brought relief from fear, but still the Jews were not accepted as part of Soviet society. Stalin's other crimes were denounced, but not those against the Jews. In the Khrushchev period, Jews were denounced as "economic criminals," dismissed from institutes of higher learning, and pushed out of posts of importance as the central government sought to satisfy the demand of many of the non-Russian Soviet republics that persons holding citizenship of the local republic take over jobs held by Jews. By this time, too, the USSR, which had supported Israel's coming into existence in 1948, turned to support the Arab states' position in the Middle East conflict. Soviet media were rife with pro-Arab, anti-Israel material that worsened the atmosphere for Jews.

Other forces were at work as well to heighten the Jewish consciousness in the USSR, well before emigration became possible or even could be envisaged. There was the Soviet incorporation of eastern Poland in 1939 and, later, of the Baltic states of Bessarabia and of part of Moldavia, each territory bringing with it a sizable, deeply caring, and knowledgeable Jewish population. There had been, since 1948, the deep impact of the creation of Israel, pride in the Jewish state, and concern for its fate in difficult moments as, for example, the 1967 conflict. For the almost 20 years during which there were diplomatic relations between Israel and the USSR, too, there was an active Israeli mission in Moscow.

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By the mid-sixties, the USSR had recognized the rights of certain categories of persons under its jurisdiction to leave the country. A Polish-Soviet agreement of July 1945 stipulated the right of Poles and Jews who were Polish citizens when the Soviets took over eastern Poland in 1939 to give up their Soviet citizenship and evacuate to Poland, in return for the right of Ukranians, White Russians, and certain others in Poland to return to the USSR. There was a second such agreement in 1957-9. An estimated 175,000 Jews were among those affected; other measures on departure would affect Germans on Soviet territory, Spaniards, and some Greeks and Armenians as well.

For the Soviet authorities, two principles appear to have been operative—repatriation and family reunification. Subsequent Jewish emigration, it will be seen, was likewise to be based on these concepts.

All these elements, negative and positive, created an altered mood among Jews in the USSR, one given rapid, widespread expression at the first official public sign from the Soviet regime in the mid-sixties that substantive emigration of Jews was not out of the question. Asked at a Paris press conference in December 1966 whether Jewish families separated by the war could hope to be allowed to come together "as was done for many Greek and Armenian families," Premier Alexi Kosygin's careful reply was that "we on our side shall do all possible for us to open the road for them, if some families want to meet, or even if some among them would like to leave . . ." This, he went on, did not and would not raise "any problem of principle."

Within a month, Soviet Jews began appearing at passport offices of the different Soviet republics with newspaper clippings of Kosygin's remarks, asking for permission to join relatives abroad. Within two months, a Soviet bureaucracy astounded at such temerity was mounting an anti-Israeli campaign and using other methods of intimidation to discourage applications.

With the 1967 Arab-Israeli war came the absolute shutdown of movement and, for Soviet Jews, a period of despair and mounting desire to leave the country.

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What prompted the Kremlin to re-invite Jewish applications for movement out of the country in September 1968 can only be surmised. Perhaps it thought that the departure of a few Jews was not too high a price to pay to silence protest campaigns abroad. Once again, however, the authorities were overwhelmed by the Jews' reaction. In the last four months of 1968, over 7,000 Jews made requests of relatives outside the USSR to file *visovs*, letters of invitation from abroad that the applicant must provide the authorities in order to be able to make a formal request to go. In 1969, 27,000 did so, in wildfire response to information that exit was possible. The government reaction was again to close the gates: the rate of exit of 450 per month in January of 1969 was reduced to less than 100 in December.

This time, however, the authorities faced a new mood of Jewish militancy. Already in 1968, there had been letters and petitions demanding the right to leave from Soviet Jews smuggled out to the United Nations and other international bodies. Now, in November 1969, came a collective petition from 18 Jewish families of Georgia who requested that the UN Human Rights Commission take up the issue. This started a flood of such documents in which groups of Jews openly asserted their desire to emigrate. The state response was a new anti-Zionist campaign in which prominent Soviet Jews were required to participate, as at a Moscow press conference in March 1970. The reply of Jewish militants was publicly to arrange for a press conference of their own, something then unheard-of for citizens of the Soviet Union, an act of no little courage, risking serious official retribution.

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In the summer of 1970 came a turning point—the arrest by the KGB of ten Jews and two non-Jews at the Leningrad airport who had hoped to hijack a plane to fly to freedom in Sweden. There were also other raids against Jews across the country.

The first Leningrad trial and the sentencing to death of two of the defendants on Christmas Eve brought worldwide protest, and the Soviets commuted the death sentences to 15 years. Matching the militancy of Soviet Jews was an impressive demonstration of international solidarity on their behalf, the first Brussels World Conference for Soviet Jews in February 1971. Once again, there came a radical change in Soviet emigration policy. In March 1971 alone, over 1,000 Jews were permitted to exit, as many as had

been allowed out in all of 1970. By year's end, the total of exits was 14,000. Major movement was on, and so, too, was a new flood of Jewish *visov* applications—40,000 were filed between March and December.

What prompted this Soviet reversal? By the late 1970s, a new element had come into play—the trend to detente, a major goal of Soviet policy. This period was to see the Berlin Four-Power Agreement, the fashioning of the Helsinki Final Act on European Security and Cooperation with important consequences for human rights, and moves toward increasing U.S.-Soviet trade. It was a time, in short, not to exacerbate conflicting policy issues between the two countries. The worldwide clamor surrounding the plight of Jews in the USSR meant not only that it no longer could be treated by the Soviets simply as an internal issue, much as they sought to insist it was one, but also made it an item on the international agenda.

Yet the reversal never was final or complete. In fact, hindsight reveals that two competing tendencies have been constantly at work inside USSR ruling circles on what to do about Jewish emigration. The KGB apparently has seen in it a multiple threat: other Soviet groups may begin to ask, "If Jews can go, why not us;" and they may take example from Jewish militancy. Other ruling elements have held that preventing the Jews from emigrating was not worth disrupting efforts to improve international relations.

Some emigration satisfied both of these viewpoints. It was no accident, surely, that those Jews considered least adapted to Soviet society (the potential "troublemakers," in Soviet eyes) made up the bulk of the earliest departures—the Jews of Georgia, strong in their particular orthodoxy, and the Jews from the most recently acquired Soviet territories, still marked by "outside" and Western influence.

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Even as the 1970s were to see substantial movement from the country, they were to see constant attempts to block that movement. One of the most serious attempts was the announcement in August 1972 of a tax on those with university education departing. This tax was defended by the Soviets on the grounds it was needed to halt a brain drain. Rates ranged from $5,000 to $25,000 per person, depending on level of studies accomplished. The result was an explosion of denunciation in the West. By October, the Soviets began to exempt emigrants; in April 1973, U.S. President Richard Nixon declared he had been told the tax had been abolished.

Arrests, harassment, and active persecution of would-be emigrants by the Soviet state security forces continued, however. The very act of registering with the OVIR offices for emigration is almost heroic in Soviet society. The authorities can refuse exit, invoking "security reasons" of one form or another. Further, there are almost immediate unfavorable consequences of seeking to emigrate: possible loss of one's job, ostracism, or difficulties for one's children to be accepted for schooling.

Even in the best of times, individuals have been refused exit and treated as outcasts; some of these now have been waiting ten years and more for permission to depart. Jews who the Soviet government felt pressed too hard for exit or who sought to teach Hebrew and Jewish culture too actively have been exiled or jailed, becoming known as "prisoners of Zion."

At one point, there was an attempt by the U.S. and the Soviet authorities to negotiate Jewish exit movement. This turned on the Jackson-Vanik amendment to trade legislation introduced in March 1973 while the education tax still was in effect. It made the granting of most-favored-nation trade status to any country dependent on its emigration practices. In an exchange of letters with Sen. Henry Jackson, then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger indicated that a "benchmark" figure of 60,000 emigrants per year would be used by the administration to judge Soviet performance. One can hardly imagine his writing this without some sense of Soviet agreement. The Trade Act passed on December 13, 1974, but was denounced by Moscow the following January. What may have triggered the Soviet rejection was an amendment limiting credit to the USSR to $300 million, a minimal sum.

In the 34 months since the March 1971 reversal, more than 80,000 Jews had left the USSR. Once again the cycle



was altered. From the high point of 34,773 in 1973, there was a drop to 20,628 in 1974; to 13,221 in 1975; a levelling off at about that rate with 14,261 in 1976; and a trifle more, 16,736, in 1977. Soviet policy was at half-way point. Repression was escalated, and emigration cut down but not cut out.

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One can only infer that passage of the strategic arms agreements (SALT I) was so important to the Soviets in 1978 that it wished nothing to stand in the way, and the number of Jews allowed out jumped to nearly 29,000. Once again, the Soviet authorities misjudged the strength of Jewish desire to go and the potential effect of their opening the gates wider. The following year, 1979, was to see record departures, over 50,000. By then, however, both the composition and destination of Jewish emigration from the USSR had shifted.

Not just the Jews from major population centers but also those from towns and villages across the USSR not previously involved were seeking to exit. Not just the Jews from the peripheral territories and those more Jewishly or Zionist inclined, wished to go, but also Jews of the Soviet heartland, third and fourth generation Soviet Jews who previously, despite all, had seen their future in the USSR. What appears to have changed their minds was a major shift in Soviet policy begun in 1968 and taking ever-increasing effect: the USSR determination progressively to shut Jews out from higher education.

In a land where they have suffered great discrimination

and where latent popular and barely disguised official anti-Semitism have had devastating effects, the Jews had been able to maintain a decent standard of living because they were the best educated group. Now even the best-off families realized that this would come to an end if their children could no longer go to the best schools and universities when worthy of them.

The destination of emigrants was also changed. The earliest movement had been only to Israel Indeed, even today that is the presumed destination of any Jew permitted to leave, as the USSR can justify the Jews' departure on the grounds that they are returning to their homeland, whereas the homeland of other Soviet nationalities—for example, the Ukranians—is in the USSR itself. But by 1972, Jews reaching Vienna en route to Israel (the Soviets do not permit direct departure, since there are no longer diplomatic relations between Israel and the USSR) realized



Source—Soviet Jewry Research Bureau, National Conference on Soviet Jewry

they could there opt to go to the U.S. or other countries that would accept them. In 1973, 4.2 percent of departures from the USSR chose a destination other than Israel; by 1976 it was 49 percent; in 1979, 65 percent; and by 1981, over 80 percent.

This has been a source of great frustration to Israel. Jewish Agency leaders responsible for immigration to Israel have sought the cooperation of the American Jewish community in stemming the tide. While ready to cooperate in many ways to enhance Israel's attraction for emigres, American Jewish leadership has not been willing to impose any limitation on individuals' freedom to choose their destination. With emigration currently at such a low level, the argument today is moot, but it can be expected to resurface should there, once again, be a reversal of Soviet policy.

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The shift in destination has also given rise to the argument by some that Jews now coming out of the USSR are "economic migrants" and hence should not be considered eligible for admission to the U.S. as refugees under present legislation. This, however, ignores the harassment and persecution—the discrimination in access to education, the mounting anti-Semitism, and the growing reluctance to give Jews jobs, much less advance them in positions—that prompted this movement in the first place, causing economically well-off Jews in the USSR to undertake the dangers of application for exit and the rigors of emigrating.

The argument has been advanced that it was the movement of Jews to the U.S. in such proportions that caused the Soviets progressively to slow down exit from 1980 to the present, and some Soviet statements do, indeed, indicate that this may have been one factor. Looking at the broader picture, however, this seems more a Soviet justification rather than the real underlying cause.

Even as emigration was at its peak, in 1979, the authorities began to fear that matters were out of their control. Already in March 1979, they introduced measures—for example, new criteria for accepting *visovs* from abroad, demanding closer family relations—to stem the emigration flow. Not only Jewish, but German and American emigration were cut substantially as well.

Internally, the KGB was cracking down on all dissident elements. The clearest signal that it meant to try to halt Jewish activism came with the arrest in the summer of 1981 of leading Jewish activist, scientist and *samizdat* editor Viktor Brailovsky, on the very opening of the Madrid Review Conference of the Helsinki Final Act calling for enhanced family reunification and the honoring of human rights.

Externally, there was the end to detente, with the effects of the invasion of Afghanistan, events in Poland, and an American administration committed to arms build-up and rhetorical anti-Sovietism. Soviet officials in private conversations at international meetings and, indeed, publicly at the Helsinki Review Conference have linked Jewish emigration to detente.

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Where does this leave Jews in the USSR today?

With the gates virtually shut, the number of those who have applied for but have been refused exit stands at a record high. As of December 1982, the figure of those turned down stood at 9,310, compared to one-third that number in December 1979. Nor do these figures include the many thousands who do not dare make an issue of their rejected applications, those who have never received an official answer to their requests to leave, or those who cannot apply because the Soviet authorities have confiscated *visovs* sent them by their relatives abroad.

Altogether, it is known, there are more than 382,000 Jews still in the USSR who have asked for *visovs* from abroad. One must estimate, then, that there are at least half a million ready to leave if the gates open and emigration becomes possible again.

Further, there are still today 11 prisoners of Zion in jail for no other crime than desiring to leave and making known this desire; 13 others who have served out their prison terms have not yet been permitted to depart.

The situation of Jews in the USSR is steadily worsening, as Soviet anti-Zionism shifts into more active anti-Semitism and the effects of discrimination mount. As in March 1970, the Soviets are again mounting press conferences to try to persuade the outside world that all is well and that Jews do not wish to depart the country. Protagonists at these conferences are the same people who declared in 1970 that only about 10,000 Jews wished to leave, when in reality over one-quarter of a million eventually exited.

These staged press conferences show, however, that the USSR still feels it must pay attention to outside world opinion. It is such opinion and the pressure of governments insisting that the USSR honor the commitments it has made in the Helsinki Final Act and other international conventions upon which rests the fate of Jewish emigration.

Calling Australia Home

Paul A. Cullen

Since the end of World War II, Australia has received nearly half a million refugees for permanent settlement. This response is all the more remarkable considering that the country's population has only just topped 15 million. Indeed, Australia's per capita response to the plight of Indochinese refugees has led the world. Since the beginning of that particular program, over 68,000 Indochinese refugees have made their home in Australia.

The Australian response to refugees has evolved from a shaky start during World War II, to today's firm commitment to continue its partnership with other major countries of resettlement. It is all the more remarkable when one recalls the notorious White Australian policy, which had for years been the cornerstone of Australian migration policy.

Upon arrival in Australia, refugees attend language training and adaptation classes at one of 3 large migrant centers in the Sydney area. UNHCR

Originally, Australia had opted almost solely for migrants of British stock, and it was primarily a response to fears of Asian jealousy of her vast underpopulated spaces which spurred Australians to seek out other (usually Mediterranean) settlers.

At the 1938 Evian conference, Australia agreed to accept 15,000 Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi domination of their European homelands. However, by late 1939, only half the quota had arrived. In July 1947, Australia entered into negotiations with the Preparatory Commission for the International Refugee Organization, and agreed to settle an annual quota of 12,000 displaced persons, with a provision for occasional increases.

This scheme was in operation from late 1947 to early 1952. Approximately 170,000 people arrived in Australia, the majority being Poles (37 percent); Yugoslavs (14 percent); and Latvians (11 percent). However, the term "refugee" was not used officially by the Australian Department of Immigration until 1954; until that time, the term "displaced persons" was used.

From the mid-fifties until 1975, Australia's yearly intake was usually fairly small, but with significant responses to upheavals in Europe. For instance, between 1956 and 1961, Australia accepted a total of 14,000 Hungarian refugees.

The general intake of refugees and displaced persons did not, however, conflict with the basic premise of Australian migration policy. Australia was a country reliant on migration, and European refugees were able to be settled in much the same way as other migrants. Settlement policies were firmly focused on the popular idea of assimilation. Only slowly was the idea of a cultural identity other than the "typical Aussie" accepted, and the notion of assimilation—that is, to forego one's cultural heritage in favor of acquiring "Australianness"—began to fall into disfavor.

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Australia's preparedness to accept other than European refugees—or migrants, for that matter—has taken a remarkable about-face within less than a decade.

In 1975, over 1,700 East Timorese made Australia their country of first asylum. They were allowed to stay temporarily, but the official response with regard to the beginnings of a Vietnamese outflow initially was confused. Despite her involvement in the Vietnam war, Australia was again hesitant to respond to the needs of these non-European refugees. The country was caught with no clear refugee policy, a heritage of xenophobia, and a crisis of international dimensions involving not only humanitarian claims but foreign affairs considerations as well. In April 1976, the first boatloads of Vietnamese arrived on Australian shores. The government made it clear, in 1976, that it would reserve the right to allow—or to deter—entry to Australia. In a statement which clarified Australia's official refugee policy for the first time, the government reiterated its ratification of the *Convention on the Status of Refugees* and its support for UNHCR. A major element of the policy was the role of the voluntary sector in assisting with the government's settlement of refugees. The intake of refugees from Indochina, which had begun in 1975, would continue. Then, as now, the official yardstick used to determine the intake quota was that it be "consistent with Australia's capacity as a community to resettle them."

By 1981, Australia was fourth in the world for the number of Indochinese resettled. The target for 1982-3 is approximately 14,000, and despite reductions in the intake of migrants, the government, opposition, and trade union movement have expressed positively that they have no intention to move towards a reduction of refugee numbers.

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Australia's intake of Indochinese has focused firstly and then mainly on those who had found first asylum in Malaysia and Indonesia. As a consequence, the vast majority have been Vietnamese. This has had the effect of reducing first asylum cases in Australia to a few—in fact only a few boatloads. However, there have been calls from other Indochinese refugee communities in Australia to increase the proportion from first asylum camps in Thailand, in an effort to make the response to all—Cambodians, Lao, and Vietnamese—more equitable.

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In view of the continuing waves of Vietnamese refugees, the Australian government with other governments entered into lengthy and delicate negotiations with the government of Vietnam. In October 1982, the Orderly Departure Program was announced, and late in that year the first 400 Vietnamese migrants arrived in Australia directly from Vietnam. They were selected from "agreed lists" formulated on the basis of family reunion criteria. This program is an ongoing one, and further planeloads of Indochinese migrants will continue to mark this watershed in Australian immigration history. Individuals arriving under this program are not counted as refugees but as migrants.

Since the introduction of Australia's Indochinese program, a significant development has occurred which bears mention. In 1982, the Australian government responded to international debate about the nature of the ongoing outflow. Questions about the "pull factor," and uncertainty as to possible economic motivations of individuals leaving their homelands, found their target. The government responded by introducing its own "case-by-case" determination of refugee status. This, it was claimed, was not in opposition to the UNHCR determination that members of various groups should be deemed refugees, but was an effort to ensure that only "genuine and legitimate" refugees found permanent sanctuary in Australia. It has been argued that this policy is based on truly humanitarian considerations, in that it discriminates in favor of those whose claim to refugee status is authentic.

Only slowly has the idea of a cultural identity other than the "typical Aussie" been accepted . . . But despite a history grounded in colonialism and racist migration practice, Australia has broken from the past.

However, there have been criticisms of the procedures used to identify "real" refugees, and questions as to their efficacy. Voluntary agencies and aid organizations have led these debates. Recently, some changes in procedure have been introduced, to make the selection procedures more humane, and it is likely that others may be forthcoming. Nevertheless, the government stands firm by its right to apply its own tests to refugees. This official policy has been, in part, a response to pleas from countries of first asylum to stem the tide of newly arriving refugees. Similar policies have been adopted by other resettlement countries as well.

Australia, as a leading nation in the Southeast Asian region, has been keen to demonstrate her commitment to ASEAN countries (Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia) through its intake policy. Her commitment to resettle large numbers of refugees landing in Southeast Asian countries has been a crucial, and successful, aspect of her foreign affairs policy.

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Despite Australia's enormous commitment to Indochinese refugees, other categories have found a permanent home in the "island continent" at the rate of about 11,000 a year.

Australia has recently responded to the continuing flow of refugees from Eastern Europe, with over 4,500 Poles arriving in 1980-1. Poles and others from neighboring countries continue to be granted residence.

Since 1947, about 12,000 White Russians from China have been admitted, and small numbers continue to be admitted, along with refugees from the Middle East.

Another important development has been the introduction of the Special Humanitarian Program. This was set up to cater to cases akin to refugee situations, but which are unable—for a variety of reasons—to qualify for refugee status.

Two groups have been the major beneficiaries of this scheme, namely Soviet Jews and East Timorese. With regard to both of these groups, fulfillment of Australian quotas has not been realized to date, due in large part to difficulties with the policies of other countries.

For instance, in 1980-1 Australia set a quota for Soviet Jews of 1,500, but only 519 applied and arrived. In the previous year, Soviet exit policy had enabled 1,777 Soviet Jews to gain settlement in Australia.

Both Indonesia and Australia agreed on a list of more than 600 Timorese who would be settled in Australia for family reunion. However, fewer than 400 have arrived, due to difficulties experienced by the nominees in gaining approval from Indonesian authorities to move from Timor to Jakarta, and from there to Australia.

It is envisaged that others in refugee-like situations (perhaps from Latin America) may take advantage of the relaxed criteria of the Special Humanitarian Program.

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When refugees arrive in Australia, they are met by a combination of government and nongovernment services. Migrant centers, institutions catering for the period of initial residence and controlled by the Australian Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, are located in most state capitals. They provide family-unit accommodation, preschools, playgrounds, and centralized dining rooms. English language classes are provided, as well as medical, dental, and counseling services. Government officials from other departments help with housing and employment information. All these services are subsidized. Refugees and migrants are thus able to live adequately on maintenance grants which are roughly equivalent to the amount received by unemployed citizens. The period of stay at the migrant centers varies, but the maximum stay for families is 12 months; for childless couples, six months; and for single adults, three months.

English instruction is available, and the length of courses varies from five to ten weeks. Refugees are encouraged to take part in orientation courses where they have access to information on such vital areas as employment, housing,

Australian law, health, finance, welfare, and interpreter services.

Voluntary agencies and the government have joined forces to provide support to refugees immediately after migrant center residence. Calfric (the Committee for Allocation of Loan Funds to Refugees in Centres), a registered company, operates a revolving fund with contributions from the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and Austcare, Australia's major refugee agency. Austcare has contributed $150,000 to the fund. Approximately $1.2 million has been placed in the fund, but because of the revolving nature of the grants, loans to the value of $2 million have been made. Administered by six voluntary agencies, Calfric has enabled large numbers of refugees to move out of migrant centers and into rented accommodations. While the maximum amount available is not large ($600 for a family, $250 for a married couple, and $100 for a single person), it covers rental bond and the connection of services.

The loans are interest-free over two years and have gained wide support due to the wonderful and exceedingly high pay-back rate of the borrowers. Indeed, there has been almost no defaulting on the loans The government has recently praised the voluntary sector for its efficient and sensitive handling of the program. However, the voluntary agencies have noted that funds available are inadequate to meet the demand and have called upon the government to increase its allocation. So far, over $1,400,000 has been repaid by the refugees.

About 10 percent of refugees arriving in Australia do not have an initial period of residence at the migrant centers. These people come directly into the community under the Community Refugee Resettlement Scheme. Introduced on an experimental basis, the scheme has developed into a major program enabling sections of the Australian community to play a positive role in assisting with the settlement of refugees into a local community. Under the scheme announced in October 1979, refugees bypass migrant centers and move directly into the community where they are in the care of groups, organizations, families, or individuals who have volunteered to provide a range of practical support and assistance.

The direct contact afforded by the scheme enhances and quickens integration, and encourages greater community awareness of the problems of refugees, while gaining a more even spread of refugees throughout the community. However, some problems arose early on with dislocation experienced by refugee families placed perhaps too rapidly in a totally unfamiliar environment. Experience has shown that support services (access to language instruction, culturally familiar contacts, and so on) are essential for the successful operation of the scheme.

Refugees thought to be suitable for placement within the scheme are selected by government officers working in refugee camps. Through a "matching process," families are linked with appropriate support groups. Applications from these groups are submitted to subcommittees of Migrant Settlement Councils and include details of their local resources and the kinds of refugees they might best be able to sponsor. Many church and community welfare groups have responded to the program and have found that, with recent revisions, the scheme is operating well.

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The voluntary agencies caring for refugees have come together under an umbrella organization known as The Refugee Council of Australia, primarily a lobbying group, representing over 50 agencies with experience and expertise in the field. UNHCR's representative in Australia has observer status. The working of the council attests to the good will and cooperation which marks Australia's refugee resettlement program. Members of the Refugee Council executive committee meet with the minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs on a quarterly basis, to discuss issues of wide-ranging significance.

Both the minister and RCOA have expressed satisfaction and pleasure at the constructive developments which arise from the frank exchange of views. The council has made submissions on such matters as the proportion of refugees selected from Thailand, the implementation of case-by-case determination of status, and the provision of post-arrival services to refugees. The close communication between voluntary and government sectors afforded by RCOA perhaps provides a pointer for other major resettlement countries.

Another organization, The Australian Council on Population and Ethnic Affairs (ACPEA), provides a forum in which the resettlement of refugees can be seen within the overall migration context. This council was set up to advise the minister and comprises experts from a wide range of backgrounds, including business and trade unions. It is interesting to note that, despite a current unemployment rate of 10 percent, none of these organizations has called for a reduction of refugee intake, even though the government has recently acted to lower its migration quota (for non-refugees). At a recent regional consultation on refugees, where ACPEA sought the views of a wider range of the interested public, the view was put forward that Australia must continue her role as a leading country of resettlement, as this was essential on humanitarian grounds alone. While conceding that a tough economic climate would, as always, increase social tensions, the view of the consultation was that there was need for increased community awareness of the plight of refugees.

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Australians have a saying, "Fair go," which embodies a commonly held notion of justice and fair play. Despite a history grounded in colonialism and racist migration practice, Australia has broken from the past.

Having drawn a sizable proportion of her population from other than British backgrounds, Australia has now developed into a culturally pluralistic society. The term "multiculturalism" has been coined to encompass the idea, and within that framework, it is hoped that all Australian citizens will be able to give expression both to their "Australianness" and to their own cultural heritage. It is within this context that refugees—whether they arrive from Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, or elsewhere—are encouraged to take full advantage of the freedoms which Australia has to offer.

Australia is justifiably proud of her performance in the field of refugee intake. Innovative policies, flexible approaches, and a strong and energetic voluntary sector, combined with the warm and open character of the Australian people, have provided the basis for a successful program. Despite the difficulties posed by the continuing dilemma of refugees around the world, many refugees will continue to find Australia a place to call "home."

Humanitarian Assistance Through Migration

James L. Carlin

It is sometimes difficult to define precisely an individual's status by the legal term "refugee." We may speak, in some instances, of "displaced persons," or "persons in refugee-like situations," or simply "persons of concern." But whatever the situation or designation, two things are immediately clear: first, the persons about whom we are speaking need physical help and/or legal protection. They have humanitarian problems in need of a solution. Second, it is governments, in the end, who must decide such people are of sufficient concern that coordinated efforts towards a solution should be undertaken on their behalf.

Once such a political and humanitarian decision is made, the operative question in the multilateral, intergovernmental context becomes what institutional machinery exists which can be brought to bear to satisfy the needs that have been identified and, in emergency situations, how quickly can the machinery respond? Which agencies in the international system have the ability to act within their statutes; which are able to obtain access to the specific groups or individuals; and which, whether singly or in consortium, have the logistical capacity and specific expertise required by the circumstances?

Chilean exiles arrive in Switzerland aboard ICM flights in the early 1970s. ICM

The Intergovernmental Committee for Migration is the only intergovernmental operational organization which carries out processing, transportation, and related resettlement services for people in need at the request of governments and in cooperation with countries of first asylum, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, nongovernmental organizations, and receiving countries. ICM's constitution provides for this assistance in the following manner:

The Committee shall be concerned with the migration of refugees for whom arrangements may be made between the Committee and the governments of the countries concerned, including those undertaking to receive them.

This flexible statute, which does not define "refugee," combined with the lack of political constraints which can encumber the United Nations system, allows ICM to operate programs as requested by its member governments or at the request of other governments with the approval of ICM's Executive Committee whenever the approval for access is given by the country where the individuals are residing. No political or legal decisions are asked or required of ICM's administration. Indeed, when a receiving country government has determined that a particular individual or group is of humanitarian concern to that government, ICM can act even within the country of origin to facilitate one primary solution to emergency situations—migration.

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Over the years, ICM has been particularly well known for its work in the resettlement of East Europeans, including the major waves of Hungarians in 1956-57, Czechs in 1968-69, and Poles in 1981-82; and for its participation, including medical screening on behalf of most receiving countries, in the international effort to resettle Indochinese refugees from 1975 to the present.

In other actions, less well publicized, ICM has functioned as the principal agent of concerned governments in handling Asians expelled from Uganda in 1972; the Cuban exodus of 1980; Soviet Jews arriving in Austria since 1971; and political prisoners allowed to emigrate from Latin American countries. During 1982, ICM assumed charge of the resettlement processing of Indochinese refugees at the NW82 camp on the Thai-Cambodian border; assisted Salvadorans moving to new homes in Costa Rica and Nicaragua; and established a transit facility in Germany for former detainees allowed to leave Poland. For all these groups, resettlement in third countries provided the solution, obviating a need for other forms of protection for extended periods of time.

ICM members include: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Honduras, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Switzerland, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

James L. Carlin worked for the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration from its founding in 1951 until 1963. He was with the U.S. Department of State for 15 years, where he worked actively with Congress in the development of the policies which were embodied in the U.S. Refugee Act of 1980. He rejoined ICM in 1979 as director.

In the case of Uganda in 1972, ICM organized an orderly evacuation of persons being expelled by government decree. The Uganda Asians were not refugees in the sense of being outside their country of origin or habitual residence, but ICM was able to send a processing team to accomplish the documentation and transportation arrangements to move 4500 persons out of Kampala. Working closely with the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations Development Program, ICM arranged the evacuation of these stateless persons in a period of six weeks, the majority to transit centers in Europe established by UNHCR in cooperation with the governments concerned.

Another category of persons of humanitarian concern similar to the expellee is the political prisoner whose sentence can be commuted to exile on the condition that he has an entry visa for another country. Release from detention is contingent on prior completion of all arrangements for documentation and departure.

During the last decade, in several Latin American countries, ICM has performed the necessary functions of intermediary among prisoners, their families, local government authorities, and countries willing to provide resettlement opportunities for selected individual cases. Operating under strictly controlled conditions, ICM staff, cooperating with ICRC, first established a basis for trust with all parties, then carried out the extensive and sensitive process of interviewing and establishing the detailed dossiers required by the potential immigration countries. Once visas had been issued, ICM concluded the arrangements with the local authorities for release of the prisoners, transfer to the airport, and departure.

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Not too dissimilar in their legal departure status are groups such as Soviet Jews, selected Romanian and Soviet Armenian cases, Vietnamese processed through the "Orderly Departure Program" (ODP), and the former detainees being allowed to leave Poland. Persons in these categories depart legally with visas issued by countries of transit or final destination; but the majority travel with documents which classify them as stateless, as they have had to renounce citizenship in their country of origin upon departure.

Jews whose applications for emigration are granted by the Soviet authorities are issued exit visas for Israel on the basis of family reunion criteria. ICM assists the Jewish Agency for Israel with the direct forwarding of persons from Vienna, where they first arrive, to that destination, while those who wish to apply for immigration elsewhere are transferred to Rome under the responsibility of Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society. Following their processing in Rome by the several resettlement countries, the emigrants are provided reduced-fare transportation and related processing services by ICM. The question of refugee status does not arise while the Soviet Jews are transiting Austria and Italy.

The U.S. government's third country processing (TCP) programs for persons from Romania and the Soviet Union (principally Armenians) illustrate another type of direct departure program. Although it applies the standard criteria for refugee admission, the U.S. nonetheless commences processing of these cases at its embassies in the two countries of origin. With prima facie eligibility established by the U.S., a transit visa is provided by Italy, and TCP cases are allowed to depart to Rome, where they receive final examination by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. As for the Soviet Jews, Italy generously provides its territory for the necessary processing but does not accept responsibility for the caseload as refugees. Also as in the case of the Soviet Jews, it is the voluntary agencies and ICM together which accomplish the necessary transit, transportation, and final reception arrangements for the U.S.

Drawing perhaps on the TCP formula, but tailoring procedures to fit the emergency circumstances of the Polish detainees, the U.S. together with the Federal Republic of Germany requested ICM to establish a transit facility near Frankfurt in mid-1982. Persons detained under the martial law ordinances of December 1981 and subsequently released have been permitted by Polish authorities to apply for emigration to Western countries, and the U.S. and other embassies have responded by providing a means to do so. Persons whose histories would certainly qualify them as

refugees were they to escape on their own to Western countries of asylum are thus aided through the mechanism of legal, direct departure from their country of origin. At the Frankfurt transit facility, ICM provides food, lodging, logistical assistance for resettlement interviews, travel documentation, and transportation to final destination.

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The best known of the direct departure systems is that which was established by UNHCR in its May 1979 memorandum of understanding with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam—the ODP. Conceived in response to the human tragedy of the Vietnamese boat people, the plan was controversial initially in both its political and humanitarian implications and then disappointingly slow in reaching a significant level of departures. Nevertheless, by the end of 1982, total departures for all destinations had surpassed 26,500, and the ODP system had become an accepted part of the overall Western effort to provide solutions to the Vietnamese refugee problem.

ICM has assisted UNHCR in the implementation of ODP since its inception by assuming responsibility for

transit arrangements in Bangkok and arranging onward movement to most of the major resettlement countries. Receiving countries have varying criteria and procedures for ODP cases, reflecting the complexity of the entire Indochinese refugee situation, and, as a consequence, have varying needs for assistance. Some consider ODP cases within the refugee category of their immigration laws; others operate ODP within regular immigration criteria only. Some require almost complete processing of applicants before departure from Vietnam, including medical screening; although ICM has not been permitted to carry out these procedures itself in Vietnam, as it does in Thailand and other locations, ICM has provided both supplies and technical advisors for the Vietnamese physicians and hospitals performing this screening.

It is anticipated that as the ODP system becomes increasingly accepted and as the caseload is to an increasing



Orderly Departure Program migrants are processed at Phanat Nikom transit camp in Thailand. ICM

degree within family reunion categories, more countries will ask ICM, as Australia did late in 1982, to manage their intake on the basis of regular immigration, rather than refugee, procedures.

Apart from these established, government-recognized programs, ICM has also been able to intervene on an ad hoc basis to effect the emigration of individuals or small groups of humanitarian concern. A recent example is the situation of civil strife in Central America where it has proved possible to utilize the ICM field office structure to obtain necessary visas and to make requisite logistical arrangements to move several small, church-sponsored groups to sanctuary in neighboring countries, as well as to accomplish resettlement out of the region.

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A principal source of ICM's utility in the field of protection is thus its ability, within its broad, humanitarian mandate, to intervene in situations where it may not be possible for other organizations to act. Further, ICM can intervene even before the precise profile of a group with regard to refugee status has been established, but where it is clear that physical movement of the people will be an essential part of the eventual solution.

One recent and important example of ICM's unique ability to intervene occurred at the Thai-Cambodia border late in 1982, at the camp known as NW82. Established by the Thai government in furtherance of its policy of deterring new refugee arrivals, the camp, with its 1800 inhabitants, became the responsibility of ICRC. As Thailand would not permit these Vietnamese "land people" to enter its territory as refugees, UNHCR was not able to obtain access to register them for resettlement processing.

With the camp residents increasingly endangered by fighting in the area, ICRC appealed both to Thailand and the main resettlement countries to act. The governments responded positively and turned to ICM, as an agency acceptable to all parties, to organize the initial interviewing by resettlement country representatives and to provide transportation to transit centers and related final processing. Working within the strict time frame imposed by Thailand, officials of ICM, ICRC, and the responsible immigration countries succeeded in channeling the NW82 caseload toward new homelands, thus resolving for them an urgent and threatening situation.

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Less dangerous on physical grounds but equally challenging in its political dimension was the occupation in April 1980 of the Peruvian Embassy in Havana by some 10,000 Cubans. At the request of and with the cooperation of ICM member countries Peru, Costa Rica, and the U.S., ICM responded within 48 hours by positioning chartered planes at San Jose and offering its operational capacity to effect an orderly and humane evacuation. Although this solution was neither immediately nor fully accepted by the Cuban authorities, ICM initially was allowed to organize the evacuation of some 1400 persons to Lima and San Jose before the airlift was abruptly replaced by the exodus by sea from Mariel.

In Costa Rica, ICM assisted the government in establishing the necessary temporary accommodation for the Cubans and undertook the tasks of documentation and related processing for third country resettlement. Neither the outflow of Cubans nor ICM's involvement ended here. ICM continued to play a role well into 1981 in assisting the U.S. government and the many voluntary agencies involved in the domestic resettlement effort which followed the exodus of some 125,000 Cubans from Mariel to Florida.

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This substantial variety of experiences demonstrates ICM's special role and versatility in responding to situations outside the "normal" parameters of resettlement work. There are no specific patterns to refugee situations or even to mass exoduses: each has its own special characteristics and the conditions of one may not obtain at all in another. Drawing from the experience of the 1930s and 40s, the drafters of the ICM constitution foresaw that there would be a variety of unpredictable circumstances calling for the services of a nonpolitical, operational, intergovernmental organization such as ICM. The successful processing and movement of some 3,300,000 persons in ICM's 32-year history, including over 2 million refugees, is a tribute to that foresight.

Central American Refugees: The Search for Appropriate Responses

Sid L. Mohn

Refugees from Central America—in particular, El Salvador and Guatemala—have been a major focus of international concern and U.S. debate during the past three years. Human rights agencies, religious organizations, and governmental bodies have been vocal, and at times opposing, participants in these discussions, endeavoring to define who is a Central American refugee, what are his or her legitimate fears, and what are appropriate humanitarian responses.

Political violence, civil strife, and foreign involvement have prompted major internal and transnational displacement in Central America since 1980. Estimates compiled by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees indicate that over 500,000 Salvadorans have fled their homeland since 1979. The U.S. Department of State estimates that 200,000 were uprooted internally within El Salvador as of May 1982; the number in early 1983 might have been 225,000. The fact that approximately 15 percent of El Salvador's population may be comprised of refugees or people in refugee-like status, coupled with estimates of 36,000 persons killed since October 1980, is dramatic evidence of the upheaval being experienced in that country.

This Salvadoran couple has taken refuge in Honduras, like several thousand of their countrymen. SR. EVE GILLCRIST

The Department of State counts nearly 250,000 Guatemalans as displaced—either internally or through migration to other countries. The Roman Catholic Bishop's Conference of Guatemala, however, has estimated that as many as one million Guatemalans may be refugees as a result of the warfare in the country.

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Some 7,000-10,000 Salvadorans have settled in refugee camps in Honduras operated by UNHCR or have migrated to mountain-top hamlets (*aldeas*) several miles across the border from El Salvador. Even in camps, these people have not found security. The UN camp at La Virtud and the settlements at Colomocagua, Guarita, El Amitillo, Guajiniquil, and Los Hernandez have been the scenes of much turmoil since the fall of 1981. For example, in November of that year, Bianca Jagger toured the La Virtud area and encountered a cadre of Salvadoran military leading some 30 refugees from the camp area. When Jagger's accompanying media team activated its cameras, the military turned for the hills, leaving the refugees to return to the protection of the UN camp. This incident, coupled with a series of similar incidents reported by church relief agencies, indicated a major security problem for refugees in the border region. Not only were refugees being harassed, tortured, or kidnapped, but local relief workers also were being harassed and, in at least two cases, killed in military incursions.

In response to the violence, UNHCR initiated a relocation program in conjunction with the Honduran government to transfer border-area refugees to camps in the interior. The National Council of Churches also responded upon receiving appeals from church relief agencies operating in the La Virtud area and accepted the invitation of CEDEN (Evangelical Committee for Development and Emergency in Honduras), the camp coordinating agency, to send teams of international visitors to the area.

Teams of U.S. and Canadian priests, nuns, ministers, and religious lay people, as well as a few volunteers from Britain, France, and Germany, spent one to two weeks living with refugees either in the UN camp or in the border hamlets. Traveling in groups of two and armed with flashlights, cameras, and foreign contacts, the Spanish-speaking international visitors endeavored to provide security for both the refugees and relief personnel by stationing themselves at entrances to the UN camp, relief workers' quarters, or refugee villages. In the event of an incursion, the international visitor would attempt to prevent kidnapping or torture by discussing with Honduran or Salvadoran military or paramilitary refugee rights and Honduran government recognition of the International Visitor Program. In most instances, no incursions occurred in villages where international visitors resided.

The international visitors, as well as on-site relief workers, were generally opposed to the plan to relocate the refugees further inland. They believed that it would prohibit future refugees from crossing the border to seek safety, and would make it more difficult for the refugees already in Honduras to blend into *aldeas* or camp life. The

Since September 1980, Sid Mohn has been executive director of Travelers and Immigrants Aid of Chicago—a social service agency working with the displaced, the homeless, refugees, and immigrants. A minister of the United Church of Christ, he participated in the National Council of Churches International Visitor Program in Honduras.

isitors also feared that elimination of international presnce at the border would lead to militarization of the area. The relocation continued, however, throughout the early months of 1982, and when persecution, torture, and killing f refugees and Caritas relief workers escalated (after the ermination of the International Visitor Program in March 982), the refugees apparently were motivated to relocate. The moves were accomplished by late summer of 1982. ignificant camp improvements were made at the Mesa Grande camp near San Marcos, the rincipal interior relocation site where pproximately 10,000 refugees were oused, to correct health, sanitation, nd water problems.

To assist escaping refugees, recepion centers in the border area were esignated where a UNHCR jeep ould make scheduled visits to meet rriving refugees and transport them a UN camp.

An eyewitness account of the danrs refugees faced as they hid along ne border until the UN jeep arrived as reported in a November 1982 isue of *Christianity and Crisis*. The rticle also reported that Honduran milies along the border were warned y the military not to assist UNHCR r escaping refugees: Honduran assisnce to refugees could result in reprial or death. In late 1982, the reception nters in La Virtud and Guarita were osed, and the Honduran government equested UNHCR roving protection fficers to leave the area.

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In its 1983 *Country Reports on the Vorld Refugee Situation*, the Departent of State categorizes the Salvadoran migrant problem ccording to a three-fold typology: political refugees, disaced peasants, and economic migrants. According to the epartment, the smallest category of persons leaving El alvador are those fleeing political persecution either by ne right or by the left. It contends that Salvadorans as a ass do not meet the provisions of the Refugee Act of 1980, ut that there are a small number who can substantiate dividual claims of persecution and be granted political sylum in this country.

The second category is that of poor peasants displaced by e civil war. These individuals come from provinces where e fighting is the heaviest. In addition to those who have mained inside the country and are residing in camps ithin El Salvador, up to sixty thousand are estimated to ave crossed the border into Honduras, Guatemala, Costa ica, or other surrounding countries. Most of these counies, according to the State Department, generally anticite that the refugees will return to their homelands, though Nicaragua has provided Salvadorans with residency and work documents, accords them treatment similar to that provided Nicaraguan citizens, and appears to be integrating refugees effectively into the fabric of its society. Under the Commission on Aid to Refugees, Mexico provides basic medical care, food, and shelter for Salvadorans; it anticipates that those wishing to remain in the country will be assimilated eventually into Mexican society. In Jalisco province, the commission has introduced a prototype program to integrate Salvadorans into urban and rural communities: refugees are located in areas needing manual laborers or workers with intermediate technical skills. In Costa Rica, refugees receive free education through the secondary level and are given medical care under the social security system.

The U.S. State Department contends that only small numbers of Salvadorans and Guatemalans are political refugees fleeing persecution.

The third State Department category is that of economic migrants; it estimates that as many as 650,000 Salvadorans fall into this category. These persons are considered by the U.S. to be leaving their home country to seek jobs: the department asserted in August 1982 that the majority of Salvadorans in the U.S.—between 250,000 and 400,000—are in search of a better economic way of life.

The State Department likewise considers that the majority of Guatemalans fleeing their country are doing so as a result of poverty, a condition exacerbated by internal conflict. Only a small number of Guatemalans are viewed as political refugees fleeing persecution based on their particular affiliations or beliefs.

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Significant protests against the State Department position on Salvadorans and Guatemalans have been made by international human rights organizations and church agencies such as Amnesty International, Americas Watch, ACLU, Center for International Policy, American Friends Service Committee, Clergy and Laity Concerned, National Coalition of American Nuns, and major Protestant denominations. These organizations cite serious human rights violations in both Guatemala and El Salvador to support calls for the recognition of Salvadorans and Guatemalans as political refugees. Testimony submitted by these organizations and a variety of investigative commissions has presented both specific and generalized instances of political retaliation and random violence against villages or groups of individuals.

Based on these reports, on estimates of civilian dead in El Salvador, and reports of 2,600 Indians and peasant farmers murdered since the presidency of Rios Montt in Guatemala, numerous human rights and religious organizations have contended that a well-founded fear of persecution exists for any Salvadoran or Guatemalan leaving his

homeland. These groups have been aggressive in their campaigns to have Salvadorans granted refugee status under the broad provisions of the U.S. Refugee Act of 1980.

In an official statement dated May 29, 1981, UNHCR declared that all Salvadorans who had left their country since the beginning of 1980 should be considered bona fide refugees under a prima facie group determination. This determination is based on the grounds that the Salvadorans fled from the consequences of political events in which they did not necessarily play an active role, but from which they and their families are likely to suffer if returned. This form of eligibility does not imply UNHCR recognition of the Salvadorans as refugees within the definition of the United Nations *Convention* and *Protocol;* UNHCR officials contend, however, that they consider it likely that a substantial portion of these exiles would meet that individual definition.

Further, an October 1981 UNHCR investigation concluded that the U.S. had followed a "systematic practice" of returning Salvadorans to their country regardless of the merits of their claims for asylum, and that the "apparent failure (of the U.S. government) to grant asylum to any significant number of Salvadorans, coupled with a large-scale forcible and voluntary return to El Salvador would appear to represent a negation of its responsibilities assumed upon its adherence" to the UN *Protocol.* Reacting to this investigation, Sen. Edward Kennedy expressed distress that "(for) the first time officials of the United Nations High Commissioner's office have found it necessary to suggest that the U.S. is failing to fulfill its international obligations to refugees." Human rights and religious organizations, too, decried the findings of U.S. violations of the UN *Convention* and *Protocol* refoulement provisions.

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In response to this debate between human rights organizations and the State Department, Congress required through the International Security and Development Act of 1981 that certification provisions be attached to continued aid to El Salvador. One of the principal certification provisions was that the government of El Salvador make concerted and significant efforts to comply with internationally recognized standards for human rights. At the same time, Congress affirmed the State Department perspective that refugee status not be presumed for Salvadorans.

Certification review has occurred in January and July 1982, and January 1983. On each occasion, assertions that relative progress has been made toward the reduction of human rights violations have been affirmed and aid to El Salvador approved by Congress. A number of U.S. religious and human rights agencies have criticized the affirmations, stating the view that absolute, not relative, progress must be attained. Such organizations also believe that the question of certification of aid is directly related to recognition of Salvadorans as refugees: as long as the U.S. approves military assistance to El Salvador, Salvadorans will continue to be generally defined as economic migrants rather than political refugees.

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Acknowledging this condition, concerned organizations initiated a campaign in 1981 to have the State Department grant extended voluntary departure status to Salvadorans in the U.S. As defined by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, this status can be granted to ". . . persons who are under a temporary inability to return . . . to their home country because of civil war or catastrophic circumstances there . . ."

Since extended voluntary departure status has been granted in recent times to Ethiopians, Afghans, Nicaraguans, and Poles, it was felt that sufficient precedent existed for a similar policy to be established for Salvadorans until they could return to their homeland in peace and security. It was also felt that this administrative remedy would meet both foreign policy constraints and human rights concerns.

Further, proponents felt, the provision of this status would halt the practice of deportation, which for some Salvadorans in the U.S. may be synonymous with reprisal, torture, or death. According to INS statistics, there were 2,332 deportations in FY 81 and 2,118 in FY 82. In 1981, Amnesty International documented the case of Santana Chirino Amaya, deported from the U.S. to San Salvador



and subsequently found decapitated near a highway known as the Road to Death. Professor Blaise Benpane, a Central American expert at California State University, told the *New York Times*, "There is no doubt in my mind that somewhere between 5 and 10 percent of those who are returned are executed." In August 1981, the *Los Angeles Times* reported that "the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has privately advised the Reagan administration that the U.S. may be violating international law and endangering thousands of lives by deporting displaced Salvadorans to their war-torn homeland."

Public support of extended voluntary departure for Salvadorans was expressed by Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services, The American Council for Nationalities Service, the International Rescue Committee, the National Council of Churches, the U.S. Catholic Conference, the ACLU, the National Lawyers Guild, and numerous others. A resolution of the House of Representatives, presented on April 7, 1981, by Rep. Ted Weiss and 14 co-sponsors, "expressed the sense of the House that extended voluntary departure status should be granted to El Salvadorans in the U.S. whose safety would be endangered if they were required to return to El Salvador."

Despite strong recommendations against deportation, however, the State Department and the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs maintained that the history of Salvadoran migration was evidence that most Salvadorans were in the U.S. for economic reasons.

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While efforts to have Salvadorans designated as refugees under the Refugee Act of 1980 and to implement a policy of extended voluntary departure continued in the latter part of 1981, human rights and religious representatives also reviewed the detention and voluntary departure procedures implemented in the Southwest. Investigators asserted that there were inadequate medical care, unsanitary conditions, and inhumane treatment in some of the detention centers. Additionally, they found many Salvadorans were ordered to agree to depart the U.S. "voluntarily" and were threatened if they refused. The Salvadorans, they found, were often not informed of their right to counsel, had limited access to telephones, and were not advised of their right to apply for political asylum.



At La Virtud camp, Honduras, near the border with El Salvador, large tents housed nutrition and basic skills center for refugees. SR. EVE GILLCRIST

In April 1982, a preliminary injunction was issued by U.S. District Judge Kenyon which enjoined INS from deporting any Salvadorans without fully informing them of their rights, including the right to an attorney and the right to file for political asylum. Under the terms of the injunction, these rights must be explained in Spanish and English, and no Salvadoran may be coerced to sign voluntary departure forms. The Center for International Policy reported in December 1982 that, since the court ruling, voluntary departures have been more numerous than deportations.

To counter poor conditions at the El Centro, California, detention facility, southwest U.S. church and community groups organized a bail bond fund in late 1981. This fund was used to bond out Salvadoran detainees so they would have greater access to legal resources and more humane living conditions. The Southside Presbyterian Church in Tucson, Arizona, took a leadership role in this venture. The church attempted to assist in the bonding out of all detainees, only to find the detention center filled again the following day with newly apprehended Salvadorans. The futility and expense of this bond effort as a solution to the plight of Salvadorans in the U.S. was quickly realized.

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In early 1982, the church worked to define a more appropriate response "as a people of faith" to the Salvadoran refugee situation. With the failure of the bond project behind them, church members researched the Judeo-Christian scriptural principle of sanctuary and its practice throughout history. On March 24, 1982, after extensive reflection and debate as to legal responsibility, the church declared itself a public sanctuary for Salvadoran refugees, reinstituting an historic religious concept to respond to a contemporary U.S. situation.

In the Scriptures, sanctuary was a provision in Mosaic law that individuals accused of involuntary homicide could retreat to a sanctuary site until they could be tried with due process and without retaliation. A mechanism to provide protection until justice could be meted out, sanctuary was based on the claim that God's law could be invoked in the name of justice and love, in opposition to civil law. This tradition of sanctuary was recognized in both Roman Law and Medieval Canon Law. Provisions of English Common Law also allowed that sanctuaries could be places of refuge for accused criminals to ensure due process in the determination of innocence or guilt or to enable the accused to leave the country in safety. Under English Common Law, every church potentially could serve as a sanctuary site.

The sanctuary tradition emigrated to the U.S. with the waves of immigrants who settled in the seventeenth century: many of the original 13 colonies were founded as places where people could be free to practice their political, social, or religious beliefs without political reprisal. The concept in the U.S. was further illustrated during the period of slavery in the 1800s. Under the provisions of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, suspected runaway slaves could be arrested on request, or on sight, without a warrant and turned over to a claimant; the claimant needed only to offer his word as proof of ownership.

Some in the religious community in the 1800s organized in opposition to the legal proscriptions of the Fugitive Slave Act. They condemned the law, held public forums, and organized antislavery societies. When these activities failed to alter the provisions of the law or the attitudes of the lawmakers, religious men and women established centers of resistance known as the "underground railroad." Through this secret network, slaves received protection and assistance in their passage from the South to the North. "Conductors" assisted these fugitive slaves in their journey and escorted them to wayhouses where they might spend several days in a protected setting. Churches were often used as waystations or sanctuary sites.

The scriptural teachings on sanctuary, the historic legal precedents for sanctuary, and the parallels to sanctuary implemented in opposition to the Fugitive Slave Act provided the foundation for Southside Presbyterian Church to engage in civil disobedience by initiating a sanctuary site for Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees. Refugees assisted across the border by parishes and individuals in Mexico would be provided safekeeping within the Tucson church building once in the U.S.

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The actions of Southside Presbyterian Church became a launching point for a national network to assist Salvadorans and Guatemalans until they could return to their home countries or until other legal remedies were enacted to ensure them of safety. At an historic congregational meeting on July 18, 1982, members of the Wellington Avenue United Church of Christ in Chicago engaged in extensive debate on a response to the Central American situation and then voted overwhelmingly to declare the church a sanctuary for undocumented refugees from Central America. In a letter to the attorney general of the U.S., the church stated that its action reflected its belief "that the current policy and practice of the U.S. government with regard to Central American refugees is illegal (in terms of international law and the Refugee Act of 1980) and immoral."

At a welcoming service in August 1982 in which a Salvadoran family of six was received, officiating clergy proclaimed, "When a church has to break the law in order to provide refuge for homeless people, the struggle for justice has reached a new stage. Now the pastoral has merged with the political, service is prophetic, and love is a subversive activity."

Indeed, the sanctuary project is considered by INS to be in violation of federal law. Though no one has been prosecuted to date, sanctuary project officials acknowledge they can be charged as felons under the Immigration and Nationality Act. That act provides for fines not exceeding $2,000 or imprisonment for a maximum of five years, or both, for harboring of undocumented aliens: $10,000 fines and/or five years imprisonment for conspiracy to harbor; and $2,000 fines and/or five years imprisonment for smuggling.

Even in villages in Honduras, Salvadoran refugees have not always found safety. SR. EVE GILLCRIST

The chairperson of Wellington Avenue UCC's church council responded to these criminal provisions: "Dangerous times call for risky responses. The consequences that may happen to Wellington are minimal in comparison to the pain that happens every day to the people of El Salvador and Guatemala."

Over the last several months of 1982, sanctuary sites were established in Seattle, Washington; Racine and Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Los Angeles, California. Each site was established with the broad-based support of other local churches, synagogues, and religious institutions. For example, the Chicago site had nearly 100 religious endorsers, and the entire Chicago presbytery voted its support. On December 2, 1982, the Roman Catholic archbishop and the Episcopal bishop of Milwaukee joined in a sanctuary inauguration service. In January 1983, a letter signed by over 300 national religious leaders was sent to President Reagan denouncing U.S. policy on Central American refugees.

While members of the religious community continue this asylum approach, they are also working with other community organizations to establish social and legal service programs for Central American refugees. Through volunteer attorneys and financial donations from corporations, foundations, and individuals, local support centers have been established to counsel Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees. This counseling focuses not only on concrete survival needs but also on immigration consultation and legal representation.

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Public debate on the status of Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees is far from resolved. On the one side, the U.S. government takes the position that the majority of undocumented Central Americans in this country are here in search of better employment prospects. Further, U.S. policy and asylum procedures are described as protecting the lives of the few Salvadorans and Guatemalans who truly are in danger of political persecution, as well as protecting the economic rights of U.S. workers through the deportation of Central American "economic migrants." As recently as May 1983, the State Department advised INS that extended voluntary departure status should not be granted to Salvadorans in the U.S. "because it would encourage further illegal immigration to the U.S. from El Salvador (and because the Salvadorans) passed through other countries before they arrived here in which they could have obtained refuge."

Immigration and Naturalization Service statistics reflect the State Department's philosophy; in the period October to December 1982, 1,039 of 1,089 asylum claims filed by Salvadorans were rejected.

On the other side, the international human rights and religious communities claim that U.S. policy towards Central America not only creates more refugees fleeing civil strife and political repression but also treats Central Americans in the U.S. inhumanely, unjustly, and immorally, by deporting them to potential persecution or death. Congressional resolutions and correspondence with administration officials once again urged that EVD status be provided to Salvadorans in mid-1983. Through their action of providing sanctuary, contemporary underground railroad conduc-

tors hope not only to protect individual refugees but also to raise the consciousness of the nation to human rights responsibilities at home and abroad.

While the controversy rages, individuals fleeing El Salvador and Guatemala are left collectively undefined, and they continue arduous individual pursuit of safe haven. Amidst reports of past and present atrocities and persecution in Central America, the debate continues as to whether Salvadorans and Guatemalans in the U.S. are "job-seekers" or "life-seekers." What is clear to persons working with this wave of refugee-like individuals is that they live in fear and seek a day when they can continue their lives in peace and security.

As Juan, the first Salvadoran given sanctuary at Chicago's Wellington United Church of Christ, said, "I hope someday I can return to a safe and free El Salvador. I think that day will come." Until it does or until the issue is resolved, portions of the U.S. religious community, at least, continue to believe that dangerous times call for risky responses.

Our Brother's Keeper?
Theories of Obligation in U.S. Refugee Policy

Each year, the administration undertakes to establish new ceiling levels for refugee admissions. The moral dilemmas involved in selecting nationalities and numbers are not easily solvable. Needless to say, it is quite difficult to build an ethical foundation on which selective policies are going to rest.

In coming to grips with moral determinants of U.S. refugee policy, one must turn to the issue of "obligation," for this is where problems begin. At present, there is no clear consensus among national leaders on what obligations should come into play when establishing a national policy toward the refugee, because there are numerous competing ethical models which seek to define those obligations.

If one's moral basis, for example, is determined by a perspective of a "shared humanity," U.S. obligations toward the rest of the world in regard to the refugee are enormous. The argument has often been made that as we are the world's richest country and because we were instrumental in creating the present international political order, the U.S. has an inherent obligation to assist casualties of political and religious oppression. Guided by such an approach, a non-discriminatory open door policy may therefore be advocated. Our obligation to the refugee then is in a sense Biblical, as it is demanded that we impose restraint and sacrifice upon ourselves in order to aid the less fortunate.

On the other hand, if one's ethical perspective is based upon what could be termed "ally responsiveness," U.S. obligations are more restricted. This approach calls for asylum mainly in the case of people who come from fallen allied democratic regimes or who served as support troops in conflicts to preserve Western values. Under these circumstances, the obligation to the refugee is a formal duty, one which reflects national pride and honor. To deny entry, for example, to an ex-South Vietnamese official or an anti-communist peasant from Laos would be a form of heresy, if not treason, to the cause of democracy.

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In turning from moral obligations based upon foreign policy considerations, there are the domestic variables. The most important ethical determinant in this instance is the American "creed," i.e., fundamental American values and beliefs. According to one school of thought, the traditional role assumed by the U.S. throughout its history as a haven for the oppressed commits the U.S. to an open refugee policy. Moreover, U.S. acceptance of freedom of movement as a basic human right imputes a kind of immorality to the barring of entry to refugees. The national conscience requires to some extent, then, that the myths of the "immigrant nation" and the "open frontier" be preserved. In this light, immigration to the U.S. is perceived more as a right than a privilege and one which should be vigorously protected.

An equally strong moral obligation, the opposition argues, is that which could go under the heading of the "general welfare." Pursuing policies which maintain the integrity and security of the existing culture must also play a role, it is said, in the legislative matrix when it comes to U.S. refugee policy. Inability to absorb, integrate, or accommodate the refugee could create faultlines within the American social fabric. Moreover, an increased number of public charges participating extensively in a welfare-dependent system would only exaggerate resentment toward the federal government by deprived minorities and an already tax-burdened citizenry. Obligations to the general welfare based upon this philosophy would therefore require an ethic rather biased against a generous admissions policy to refugees.

In regard to obligations on behalf of the individual citizen to the refugee, the ethical parameters are even less easily identifiable. Americans as a whole vacillate between "minimal altruism" (which entails that one help others when it can be done without great cost) and "heroicism" (which calls for major personal sacrifice). While the Judeo-Christian ethic obligates the American citizen to assist the less fortunate, the Social Darwinist streak prevents compulsion toward heroic behavior. Thus there is no consistent ethical norm which would obligate the surrender of an individual's high standard of living to come to the aid of the poor. That is to say, no national consensus exists which would accept the curtailment of individual welfare in order to allow the millions of oppressed persons a homeland in the U.S. The dialectic between the rights of the individual and his obligation to others will always remain, offering no solid guidelines for U.S. refugee policy.

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Which among the many possible ethical frameworks will ultimately dictate U.S. refugee policy is open to speculation. However, if it is the case that liberalism as the dominant ideology is on the wane, notions of communal guilt and good samaritanism will no longer have the same strength to sway middle-class America. Thus other moral concepts of obligation will most likely be incorporated into legislation and incorporated in administrative decisions. This being the case, the volume of immigration into this country may even be further restricted.

Richard Feen
Special Consultant to the
Office of the U.S. Coordinator
for Refugee Affairs
May 1983

A Congressional Perspective on Refugee Policy

Rep. Hamilton Fish, Jr.

The American people repeatedly have affirmed their concern for persons escaping persecution. In addition, there is an important interrelationship between America's response to the world refugee situation and the continued vitality of our relationships with other countries. The U.S. Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, in recognition of our historic role in refugee assistance, expressed its support in 1981 for the "continued U.S. commitment to the acceptance and aid of refugees, finding in that commitment not only a well-founded, humanitarian tradition but a means of both stabilizing world order and of reaping national benefit." That same year a special refugee panel, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Marshall Green, persuasively outlined the foreign policy dimensions of United States refugee policy toward Indochina. "United States assistance and resettlement," the Green report noted, "have been vital factors in maintaining stability and unity among (Southeast Asian) nations."

Indochinese refugee children attend an English lesson in Phoenix, Arizona. UNHCR

In spite of the strong humanitarian and foreign policy dimensions to our refugee policy, the administration's consultations with Judiciary Committee members on refugee admissions during the 97th Congress took place against a background of major change in public opinion. The illegal mass migration by boat from Cuba and Haiti had caused many Americans to question our capacity to continue a world leadership role in the acceptance of refugees, even though the present levels of refugee admissions represent only a fraction of the estimated hundreds of thousands of persons coming to the U.S. illegally each year. Resentment toward legitimate refugees had resulted from the flouting of our laws represented by large-scale illegal flows, from a failure by many to recognize the clear distinction between illegal and legal entries, and from the growing burdens imposed by refugee resettlement on states and localities.

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I believe we can assert control over our borders and coasts while continuing to provide refuge to victims of persecution. The appropriate agenda for Congress is not to devise ways for the U.S. to abandon its role in providing hope, opportunity, and freedom for persecuted people, but rather to bring the flow of illegal immigrants under control and improve our resettlement efforts.

My hope is that Congress, during the 1983 session, will adopt strong measures to discourage the entry of illegal immigrants. In addition, we must continue to address the problems in refugee resettlement if we hope to preserve the viability of a humane American response to refugee crises. As Mayor Gordon Bricken of Santa Ana, California, pointed out in congressional testimony, . . . "We need to look at ways to tilt the incentives of the system away from welfare and toward rapid employment and self-sufficiency in order to use, and not frustrate, [refugees'] potential productivity."

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Significant efforts to improve refugee resettlement were made in the last congressional session. In October, Congress passed the Refugee Assistance Amendments of 1982, legislation that extended for an additional year the funding authorization for resettlement activities. Members of Congress, regardless of individual reservations about aspects of our admissions program, united in recognition of the necessity to assist refugees in the U.S. Failure to fund the program, members realized, would have increased the burden on state and local governments and lessened our capacity to provide refugees with the tools to function independently and productively in American communities.

A number of provisions of this legislation promoted the important objective of helping refugees to become self-supporting. A clear statement of congressional intent emphasized job placement as soon as possible after a refugee's arrival in the U.S. Further, Congress recognized the need to explore innovative solutions to meet the legitimate transitional requirements of our refugee population and at the same time guard against the enticements of the welfare system. The 1982 amendments, therefore, authorized a feasibility study and report to Congress on concepts strongly advocated by voluntary resettlement agencies: the utilization of mechanisms other than welfare to provide interim support to refugees who are not employment ready and medical assistance to refugees who do not require cash assistance.

Under the new amendments, voluntary agencies and welfare offices must share certain critical information. Voluntary agencies are to notify welfare offices when they learn that a refugee has been offered employment. This information will assist welfare offices to determine if individuals no longer qualify for assistance. The new law

Hamilton Fish (R-N.Y.) was for many years ranking minority member of the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law. He is currently ranking minority member of the full Judiciary Committee. He served as a member of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy.

specifically provides for the termination of cash assistance if a refugee refuses an appropriate employment offer. The Refugee Assistance Amendments, moreover, strengthen the provision of the Refugee Act that makes availability of cash assistance to an employable refugee conditional on his or her registration with an appropriate employment agency or service: the recent change in the law eliminates an exception that had permitted a refugee to obtain cash assistance without registering during a 60-day period after entry.

In turn, the voluntary agency providing resettlement services must be notified promptly whenever a refugee applies for cash or medical assistance. This notification will afford the agency an opportunity to work with the refugee during the critical period before the refugee becomes dependent on welfare.

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Another section of this legislation emphasizes the importance of initial placement decisions. Under the mandate in this bill, agencies assuming responsibility for refugees generally must avoid placing them in highly impacted areas. Certain close relatives of persons already residing in an area are exempted from this restriction, in recognition of the reality that separation of families may lead to feelings of estrangement and promote unplanned secondary migration. Such secondary movement, in turn, tends to subvert efforts by voluntary agencies to assist refugees to become self-sufficient.

The disproportionate effect of refugees on a relatively few communities can exacerbate tensions and detract from the capacity of local governments to meet the needs of long-term residents. The 1982 legislation recognized that we can attempt to discourage excessive refugee concentrations in the future through our placement policies, but also must address the problems resulting from past initial placements and secondary migration by considering new initiatives in impact aid to states and counties.

The legislation, acknowledging the responsibility of the federal government to aid communities seriously affected by the national refugee admissions program, required the Office of Refugee Resettlement to study the need for a refugee impact aid program. This mandate recognizes both the inevitable increase in public outlays caused by increases in population (whether consisting of refugees or other individuals) as well as the positive impact of new groups moving into a community. With the information provided by this study, Congress will be able to consider an assistance package that addresses a variety of concerns without duplicating impact aid provisions of existing law.

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In the 97th Congress, refugee admissions became an issue during consideration of major immigration legislation. The Senate version of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1982, introduced by Senate immigration subcommittee Chairman Alan Simpson, proposed a ceiling on immigrant admissions of 425,000 annually. Refugee admissions would continue to be treated separately. A proposal by Sen. Walter Huddleston, by contrast, included refugees in the ceiling without making any accommodation in overall numbers. Under the Huddleston amendment to S. 2222, refugees would compete with immigrants for what essentially was the pool of immigrant numbers; any refugee admissions would result in reductions in immigrant admissions the following year. Opportunities for family members in the U.S. to seek reunification with various categories of relatives would be reduced under this proposal each time a refugee was admitted to this country. Provisions of the immigration reform bill already would reduce certain family reunification numbers progressively, in response to projected increases in levels of numerically unlimited immediate family admissions, even without factoring in refugee admissions.

In the Senate debate, Huddleston and Simpson articulated two very different views about the relationship between refugees and immigrants. "[R]efugees," Huddleston argued, "must also be recognized as the immigrants that they are and their numbers, with some flexibility, must come within the ceiling." Simpson contrastingly described refugees and immigrants as "two distinct groups" that "must be treated separately."

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The Huddleston amendment was disturbing for two reasons. First, it put refugees and immigrants together in a single pool—placing the need to save lives in competition with the legitimate desires of our own people to bring relatives to this country. "We all know," Sen. John Danforth pointed out, "who would win that kind of perverse competition [between relatives and refugees]—the relatives of those already here." Second, the proposed amendment effectively eliminated any special provision of refugee numbers, thus cutting back on the total figures available for refugees and immigrants.

In my view, adoption of the amendment would have signaled to the world an abandonment of our leadership role in responding humanely to victims of persecution. The likely result would have been a greatly reduced international rescue effort; first asylum would have been threatened, endangering the lives of many thousands.

Further, by failing to provide realistically for a flexible U.S. response to future refugee crises, provisions of the Huddleston amendment would have fundamentally altered the Refugee Act of 1980. This act was designed to facilitate responses to both foreseeable and emergency refugee situations. It replaced the ad hoc pattern of separate legislation and excessive reliance on the attorney general's parole authority.

The Huddleston amendment was soundly defeated. The following day, however, the Senate faced another effort to circumscribe refugee admissions through legislation. Sen. Dale Bumpers offered an amendment to permit Congress, by concurrent resolution, to block non-emergency admissions in excess of 75,000 in a single year. Simpson, arguing against the amendment, said, "Restraint [in admissions] has come because Congress is finally exercising its muscle in the consultation process." Bumpers, however, expressed

the view that "[i]f we do not put a limit on the number of refugees, then what we are doing on this entire [immigration reform] bill is really for naught." The Senate defeated the Bumpers amendment—but the very narrow margin of 45 to 41 demonstrates that the issue of congressional control over refugee admissions remains very much alive.

This year, renewed efforts to inject refugee admissions into congressional consideration of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1983 can be expected. My hope is that the separation of refugee and immigrant admissions issues can be maintained so that America, in the years ahead, will have the flexibility to respond humanely to future refugee crises.

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Much of the impetus for including refugees within an overall immigration cap has been based on the perception that the consultation mechanism has proved ineffective in controlling the level of U.S. refugee admissions. The mandate for this mechanism, the Refugee Act of 1980, requires the president to engage in "appropriate consultation" before setting the annual level of refugee admissions. The term has been defined by statute and legislative history to mean detailed discussions between cabinet-level representatives of the president and the chairmen and ranking minority members of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees and immigration subcommittees.

Our short experience with the Refugee Act demonstrates that the consultation process has been effective. It has led to a cooperative working relationship between the administration and Congress in setting admissions levels and identifying "refugees of special humanitarian concern" to the U.S. Furthermore, substantial reductions in refugee admissions have been achieved in recent years. The consultation on FY82 admissions resulted in the administration setting the ceiling at a level 33,000 below its initial proposal—and then achieving additional reductions in excess of 40,000 by managing actual admissions to even lower levels. The effect has been a marked decline in actual admissions from 212,000 in FY80 to less than 100,000 in FY82. For FY83, the administration accepted the Senate's suggested admissions ceiling of 90,000, in spite of the fact that three of the four House consultative members did not object to the administration's proposal of 98,000; again, actual admissions well below that ceiling are expected.

It should be noted that this gradual reduction in levels of refugee admissions, particularly from Southeast Asia, has been devised to procede in a way consistent with our international responsibilities. Few dispute that the U.S. vigorously should seek alternatives to resettlement in this country. Congress and the administration have directed attention to reducing "pull factors" that may induce individuals to leave their homelands. Further, our government encourages efforts by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to arrange for voluntary repatriation to countries of origin and pursues, at the highest diplomatic levels, greater internationalization of the burden of refugee resettlement in third countries.

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In 1982, the Judiciary Committees opted for a single-year reauthorization of the Refugee Act in order to provide impetus for Congress, during the following year, to examine some of the fundamental issues in our refugee program, including the definition of "refugee." In defining a refugee, the act addresses an individual's reasons for not returning to his home country. It focuses both on the past ("persecution") and on the future ("a well-founded fear of persecution . . . ")

Some members of Congress claim that the reason for the original decision to leave is the only critical issue—and that the prospect of persecution upon return is insufficient to qualify a person as a refugee. That argument, however, transforms language that focuses on why an individual "is unable or unwilling to return" into a provision that places sole emphasis on reasons for departing.

The absence of a viable opportunity to live in one's own country should remain a key factor in our recognition of claims to refugee status. The approach advocated by members who look exclusively to the situation at the time of departure may lead to the rejection of persons who cannot safely return. Past persecution, however, continues to provide an appropriate basis for designating individuals as refugees: the refugee definition embraces victims of persecution whose experiences have made them "unwilling" to return.

Another issue is whether the definition of refugee should be expanded to include persons persecuted or facing persecution because of their membership in an "economic" group. This debate includes so-called asylees as well as refugees since, under U.S. law, asylum applicants must satisfy the attorney general that they meet the refugee definition. The high rejection rate in Haitian and Salvadoran asylum cases, in the view of some members, "indicates . . . that the refugee definition in the Refugee Act of 1980 is not being uniformly applied."

Although major concerns have been expressed about the application and interpretation of the act, a statutory change in the refugee definition at this time, in my opinion, would be inadvisable. The present language follows the international definition; a change in the American standard might place our domestic law in conflict with our obligations under international law. Change, moreover, could provide the impetus for other nations to take restrictive measures which would compromise important humanitarian goals and undermine our objective of internationalizing refugee resettlement.

The present refugee definition and the requirement that admissions be "allocated among refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States," in my opinion, are sufficiently flexible to permit this country to respond appropriately to foreseeable and unforeseeable refugee situations. The real problems involve implementation of the act rather than the scope of the legislative mandate. The congressional consultation process provides a forum for members of Congress to address these problems without eliminating by legislative change the necessary flexibility inherent in the act's provisions.

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In the continuing debate over U.S. refugee policy, we must never lose sight of what our admissions program has accomplished. The U.S. has saved the lives and futures of countless thousands, promoted the stability of a number of our allies, and set a high standard for the rest of the world. The people who have come to this country as refugees, moreover, have made an inordinate contribution to our society. Our historic experience gives me confidence that we will continue to display compassion toward the persecuted of other lands.

The Economic Adjustment of Southeast Asian Refugees in the U.S.

Robert L. Bach, Linda W. Gordon, David W. Haines, and David R. Howell

Although humanitarian concern continues to be the overriding reason for admitting refugees to the U.S., judgments of the resettlement program depend increasingly on how fast the newcomers attain "self-sufficiency." In recent years, relatively high levels of public assistance use, combined with low labor force participation among the most recent arrivals, have generated alarm among many observers over whether the goal for refugees of self-sufficiency can be reached within a reasonable period following entry to this country. Clearly, the longer the transition period to self-sufficiency, the higher are the costs of the refugee program. In the face of high costs, it may be more difficult for program officials to seek desired levels of refugee admissions.

Reflecting these concerns, a wide variety of explanations has emerged regarding perceived difficulties in the economic adjustment of Southeast Asian refugees in the U.S. Critical commentary has generally focused on three areas: the structure and philosophy of the federal resettlement program; the absorptive capacities of local communities; and the characteristics and behavior of the refugees themselves. The task of assessing the relative significance of these and other factors influencing economic adjustment, however, remains a vexing one. Nationwide variation in individual resettlement experiences, economic conditions, and state program administration, for example, severely limits the possibility of making valid judgments about the overall economic progress of refugees. But the most important source of ambiguity in public debates is often the lack of timely and accurate information documenting trends in refugee economic adjustment.



In Wheaton, Maryland, members of Khmer Classical Ballet work at a variety of jobs and attend classes while keeping the dance troupe together.
KHMER CLASSICAL ARTS ASSOC.

To provide basic information on the economic progress of refugees, the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services conducts an annual survey of Southeast Asian refugees resettled in the U.S. since 1975. The central findings from this survey appear in ORR's annual *Report to the Congress.* The latest survey, conducted in the fall of 1982, was based on a random sample of 1,182 households containing 6,767 persons and representing approximately 600,000 refugees from Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Inteviews were conducted by telephone in the native language of the respondents by ORR's contractor, Opportunity Systems, Inc. The questionnaire focused on refugees' progress toward self-sufficiency, including their use of services and their employment experiences in the U.S.

Although many factors contribute to the overall resettlement process, in the following we concentrate on those which relate directly to economic adjustment because it is this process which contributes most significantly to self-sufficiency, a goal specified in the Refugee Act; because economic issues in general are a major concern in domestic

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policy and politics throughout the U.S. at this time; and because program reauthorization and appropriations, which are both influenced by overall refugee economic progress, are slated for particular attention in 1983. For these reasons, we present data on refugee labor force participation and employment, the influence of refugee background characteristics on economic adjustment, and refugee use of public cash assistance. Each of these factors is presented separately for clarity, although it should be recognized that they are highly interrelated.

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Findings from the 1982 survey follow the general patterns in refugee economic adjustment that have appeared in previous survey efforts. Perhaps most importantly, the data indicate the increasing frequency with which refugees participate in the labor force* over time. In fact, "early arrivals" in the U.S.—those arriving from 1975 to 1978—had higher labor force participation rates at the time of the survey than the general U.S. population. Those who arrived in 1979 were only slightly less likely to be in the labor force than the general U.S. population. A comparison of the 1982 survey with the one conducted in 1981 further documents increased labor force participation rates for Southeast Asian refugees. The overall labor force participation rate for all refugees rose from 50.9 percent to 55.9 percent with particularly sharp rises for those who had been in the U.S. less than one year at the time of the 1981 survey.

Participation in the labor force, however, does not always mean that refugees have been successful in finding employment. Refugee economic progress is strongly affected by the general condition of the U.S. economy. Like many native-born Americans, Southeast Asian refugees have suffered from the current recession. In the fall of 1982, the unemployment rate among refugees was 24.1 percent, more than twice that for the general U.S. population, and significantly higher than the 15.5 percent refugee unemployment rate found in the fall 1981 survey. Even early arrivals appeared to be experiencing more difficulty in finding or keeping jobs during this recent period.

The difficulties faced by refugees in the labor market are clearer when discussed in terms of specific entry cohorts. Data from the fall 1981 survey, for example, indicate that refugees who had arrived during 1980 had a labor force participation rate of 43.4 percent but experienced an unemployment rate of 30.0 percent. By fall 1982, the 1980 cohort had increased its labor force participation to 51.3 percent but had been unable to lower its jobless rate. Following a similar pattern, the last full-year cohort for which we have available information, those arriving in 1981, participated in the labor force during their first year in the country at a rate of only 24.0 percent. This is one of the figures related to progress toward self-sufficiency that alarms many commentators. The unemployment rate in 1981 for this cohort was also a troublesome 40.6 percent. After one year of residence and initial adjustment, the 1981 arrivals' labor force activity jumped to 41.5 percent. Their unemployment rate, however, remained at a level similar to that of their first year—40.7 percent.

TABLE 1
Employment Characteristics in the U.S. by Primary Occupation or Activity in Country of Origin, Persons 16 Years of Age or Over, Fall 1982

Occupation or Activity in Country of Origin	Labor Force Participation in U.S. %	Unemployed in U.S. %
Manager, Professional	73.5%	20.0%
Technical, Sales, Administrative Support	63.7	23.5
Service	68.1	23.9
Farming, Forestry, Fishing	43.1	38.2
Precision Production, Craft, Repair	66.2	26.0
Operator, Fabricator	68.5	39.6
Laborer	48.2	42.0
Military	75.8	25.1
Homemaker	39.1	25.0
Student	49.3	22.8

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A common explanation for refugees' employment experiences in the U.S. is the difficulty that many face in transferring occupational skills which were developed in their country of origin to the labor market in their country of resettlement. Data on their experiences after resettlement, however, support the argument that this is, at best, only a partial explanation. Rather, they suggest that conditions faced in the U.S. after arrival are as much a factor in determining progress toward self-sufficiency as the refugees' personal backgrounds.



ESL classes like this one in St. Louis are an important step in the economic adjustment of Southeast Asian refugees.
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MET. ST. LOUIS

Table 1 shows that diverse occupational experiences in Southeast Asia are not, in general, reflected in differential levels of labor force participation and unemployment in the U.S. Sharing the highest labor force participation rates were refugees who served in the military at home and those who were professionals and managers. At a lower but shared rate, a second group consisted of such diverse occupations as service workers; operators and fabricators; production, craft, and repair workers; and sales and administrative support staff. The least frequent labor market participants included former laborers, farmers or fishermen, homemakers, and students. These occupational differences, however, did not appear to be reflected in rates of joblessness in the same way they were reflected in labor force participation rates, with the exception of laborers and farmers and fishermen, who participated infrequently and experienced high unemployment.

Occupational experiences at home also do not appear to have strongly influenced the types of job secured in the U.S., as Southeast Asian refugees have acquired employment in fairly diverse sectors of the U.S. economy. Roughly

40 percent work in the manufacturing sector, with three out of every four of these employees producing durable goods. Retail trade and professional and related activities comprise the second and third largest industrial concentrations: 23.9 percent and 15.0 percent, respectively. By broad occupational groups, refugees are distributed even more thoroughly through the economy. The four categories of jobs held most frequently contain roughly four-fifths of the working population: included are technical, sales, and administrative support workers (24.4 percent); precision production, craft, and repair workers (22.3 percent); service (21.1 percent); and operators and fabricators (18.6 percent).

Within these broad occupational groups, refugee employment is frequently concentrated in a few specific jobs. These jobs reveal an important dimension of the steps taken by refugees to move toward self-sufficiency. Many of the most frequently held jobs are available because they are

typically characterized by high turnover or represent low-wage, entry-level positions. Of course, in tough economic times, these jobs may be neither temporary nor entry-level, because job mobility, especially upward, is reduced during such periods. The job most frequently held by refugees, janitorial service (6.6 percent), clearly falls within this category. Other prevalent positions include kitchen worker, cook, waiter and waitress, and cashier.

A second type of job opportunity available to refugees appears to lie in the expanding employment sectors. Reflecting the concentration of many refugees in southern California, and perhaps related to the type of training many receive from government programs, a relatively substantial share of the refugees (10.8 percent) work in assembly jobs, particularly those related to electrical and electronic components. If we add to these jobs the more skilled but related occupations in the electronics industry (for example, computer programming), these "high-tech" jobs account for a surprisingly substantial share of the refugee workforce.

These types of jobs are interesting because they provide evidence of the match between the availability of jobs within the U.S.—a factor in refugees' progress toward self-sufficiency over which they or the refugee program have very little control—and the active employment and assistance strategies of the individuals, households, sponsors, and ethnic communities. Obtaining these jobs requires refugees to undertake many of the same labor market adjustments forced by recession upon native-born U.S. workers. Consequently, it seems plausible that precisely as more refugees become actively engaged in the U.S. labor market, a step toward self-sufficiency that everyone applauds, they make adjustments that for native-born workers also produce short-term problems which frequently require additional income assistance, compensation, or participation in training programs.

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A major problem in evaluating refugees' progress toward self-sufficiency is caused by the social and cultural heterogeneity within the refugee population itself. In addition to differences in country of origin, resettlement experience, and access to programs, the refugee population as a whole is continuously supplemented through new arrivals and is therefore different, or potentially different, at each assessment. While calendar years are rather arbitrary units by which to aggregate refugee data and to consider possible differences over time, we do so here to examine a popular claim about the comparatively lower capabilities of recent refugee arrivals. The familiar argument holds that much of the current difficulty in resettlement is due to the lower level of skills and education allegedly characteristic of refugees who have arrived in recent years.

One problem with this argument lies in the nature of the implicit comparison: recent arrivals are less skilled than whom? Few would disagree, for example, that the "first group which left South Vietnam in 1975, like many first waves" of refugees, represented in average terms a population of greater wealth, more education, and higher social status than that country's populace as a whole. But is this the proper comparison group for the majority share of the refugees who arrived in the U.S. during and after 1979 and who originated not only outside Saigon, but from a variety of national and ethnic backgrounds?

Moreover, if the economic problems facing the U.S. and its workforce are also a major source of problems for refugees, as we have suggested, should 1982 arrivals be expected to move toward self-sufficiency at the same rate as, for example, those who arrived in 1979, for whom economic conditions were different?

Results from the 1982 annual survey help distinguish differences within the refugee population over time. As has been observed in previous surveys, the 1975 cohort arrived in the U.S. with a higher average level of education than all subsequent groups. Later cohorts, however, have shared virtually the same level of prior schooling: for example, the cohorts from 1979 to 1982 have roughly seven years of formal schooling abroad; the comparable figure for the 1975 cohort is 9.5 years. Also, perhaps as a result of English language training in the refugee processing centers overseas, the 1981 cohort arrived with a larger share of its members able to speak English fluently or well than the 1980 arrivals, and the refugee cohort arriving in the first four months of 1982 had more proficient English speakers than any cohort since 1976-7. Of course, the proportion of proficient English speakers in any cohort was not high: from 1978 to 1982, roughly 45 percent of each cohort reported they knew no English at all upon their arrival in the U.S.

Previous occupational experiences also do not differ dramatically among cohorts, although the few specific changes in job concentrations are important. For example, the relative share of each cohort reporting no previous occupation has remained virtually the same since 1975, as

has the proportion of civil servants. The primary changes during the past eight years involve a substantial increase in the number of persons who were self-employed in Southeast Asia (see Table 2). Clearly related to this self-employment is an increase in the proportion of farmers and fishermen. Indeed, in the last three years, one of every five workers that came to the U.S. used to be a farmer or fisherman.

This specific occupational shift may help explain the source of popular claims concerning the greater difficulty encountered by more recent arrivals in finding employment. We noted previously that former farmers and fishermen, as an occupational group, have a low labor force participation rate and high unemployment rate after arriving in the U.S.

But quick conclusions from these figures that this subgroup is responsible for current problems of refugee unemployment are unwarranted. First, if it is true that English

This Lao refugee works in a clothing factory in Queens, New York. UNHCR

proficiency and educational backgrounds are not appreciably lower among the recent arrivals, then there is little direct indication that personal skills in this group are inferior to those of former groups. Second, as we have seen, recent arrivals start slowly but move quickly to increase their levels of labor force participation. The FY 82 arrivals, given time, should progress similarly. However, since employment conditions have recently worsened, a significant decline in their unemployment may take longer. Consequently, at this time, it seems unjustified to attribute the slow rate of progress toward self-sufficiency of recent arrivals to specific limitations of their economic background.

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Given the difficulties faced by refugees in finding employment—many of which reflect current constrictions in the American economy—it is hardly surprising that there is substantial utilization of public cash assistance by refugees. The fall 1982 survey indicated that 47.4 percent of all Southeast Asian refugees resided in households which received at least some cash assistance.

TABLE 2
Occupation in Country of Origin by Year of Entry,
All Individuals Employed Abroad, 16 Years of Age or Over

Occupation in Country of Origin	Year of Entry 1975	1976-77	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	Total
Managers, Professionals	23.6%*	10.4%	20.4%	14.0%	13.9%	14.0%	10.2%	16.3%
Technical, Sales, Administrative Support	48.0	59.3	53.8	52.6	38.0	32.5	23.0	41.3
Service	4.9	6.6	6.0	5.6	7.2	5.5	3.6	5.6
Farming, Forestry, Fishing	3.6	27.2	5.8	11.9	23.5	20.0	27.3	15.6
Precision Production, Craft, Repair	11.3	10.6	7.4	12.0	11.9	15.5	22.2	12.9
Operators, Fabricators, Laborers	8.7	10.3	6.6	4.1	5.5	12.7	13.8	8.4

*Percents based on total who were employed in country of origin who arrived in given year.

This figure in itself, however, provides no insight into the important question of whether receipt of cash assistance is a temporary feature in refugee adjustment to the U.S., or a more enduring problem. Here the 1982 survey data are instructive in showing the extent to which utilization of cash assistance decreases over time. When utilization rates are calculated separately by six-month periods of residence in this country, the results show a gradual and continuing decline to a rate of 22.7 percent for those refugees resident for more than 36 months. Further, a comparison of the 1981 and 1982 surveys shows that the various entry cohorts used cash assistance less in 1982 than in 1981. For example, 67.9 percent of 1980 arrivals were in households receiving cash assistance in 1981, but by late 1982 this had declined to 53.9 percent. For 1979 arrivals, the decline was from 62.9 percent to 42.1 percent, and for 1978 arrivals it was from 52.7 percent to 31.6 percent.

Further analysis of the utilization of cash assistance by refugees, however, requires a recognition of household composition and need as important factors. Data from the 1982 survey, for example, show that the probability that households receive assistance increases directly with household size. One way to see the effect of this is to calculate the cash assistance utilization rates on the basis of households rather than on the basis of individuals who live in households which receive assistance. Because of the greater frequency with which large households receive assistance, such a calculation provides a utilization rate of 40.6 percent, as compared to a rate of 47.4 percent calculated on the basis of individuals.

An alternate way to see the effects of household size and composition is to compare the aggregate characteristics of households receiving cash assistance with those of households not receiving such assistance. Table 3 presents such a comparison. In contrast to households which do not receive aid, the average recipient household has at least one more person to support. Not only are recipient households larger, but they contain a proportionately greater number of dependent children, computed either as those aged less than 6 or those aged less than 16. Recipient households thus have greater need than non-recipient households, a need taken into account not in wage rates but in assistance policies and benefit levels. Additionally, the data suggest that adults in recipient households not only must deal with greater household need but also experience more difficulties in becoming employed. As indicated in Table 3, adults in

TABLE 3
Use of Cash Assistance by Southeast Asian Refugee Households in the United States, Fall 1982

Household Characteristics	Recipient Households	Non-Recipient Households
Mean Household size	5.1	3.8
Mean Number of Persons with a Job in Household	0.5	1.6
Mean Percent of Members less than 6 Years of Age	14.5%	9.0%
Mean Percent of Members less than 16 Years of Age	38.1%	24.5%
Percent of Households with at least one Fluent English Speaker	2.4%	15.0%
Mean Percent of all Adult Household Members who are Looking for Work or Working	24.0%	59.6%
Mean Percent of all Adult* Household Members who are Looking for Work but do not have a Job	14.4%	7.7%

*Base population includes all persons aged 16 and over, regardless of potential barriers to employment.

recipient households are less likely to be working or seeking work than their counterparts in non-recipient households, and they are also less likely to find work when they seek it. One key problem is the lesser likelihood that recipient households will include at least one fluent English speaker (2.4 percent versus 15 percent for non-recipient households).

One final comparison between recipient and non-recipient households is instructive in examining the achievement of self-sufficiency by refugees: on the average, recipient households have .5 persons who hold a job, whereas non-recipient households have an average of 1.6 persons who are employed.

The .5 figure is a reminder that many recipient households do include an adult who holds some kind of job, but that this job provides insufficient income to meet all family needs. For many refugee households, receipt of cash assistance is thus a supplement to, rather than a replacement for, earned income. The average of 1.6 employed persons for non-recipient households suggests that, given relatively low wage and salary levels, self-sufficiency for many refugee households is only achieved through the efforts of multiple wage-earners within the household. This is because a single job, especially if it is a low-paying one, is unlikely to be sufficient to support an entire household.

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While there is still much to learn about the economic adjustment of refugees, the survey information presented in this discussion documents some progress that has been made toward understanding that process. It is not yet possible to draw conclusions about either the economic status of refugees or the processes of adjustment which lead to self-sufficiency. However, it is evident that many factors are involved and that some which have been accepted as important are perhaps only marginally so. At the very least, these data suggest that as refugees move toward self-sufficiency, they are overcoming quite serious obstacles in doing so.

*Those considered to be in the labor force include all individuals who are working or who are actively seeking employment. The unemployment rate is the percentage of those in the labor force who are not employed. These definitions and the occupation categories and definitions used in the survey from which these data are derived are the same as those used by the U.S. Department of Labor.

Refugee Resettlement: A Bright Achievement

The record of the U.S. with regard to refugee admissions and resettlement is one of our brightest achievements—since 1975, we have brought into our nation's communities over 828,000 refugees, some 600,000 Indochinese alone. Most refugees who have come since World War II have assimilated successfully into the mainstream of American life and have become loyal citizens and productive members of their communities.

In the international arena, the U.S. continues to accept more refugees for permanent resettlement than any other country of the world. We in the Congress believe that it is in the best humanitarian and foreign policy interests of the U.S. to continue generous refugee admissions.

Nevertheless, the record numbers of refugees coming to the U.S. in the past few years, coupled with a resettlement program which makes extensive use of federal cash assistance, have generated substantial problems for recent refugees, their sponsors, and the federal agencies charged with implementing the Refugee Act of 1980. Moreover, we are increasingly becoming a major country of first asylum for persons fleeing persecution in this hemisphere: the number of persons in the U.S. whose asylum cases are pending has grown dramatically even since 1979.

It is indeed unfortunate that we resort to numbers when discussing the fate of flesh and blood human beings. But Congress has determined that refugee resettlement is a federal responsibility: local taxpayers cannot be asked to absorb the costs of this effort. And the fact is, if the costs continue to rise, admissions levels must necessarily be reduced, for it is unfair to shift these burdens to the states and counties which have been most generous in accepting refugees into their communities.

Let me stress that Congress does recognize the tremendous work which has been achieved in refugee assistance in the U.S. and around the world, often at great personal and organizational expense. One must also acknowledge the advances which have been made on the local and national levels in improved communication among all of those involved in the resettlement effort—churches, voluntary organizations, state and local governments, federal agencies, and the refugees themselves. Such communication and cooperation is essential if the program is to work as Congress has intended.

This country was founded by persons fleeing persecution in their homelands and seeking freedom and a better life. The U.S. has achieved a great moral and humanitarian accomplishment in this regard throughout our history. Despite our limitations and our human faults, we remain a nation of great strength and compassion—a visible tribute to the ideals of democracy and the inherent dignity of the individual. We must continue to ensure that the U.S. maintains its fair share of the world refugee responsibility, in a way which is consistent with the short-term economic goals and the longer-term ideals and principles which govern this nation.

Senator Alan K. Simpson
Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy

The Indochinese in America: Progress Towards Self-Sufficiency

John Finck

When Congress, public and private agencies, and the American public consider the recent experience of domestic resettlement, they are confronted with the suspicion in some quarters that the program is unduly expensive, especially because of continuing welfare dependency among refugees. But the progress Indochinese refugees have made in communities around the country should not be ignored. It would be wise to look at cities and other areas where steady progress continues to be made towards integrating the Indochinese into the stream of American life.

Providence, Rhode Island, is one city recently determined to be "heavily impacted" by the large number of Indochinese who have become its newest residents. How has a New England industrial city with a per capita concentration of refugees as high as any city in California (the state with the largest Indochinese refugee population) managed its resettlement resources? How are the Indochinese, especially the Hmong, doing in terms of achieving self-sufficiency and finding a place in a multi-ethnic, multi-racial urban center?

Many Hmong resettled in Rhode Island have experienced successful assimilation. ELLEN KURAS

Like other American cities, Providence is firmly locked in the jaws of the recession. The number of jobless has been at its highest level in more than 30 years; when adjusted for seasonal factors, the state's unemployment rate stood at 11.3 percent in January 1983. In the same month, the national unemployment rate was 10.4 percent.

The refugees—whether from Cambodia, the Soviet Union, or Ethiopia—could not have chosen a bleaker moment to try to crack the job market. Despite the daunting statistics, however, the majority of refugees in Rhode Island are supported by paid employment. Of the state's 7,700 refugees, only 2,089 received assistance in January 1983, and one-third of this number were categorically eligible for Aid to Families with Dependent Children, presumably not able to work because of incapacity, disability, or the absence of a parent. If the number of refugees eligible for AFDC is set aside from the number receiving assistance in Rhode Island, it leaves only 18 percent of refugee heads-of-household unemployed, an amazing accomplishment in the face of the local unemployment rate.

Taken as a whole, the Indochinese have only a 6.6 percent higher unemployment rate than other residents of Rhode Island. Some communities are doing even better. None of the 55 Hmong families in Fort Smith, Arkansas, receives welfare. Utah reports an 11 percent dependency rate, while in Arizona only 9 percent of the refugee population receives assistance. In the New England states, Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire also report low dependency rates.

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It comes as no surprise that, as a group, the Vietnamese move toward self-sufficiency more rapidly than other Indochinese groups. What amazes many observers in Providence is how the Hmong, who came to the West with the least preparation, have organized their community and encouraged one another to accept the realities of their new lives.

Many Hmong came to cities like Providence from refugee camps in Thailand, bringing farm equipment, expecting to plant rice and vegetables. One such Hmong, Moua Yang, a slender man of 25, spoke but a few words of English on the day of his arrival. His wife spoke even less. It was his grandfather who gave the young man and his family the emotional support to bear the early months. Moua, already the father of two, enrolled in an English as a Second Language class. At night, he tried to teach his children what he had learned by day. His son's first English word was "Pepsi." Encouraged by his grandfather, Moua found a job at a local wire company. He tried to study for his high school equivalency exam at night but found he could not concentrate after the long factory day. After six months on the job, he was laid off.

As for Moua, the greatest challenge facing the refugees, regardless of where they are living and the agencies which help them, is finding enough jobs. Once jobs are found, however, employers in Providence who have hired the Indochinese are enthusiastic about their performance. The Indochinese have had notable success in companies where piece-work is valued. In packing, assembling, cutting, grading, or polishing—jobs that require manual dexterity—the

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Indochinese have shown that they can meet or surpass production quotas. Employers also value the refugees' reluctance to participate in the formation of unions.

Cities with large refugee populations have experimented with innovations to encourage employers to hire Indochinese. In one promising strategy, the employer is asked to hire one experienced, bilingual refugee worker. If the individual "works out," the company is asked to hire other refugees who speak little English but who can be trained by the more experienced refugee who has already proven his or her value to the company.

In collaboration with the U.S. Catholic Conference, the Rhode Island state refugee coordinator has pursued another strategy. He has hired an actress to speak before companies who have yet to hire any Indochinese. Job opportunities sparked by these presentations will be referred to the employment office under contract to the state refugee program, which has a skills bank of all the refugees who are unemployed. There will also be presentations before local churches to ask not for another batch of clothes or load of used furniture, but for jobs for the refugees.

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Most Indochinese have turned to wage income for support. But a few brave souls have opened their own businesses. In Santa Ana, California, hundreds of Vietnamese-owned stores have opened in the last two years, offering every conceivable product or service. The number of stores and professional offices in that city now warrants a Vietnamese Chamber of Commerce. Nationally, many refugee-owned businesses have been financed within the ethnic communities that support them.

Even in a city as small as Providence, the Lao, Cambodians, and Hmong have opened stores in the past year. The Indochinese community includes a Cambodian jewelry repair store, a Cambodian ethnic-Chinese restaurant, a Lao restaurant, and a Hmong grocery store. Downtown, a group of Americans, aided by a $10,000 grant from a local foundation, opened a retail store to market Hmong textiles. Last year the store sold close to $50,000 worth of merchandise.

In most instances, refugee-owned businesses are opened without technical aid or assistance from Americans. When refugees have turned to the Small Business Administration for help, they have received numerous booklets, flyers, and pamphlets—but little practical advice. Refugees interested in agricultural work face similar problems. The Hmong community in Little Rock, Arkansas, for example, has purchased 240 acres of potentially arable land for $43,200 on a site 70 miles from the state capital. They plan to clear the land, but they have no tractor. They want to plant dry upland rice but do not know a supplier of seeds. The right kind of technical help on a local level could do much toward the development of this land into a profitable farm.

Nationwide, there is a growing awareness in Indochinese communities that they stand to benefit more from business advisors than from social workers. Some of the voluntary agencies have already recognized this need. Church World Service has raised over $1 million to purchase land outside of the Twin Cities, Minnesota, for a large farming project. Efforts like these generate hope among refugee communities that they are not destined to remain at minimum wage forever, boning chicken, scaling fish, or sweeping floors.

Moua enrolled in an English as a Second Language class. At night, he tried to teach his children what he had learned by day. His son's first English word was "Pepsi."

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Nearly all Indochinese regard education as their way out of the "poor people's melting pot." In all of their cultures, teachers are revered and respected, and education is valued even in families where the parents cannot read or write. American high school teachers have been surprised when Indochinese parents have asked them to be tougher with their children, who excel in math, enjoy science, and struggle with English. In Dallas, Hmong teenagers have formed a homework club that meets each week for practice and review sessions. They have invited college admissions officers to meetings to seek their advice on getting into college.

These and other special groups the Indochinese have organized in their own communities help to keep teenagers in high school with hope for the future. Some groups were started as refugee leaders realized that large numbers of girls were leaving high school to get married. Estimates in Providence range from 75 to 90 percent of the teenage Hmong girls who begin their adult lives with children and no high school diploma. Although early marriage is culturally sanctioned, it greatly concerns ethnic leaders who want their people to break out of the poverty cycle.

Among adults, men often begin their English language training with the advantage of some prior schooling, but the women have proven eager students. In some cases, they have overtaken their husbands in conversational abilities because they are more willing to make the mistakes that learning a new and difficult language requires and to initiate conversations with Americans. In cities like Providence, where more Indochinese women than men are employed, the requirement of speaking English in the workplace gives the women extra practice.

Special learning opportunities occasionally open for the Indochinese. Last year in Providence, a private foundation made an unsolicited grant of $100,000 to a local church for the purpose of opening a school to teach basic English to Indochinese widows and widowers. The school opened last fall, enrolling 100 adults, many of whom had never been to school before. Although these adults are enthusiastic students, their progress has been slow and painful. For them, even learning how and where to wait for their school bus each morning required dealing with such concepts as telling time, punctuality, and repetition of an activity on a daily basis. They had to learn proper dress for winter mornings and to be confident that the bus will come, even if it is late.

For many of the older Indochinese women, going to school on their own is a remarkable departure from their past. Making decisions outside of the home, away from their husbands, in a classroom setting, is without precedent. Some will learn, but others will not. The non-learners will need the protection of their families and will probably never become wage-earning Americans. But even for them, through programs like this and others around the country, such valuable survival skills as safety, sanitation, protection from crime, and the rights of tenants are being taught and learned.

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Crime continues to plague refugees, no matter where they live. In early 1983, the *New York Times* reported that 22 major crimes, not including muggings, were committed against 150 Cambodians living in a small area in Brooklyn during a six-month period. Finally, the Cambodians were evacuated to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, by World Relief, a voluntary agency.

In Providence, an arsonist robbed a Cambodian family and burned their house as they watched. The incident was reported in the local newspaper, resulting in hundreds of dollars of contributions to the displaced family.

Unreported are the daily break-ins, the harassments, and verbal abuse that refugees endure as they walk to school or the grocery store. Many families in Providence are afraid to leave their homes unattended. Cambodian and Hmong leaders believe their people are singled out for attack, although the police say that the refugees live in a high crime area where everyone is at equal risk.

Although language barriers often prevent refugees from reporting crimes in progress, police departments across the country have not shown great zeal in hiring bilingual staff, thereby compromising their ability to investigate complaints filed by the Indochinese. Although the Providence

In Providence, Rhode Island, 350 Hmong families cultivate a communal seven-acre garden. JOHN FINCK

police have not added any Indochinese to their staff yet, the department's ranking officers recognize the communication barriers and have shown genuine interest in providing more effective police intervention.

The city of Portland, Oregon, has devised a temporary measure to reduce some of the barriers between the Indochinese and such vital emergency services as police and fire protection. In that city, anyone, American or Indochinese, may call a special number, 24 hours a day, that will put them directly in touch with an emergency interpreter at the refugee office. After working hours, a switchboard immediately connects the caller, via a conference call, to a bilingual interpreter at his or her home. Thus, refugees in Portland have a go-between for quick exchange of emergency information. Cities with large numbers of limited-English speaking refugees can easily replicate this three-way method of linking callers to interpreters.

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Regardless of whether the Indochinese live in small cities or large ones, they tend to be isolated from the surrounding community. Many Lao, Cambodian, Hmong, and Vietnamese adults seldom talk to an American other than their sponsor, a teacher, or a doctor, and even that is often through an interpreter. Because the refugees have not become well integrated into their American communities, many Americans have little idea of who they are, where they came from, or how they are doing. With few exceptions, Indochinese leaders are reluctant to stand up before the local Rotary or Lions Clubs to tell their stories. In many communities, the Indochinese have avoided establishing contact with the press and do not yet see the media as a way of building public support for their presence.

At the same time, many refugee families say they would like to have American friends but do not know how to begin these relationships. They worry, especially, that their limited English will make it impossible to talk with Americans. A program to reduce cultural isolation called "Family to Family" has been organized by a number of churches in Providence. The program links Americans who would like to meet an Indochinese family with a Hmong or Lao or Cambodian family. After the Americans receive some initial orientation, the program sponsors events such as a traditional Thanksgiving dinner or, in the summer, a picnic, where Indochinese and Americans can meet each other in an informal setting, with the expectation that each family will later invite the other to their home. Because "Family to Family" is based on reciprocal relationships, it differs dramatically from traditional refugee sponsorship. The program costs nothing and, in Providence, has become an educational experience for all concerned.

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An estimated 600,000 Indochinese have taken their places beside other immigrant and refugee groups in hundreds of communities across the country. Analysts have not yet predicted when the amount of taxes paid by the Indochinese will exceed the amount of money spent for their resettlement. But the question clearly is not whether it will happen, but when and how soon.

Indochinese shed the label "refugee" at different rates, depending on where they came from and where they have settled. A balanced assessment of domestic resettlement will show that the ability of cities and towns to promote refugees' self-sufficiency varies as dramatically as the cultures of the refugees who are resettled there. Examples of successful resettlement should be proclaimed from the highest mountain for all to hear and be heartened.

A Slow Transition

. . . [T]he Hmong transition remains painfully slow. John Finck (a Hmong specialist for the Rhode Island Office of Refugee Resettlement) recalls taking a group of older Hmong from Providence to Plimoth Plantation—a reconstruction of a 17th-century Pilgrim village. The Hmong examined the chickens and the pigs, took samples of the herbs and affectionately rubbed the thatched-roof houses —not unlike the ones they left behind.

When they were about to leave, Soua Xai Thao, a small man with gray bristles poking from his leathery chin, leaned on his cane and asked Mr. Finck through an interpreter: "Can we move here and make this our home?"

Wall Street Journal
February 16, 1983

1983 World Refugee Statistics and Country Reports

Among the most frequent inquiries about refugees are those about numbers: How many refugees are in Africa? How many Afghans are in Pakistan? Where is the world's largest refugee population? How many refugees are women? How many Salvadorans have fled their country? How many refugees have been resettled since 1975?

Such questions can be stated simply, and figures to respond to them are available from a variety of sources. But these numbers are too often used uncritically and with apparent certitude.

There are numerous complexities surrounding refugee population counts which affect their validity, comparability, and utility: Who is being counted as a refugee? By whom? For what purpose? By what means? Responses to these questions, in turn, involve politics, history, sentiment, and semantics. Obviously, too, the numbers are not static, and the timing of a census is important.

Some of the issues involved in national and international deliberations about who is a refugee are addressed in papers in this *Survey*. Reliable counts of such people, once defined, depend on their being known and acknowledged by recognized agencies—governments or international assistance groups—or perhaps even trusted individuals or interest groups. Even among recognized agencies, there may be profound differences: UNHCR and numerous human rights groups, for example, refer to large numbers of Salvadorans as refugees; the U.S. considers the majority "economic migrants" or illegal aliens, although generally respected media in this country freely use the term refugee. Still further, agents may provide the firmest counts based on those people to whom they provide aid, while acknowledging the number beyond their programs to be somewhat or even significantly larger.

An important definitional issue is when an individual ceases to be a refugee. Legal, political, humanitarian, and psychological responses here would vary, although everyone would probably agree that the status ceases to be salient at some point. UNHCR, for example, ceases to count as refugees individuals who have obtained a permanent legal status in a nation (often citizenship, when it is possible to obtain such information), or when repatriation occurs.

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Spurred by the need to make meaningful plans for assistance, agencies, governments, and researchers are working to make sharper distinctions between refugees in immediate need of sustenance, shelter, and legal protection and those for whom such needs are less pressing. Among this latter group would be refugees who have been formally resettled in new homelands, as for example Southeast Asians in Australia, Canada, the U.S., France, and other "third countries" around the world. Also included would be refugees who have been permitted to stay permanently in the country where they sought asylum—a solution sometimes referred to as "settlement in place." Ill-defined are the people who stay in such asylum countries, largely with the acquiescence of the host government, but either they or the host do not consider this a final resolution of their status as refugees. Many in Europe and Africa are considered to fall in this nebulous category, and reporting of numbers and provision of aid to them may not follow consistent patterns.

In the face of such definitional issues, matters of reliability of data collection methods and instability of populations over time pale, but they should not be forgotten. In Pakistan in 1982, for example, significant effort was made to recount the Afghan refugee population to overcome largely methodological and field problems of earlier counts.

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In reporting its statistics this year, USCR is striving to provide data which are useful and responsible and which reflect to the best of our ability the state-of-the-art of counting refugee populations. As in the past, we rely on other sources which we judge, in turn, to be responsible. The sources used are listed below; an annotated list attributing each count to its source will be available from USCR. Efforts have been made to ensure comparability of figures; for example, most of the counts reflect populations reported by sources in mid-1982.

In a significant departure from the 1982 *Survey*, we have attempted to separate specifically refugees in need (see Table 1) and those resettled or generally deemed to be settled or otherwise "no longer in need" (see Table 2). Last year, these latter categories were included in an asylum/settlement/resettlement country's count and an estimate of 25 percent of the overall refugee population "no longer in need" was reported. We share with other agencies a sense of discomfiture with this label and concept, and it is here in particular that we will encourage and seek further refinements in next year's data collection and reporting.

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While we are confident that judicious decisions have been made in choosing sources and figures, we stress that none of the numbers should be interpreted absolutely. Rather, they should be considered measures of magnitude and indicators of relative impact of the refugee population on home countries and countries of asylum/settlement/resettlement. Further, the sheer number should not be considered the only indication of the gravity of a given situation—Tables 3 and 4, which present refugee populations in relation to size of native populations and to countries' gross national products, introduce some of the other factors which should be taken into account.

The country reports which follow the statistical tables provide still other information to allow more sophisticated interpretation of the numbers. These reports cover countries from which refugees flee as well as those to which they flee or in which they find permanent resolution to their situation. Omitted from this year's reports (though they may be included in statistical tables) are countries whose situations are little changed from last year. Readers are referred to the *World Refugee Survey 1982* for amplification in such cases.

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Voluntary repatriation numbers reflect those people who participated in formal programs administered by UNHCR (see Table 5). Assuredly there are instances of informal (privately undertaken) voluntary returns to homelands, but data on such cannot be deemed reliable.

Special caution should be taken in using figures for internally displaced populations (see Table 6). These are people displaced within their homeland by civil strife or persecution, sometimes also affected by drought or other natural

disaster. Although they share many characteristics with refugees who cross an international border, they are generally not eligible for international assistance as refugees (though often the same or similar mechanisms are used). No agency currently has the capacity or responsibility for keeping track of all the displaced people; therefore, available figures are offered here as general estimates, acknowledging that many large groups in different parts of the world are uncounted and unreported. Because the figures are inconclusive, no total of internally displaced people is provided.

With somewhat more certainty, the amounts of financial assistance provided to international agencies by countries can be reported (see Graph 1). However, due to reporting difficulties, information from the World Food Program could not be included, nor could individual countries' contributions to the European Economic Community be specifically credited. Bilateral aid, some forms of aid which are not exclusively or even primarily designated for refugees, and aid through such agencies as the World Bank which may benefit refugees are not reflected in these tables. Once again, relative import of contribution should be considered not only in terms of absolute size, but also size in relation to each nation's per capita income and gross national product (see Table 7).

Editor

(1) Country/Area of Asylum
(2) Source Country/Area

AFRICA		
(1)Algeria		**54,000**
(2)W. Sahara	50,000	
Chile	1,000	
Others	3,000	
Angola		**93,000**
Namibia	70,000	
Zaire	18,000	
S. Africa	5,000	
Botswana		**1,300**
Angola, Namibia, S. Africa, Lesotho		
Burundi		**55,000**
Rwanda	50,000	
Others	5,000	
Cameroon		**1,000**
Chad		
Central Af. Rep.		**5,600**
Chad		
Djibouti		**31,500**
Ethiopia		
Egypt		**1,200**
Ethiopia, Armenia, Chad, Afghanistan		
Ethiopia		**5,400**
Sudan		
Kenya		**3,800**
Ethiopia	1,500	
Rwanda	1,200	
Other	1,100	
Lesotho		**1,100**
South Africa		
Niger		**5,500**
Chad		
Nigeria		**400**
Chad		
Rwanda		**60,000**
Uganda	45,000	
Burundi	15,000	
Senegal		**5,200**
Guinea-Bissau and others		
Somalia		**500,000**
Ethiopia		
Sudan		**513,000**
Ethiopia	350,000	
Uganda	150,000	
Chad	5,000	
Zaire	8,000	
Swaziland		**a,300**
S. Africa	6,000	
Other	300	
Tanzania		**155,000**
Burundi	124,700	
Zaire	23,000	
S. Africa	3,000	
Rwanda	2,300	
Malawi	2,000	
Uganda		**102,900**
Rwanda	69,900	
Zaire	32,000	
Ethiopia	1,000	
Zaire		**270,000**
Angola	200,000	
Uganda	35,000	
Rwanda	22,000	
Burundi	11,000	
Zambia	2,000	
Zambia		**49,800**
Angola	37,000	
Zaire	5,800	
Namibia	4,800	
S. Africa	2,200	
TOTAL AFRICA		**1,921,000**
EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC		
Burma		**1,000**
China, Malaysia, Other Asia		
China		**1,500**
Vietnam		
Hong Kong		**12,000**
Vietnam		
Indonesia		**12,800**
Vietnam	7,000	
*Processing Center	5,800	
Japan		**1,800**
Vietnam		
Laos		**3,500**
Cambodia		
Macau		**1,000**
Vietnam		
Malaysia		**8,400**
Vietnam		
Philippines		**14,900**
Vietnam	3,900	
*Processing Center	11,000	
Singapore		**500**
Vietnam		
Thailand		**169,000**
Cambodia	84,000	(does not include border camps)
Laos	76,000	
Vietnam	9,000	
Vietnam		**30,000**
Cambodia		
TOTAL E. ASIA/PACIFIC		**256,400**
EUROPE		
Austria		**17,700**
Poland	14,600	
Other E. Eur.	3,100	
Greece		**3,400**
Iraq, Iran		
Italy		**6,500**
E. Eur., Ethiopia, Iraq		
Turkey		**300**
E. Eur., Afghanistan, Iran		
Yugoslavia		**2,800**
E. Eur.		
TOTAL EUROPE		**30,700**
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN		
Argentina		**12,300**
Europe, Latin Amer., S.E. Asia		
Belize		**5,000**
El Salvador		
Brazil		**5,400**
Europe, Latin Amer.		
Chile		**1,500**
Europe		
Costa Rica		**15,000**
El Salvador	10,000	
Other Latin Amer.	5,000	
Dominican Rep.		**5,000**
Haiti		
Guatemala		**70,000**
El Salvador		
Honduras		**33,300**
El Salvador	20,000	
Nicaragua	12,000	
Other	1,300	
Mexico		**140,000**
El Salvador	120,000	
Guatemala	20,000	
Nicaragua		**22,500**
El Salvador	22,000	
Guatemala	500	
Panama		**1,500**
El Salvador	1,000	
Other	500	
Peru		**500**
Europe, Latin Amer.		
Venezuela		**500**
Europe, Latin Amer.		
TOTAL LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN		**312,500**
MIDDLE EAST/SOUTH ASIA		
Gaza Strip		**377,000**
Palestinians		
India		**4,700**
Afghanistan	4,000	
Iran	700	
Iran		**560,000**
Afghanistan	500,000	
Iraq	60,000	
Jordan		**749,000**
Palestinians		
Lebanon		**242,100**
Palestinians	239,000	
Other	3,100	
Pakistan		**2,800,800**
Afghanistan	2,800,000	
Iran	800	
Syria		**221,000**
Palestinians		
West Bank		**341,000**
Palestinians		
TOTAL MIDDLE EAST/S. ASIA		**5,295,600**
TOTAL		**7,816,200**

*In transit to third country.

Country	Total
AFRICA	
Ethiopia	5,400
Zaire	200,000
TOTAL	205,400
EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC	
Australia	317,000
China	265,000
New Zealand	10,600
Malaysia	70,000
TOTAL	664,800
EUROPE	
Austria	30,000
Belgium	22,000
Denmark	1,800
Germany (FRG)	100,000
France	150,000
Greece	4,000
Italy	13,500
Netherlands	13,000
Norway	6,000
Portugal	7,600
Romania	1,000
Spain	21,900
Sweden	20,000
United Kingdom	146,000
Yugoslavia	1,100
TOTAL	537,900
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN	
Cuba	2,000
TOTAL	2,000
NORTH AMERICA	
Canada	353,000
United States	1,003,000
TOTAL	1,356,000

CONTINENT TOTALS	
AFRICA	205,000
EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC	664,800
EUROPE	537,900
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN	2,000
NORTH AMERICA	1,356,000
TOTAL	2,765,700

Afghanistan	3,304,000	El Salvador	241,000
Palestinians	1,927,000	Angola	237,000
Ethiopia	883,000	Uganda	230,000
Indochina	256,400		

Country	Ratio	Population (In Millions)	Refugees	GNP Per Capita
Jordan	1:5	3.5	749,000	$1,420
Somalia	1:9	4.6	500,000	N/A
Lebanon	1:11	2.7	242,100	N/A
Zambia	1:12	6.0	49,800	560
Djibouti	1:16	.5	31,500	480
Pakistan	1:33	93.0	2,800,800	300
Sudan	1:39	19.9	513,000	470
Belize	1:40	.2	5,000	1,080
Syria	1:43	9.7	221,000	1,340
Angola	1:73	6.8	93,000	470
Iran	1:73	41.2	560,000	N/A
Burundi	1:80	4.4	55,000	200
Rwanda	1:90	5.4	60,000	200
Swaziland	1:95	.6	6,300	680
Guatemala	1:110	7.7	70,000	1,110
Zaire	1:112	30.3	270,000	220
Nicaragua	1:115	2.6	22,500	720
Uganda	1:121	13.7	102,900	280
Honduras	1:121	4.0	33,300	560
Lesotho	1:127	1.4	1,100	390
Gaza	1:1.3	.5	377,000	N/A
W. Bank	1:2.4	.8	341,000	N/A

Country of Resettlement	Ratio of Refugees to Population	Total Population (in millions)	Total # of Resettled Refugees	GNP Per Capita
Australia	1:47	15.0	317,000	$ 9,820
Canada	1:69	24.4	353,000	10,130
U.S.	1:231	232.0	1,003,000	11,360
Austria	1:253	7.6	30,000	10,230
New Zealand	1:292	3.1	10,600	7,090
France	1:348	54.2	150,000	11,730
United Kingdom	1:384	56.1	146,000	7,920
Sweden	1:415	8.3	20,000	13,520
Belgium	1:450	9.9	22,000	12,180
Germany	1:617	61.7	100,000	13,590
Norway	1:683	4.1	6,000	12,650
Netherlands	1:1100	14.3	13,000	11,470
Portugal	1:1302	9.9	7,600	2,350
Spain	1:1750	37.9	21,900	5,350
Greece	1:2450	9.8	4,000	4,520

To Guinea Bissau, 1975	45,000
To Angola, 1975	300,000
To Mozambique, 1975	84,000
To Zaire from Angola, 1978	150,000
To Burma from Bangladesh, 1978	200,000
To Nicaragua, 1979	100,000
To Angola from Zaire, 1979	50,000
To Equatorial Guinea, 1979	30,000
To Uganda, 1979	30,000
To Cambodia from Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, 1979-82	420,000
To Laos from Thailand, 1979-82	11,000
To Zimbabwe, 1980	250,000
To Chad, 1981-82	150,000
To Ethiopia from Sudan, 1981-82	61,000

AFRICA

Angola—tens of thousands (International Committee of the Red Cross program reaching 70,000 in 1982).
Chad—large portion of 4.6 million population displaced by drought and civil strife; 50,000 are assisted by CARE.
Ethiopia—64,000 to 250,000.
Uganda—35,000.

ASIA

Thailand-Cambodia border—230,000 displaced Cambodians.

LATIN AMERICA

El Salvador—225,000 internally displaced.
Guatemala—30,000 to 250,000.
Nicaragua—500,000.

MIDDLE EAST

Lebanon—60,000 homeless.

To UN High Commissioner for Refugees....	$344,920,420
To Intergovernmental Committee for Migration	72,268,000
To UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.....	181,958,000
Total	**$526,878,420**

Country	Contribution Per Capita	Population (in millions)	Contribution (in millions of dollars)	GNP Per Capita
Norway	$3.82	4.1	$ 15.7	$12,650
Denmark	3.04	5.1	15.5	12,950
Sweden	3.02	8.3	25.1	13,520
Quatar	2.12	0.3	0.6	26,080
Switzerland	1.54	6.5	9.7	16,440
Kuwait	1.49	1.5	2.2	22,840
Canada	1.14	24.4	27.8	10,130
U.S.	1.05	232.0	244.4	11,360
Liechtenstein	0.79	0.03	0.02	N/A
Netherlands	0.77	14.3	11.0	11,470
Australia	0.76	15.0	11.4	9,820
United Arab Emirates	0.67	12.0	0.8	30,070
Saudi Arabia	0.56	11.1	6.2	11,260
Japan	0.48	118.6	57.5	9,890
Finland	0.44	4.8	2.1	9,720
Belgium	0.43	9.9	4.2	12,180
Germany (FRG)	0.42	61.7	25.8	13,590
Libya	0.39	3.2	1.3	8,640
Iceland	0.31	0.2	0.06	11,330
United Kingdom	0.28	56.1	15.6	7,920
Luxembourg	0.26	0.4	0.1	14,510

*Contributions by countries for EEC programs are not reflected in this table.



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Africa

Algeria

Since 1975, a popular front has warred with Morocco over control of the former Spanish Sahara. Refugee camps for Saharans are at Tindouf, across the border in Algeria. The front has established a Saharan Democratic Arab Republic, which has been recognized by several states. Fighting between Moroccan forces and Polisario guerrillas continues.

According to the State Department's *Country Reports*, estimates of the number of refugees have ranged from 12,000 to 120,000. The UNHCR assistance program in the Tindouf region is based on a figure of 50,000. The 19 camps are run by the Polisario. UNHCR, International Committee of the Red Cross, and other international organizations have not been permitted regular access.

Other refugees in Algeria include about 1,000 Chileans and 3,000 others, such as Palestinians and African dissidents.

Angola

Since winning independence from Portugal in 1975, Angola has been drastically affected by war between rival political groups, fighting with foreign forces, drought in many areas, and a deteriorating economy.

The conflicts over many years uprooted up to an estimated 400,000, now considered settled in Zaire, although the Angolan government contends 180,000 have voluntarily returned to Angola. At present, 200,000 Angolans receive UNHCR assistance in Zaire. Another 37,000 are in Zambia.

In the south, fighters of the Southwest Africa People's Organization are part of the refugee camp population of 70,000 Namibians in Angola. SWAPO operates the camps with funds from UNHCR.

Because of deteriorating economic conditions, the Angolan government has reversed its policy and is permitting emergency food aid from international relief organizations in areas it does not fully control.

Cameroon

During 1982, the number of refugees in Cameroon decreased to about one thousand, consisting of those people from Chad who decided not to return to their homeland. A year before, estimates ranged as high as 260,000.

On a visit to Cameroon in September 1982, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Poul Hartling praised the government for its cooperation in protection of refugees. He also visited refugee centers in the interior where land has been made available to Chadian refugees who wish to remain in Cameroon.

Chad

More than 150,000 Chadians had returned to N'Djamena by the time UNHCR's repatriation and rehabilitation program ended in June 1982. Also assisted were 50,000 internally displaced people in an operation conducted by CARE, under an agreement with UNHCR and the government. In addition, the World Food Program provided $7,070,300 in assistance in 1982.

Djibouti

Aid from France to its former colony is a mainstay of this tiny impoverished state, where 40 to 50 percent are unemployed. Temporary asylum is given to 31,500 refugees from Ethiopia; they are not permitted to work. A small number of refugees have been resettled in the U.S. and Canada. A number of Ethiopians, including registered refugees, were forcibly repatriated to Ethiopia in February 1982.

Ethiopia

War, drought, civil strife, and oppression have driven more than one million Ethiopians out of the country. The 350,000 in Sudan are primarily Eritreans who fled their homes in that northern province, most since 1978 when central government forces drove liberation forces from towns and cities into the countryside. More than 500,000 from Ethiopia have taken refuge in Somalia, and another 31,500 in Djibouti.

The Ethiopian government states it welcomes returnees, but amnesty decrees are not unconditional. The risk of persecution is considered by some to be less than it was during the worst period of instability in the late 1970s, but many refugees still fear reprisals if they have been associated with banned political parties, separatist organizations, or certain religious or social groups.

The government estimates that some 129,000 refugees have returned from Somalia and about 71,000 from Sudan; U.S. AID places the number of repatriates under a UNHCR program at 61,000.

The 11,000 refugees listed by UNHCR as living in Ethiopia are mainly from Sudan, having fled the North-South civil war of 1955-72. Half are integrated into the economy and the others, Ansar tribesmen, live in camps.

Rwanda

A tide of uprooted people from Uganda unexpectedly entered Rwanda in October and November 1982. As 1983 began, UNHCR, with World Food Program and voluntary agency assistance, had launched a major emergency feeding and maintenance program for 45,000 people, many of Rwandan stock but longtime residents of Uganda. Some also were Ugandans ethnically related to Rwandans.

Apart from this influx the refugee situation in Rwanda is stable. Some 15,000 Hutus from Burundi have settled in Rwanda, where members of the Hutu ethnic group have political control. The refugees have most of the rights of local people, except citizenship.

Somalia

Somalia, among the poorest nations in the world, also has one of the highest concentration of refugees: one for every nine residents. Almost 80 percent are women and children.

Most of the 500,000 refugees are from Somali-speaking tribes in the Ogaden area, a vast dry region in eastern Ethiopia. Others are Oromo, from the area west of the Ogaden; and Eritreans and Tigreans, from the northern part of Ethiopia.

Fighting over the vast grazing area of the Ogaden, coupled with the longest drought in 30 years, caused refugees from Ethiopia to flee across the border in the late 1970s. For a time, their fellow Somalis helped them, without aid from abroad. In 1978, the international effort began, and it now involves UNHCR, World Food Program, and 30 voluntary agencies. Aid from bilateral contributors totaled $50 million in 1982.

The refugees are located in 35 camps throughout the countryside. A large number also live with Somali kinsmen. The influx of so many people in desperate straits has hurt the environment: trees and shrubs have been consumed for huts and firewood, and the water table has dropped because

thousands of holes were dug as part of the continual search for water.

Efforts are now directed towards self-help and self-sufficiency. Though arable land near camps is scarce and water limited, the land cultivated by refugees has increased from 2,500 to 7,500 acres.

Eventually, some refugees may be permanently settled there, but because of political, economic, and environmental factors, the Somali government has made no such plans. Repatriation to Ethiopia does not appear likely in the near future.

Sudan

Sudan, Africa's largest country, is among the least developed. The presence of more than 500,000 refugees strains government services, yet the government has taken the initiative to establish refugees in agricultural settlements tied to its development program.

In 1982, three new rural settlements were established in eastern Sudan and six new settlements in the south, for refugees from Ethiopia and Uganda, respectively.

At year's end, most of the refugees from Chad were returning home, but the influx from Uganda increased, reaching a total of 150,000 at the end of 1982. Also in the south are 8,000 from Zaire. The largest total is from Ethiopia, some 350,000-400,000; most are Eritreans.

In 1982, UNHCR contributed $18 million to 42 settlements for refugees, providing for land clearance, feasibility studies, and water supply systems. UNHCR also runs the largest education program it has in Africa, with a budget of $1.9 million. World Food Program provided over $3.5 million in assistance.

Some increase in voluntary repatriation is expected in 1983; in the first half of 1982 fewer than 400 returned to their home countries. In 1982, about 1,000 refugees resettled abroad.

Tanzania

In 1982, the cumulative refugee population, largely self-sufficient but some receiving international assistance, totaled 155,000, according to the U.S. State Department. The largest number, about 124,700, are from Burundi.

A joint project of UNHCR, Lutheran World Federation, and Tanzanian development authorities provides integrated development for the Kigoma region, where 25,000 settled Burundi refugees live and work in the same villages as the local population. The project—first of its kind in Africa—has a four-year budget of $8 million to build dispensaries, classrooms, and multi-purpose cooperatives.

Uganda

In October and November 1982, UNHCR was called upon to supply emergency relief to 45,000 people expelled by force from southern Uganda into Rwanda. Mostly of Rwandan origin, these people had been settled for several decades; many were Ugandan citizens. Another 35,000 were driven into existing refugee settlements near the Rwanda border. In late October, representatives of the two governments and UNHCR met and issued a communique delineating initial steps to be taken towards resolving the crisis. By year's end, no progress had been made by Ugandan authorities.

An estimated 150,000 Ugandans have fled into Sudan, while 35,000 remain in Zaire, as a result of intertribal fighting. Before the Rwandans were expelled, UNHCR listed 113,000 refugees in Uganda from other countries.

Zaire

"Tens of thousands fled Zaire following the collapse of the Simba, Katangan, and Kiva rebellions in the 1960s and 1970s, and some thousands still remain in neighboring states," state the *Country Reports*. Some who leave now seek to avoid persecution due to their political opinions.

Refugees in Zaire number 270,000—the third largest total in Africa. For the most part, they are from nearby countries, the largest number being from Angola and have settled where the local people are of the same or a related tribe. The government is sensitive to political and military activity of refugees and attempts to control it.

The government policy is to accept refugees and assist them to become self-sufficient and permanently settled. Large numbers have been in Zaire for a considerable length of time.

Zambia

Zambia has a refugee population of almost 50,000, according to the Department of State. Of these, 31,000 are considered to be spontaneously settled and lack recognition of their refugee status. Some have been caught in government "round-ups" and forcibly repatriated. UNHCR is launching a campaign to register refugees throughout the country.

The remaining 19,000 refugees live in organized camps, except for some 700 classified as "urban refugees" for whom resettlement is sought.

Crossroads in International Assistance

When reflecting on the [process of rehabilitation/self-suffiency/development of a particular group of refugees in a rural settlement issue] today, one can see that the international community is at a crossroads in its perception of the refugee problem. Until recently, the international refugee assistance community has successfully dealt with refugee problems by adopting a humanitarian, apolitical approach, which has meant treating the effects exclusively in a short-term, temporary fashion. However, the sheer magnitude and persistence of the problem calls for imaginative solutions beyond traditional responses. Such solutions must be devised within the economic and political context in which the majority of the world's refugees are currently found in the Third World, particularly Africa. This does not mean abandoning the humanitarian principle, but rather its reinforcement through more effective assistance to those affected. For is it not more humanitarian to promote the rehabilitation of refugees in the shortest possible time so that they will become normal and productive members of their country of asylum and, when conditions permit, of their country of origin? To do so in the context of present day Africa requires a development focus to humanitarian assistance and at least an understanding of the root causes of the problem.

Anthony J. Kozlowski
Executive director, International Council of Voluntary Agencies
Paper presented at the Refugee Seminar
Khartoum, Sudan
September 11-14, 1982

East Asia and the Pacific

Australia

Australia, a leading resettlement country, accepted 22,000 refugees in the 1981-82 fiscal year. Two-thirds are Indochinese, one-third from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Similar figures are expected for the 1982-3 year.

More than 63,000 people from Indochina have integrated "reasonably well" into Australia, the *Country Reports* state. The majority are self-supporting and have had negligible social impact overall.

Australia is a leading contributor to UNHCR and also contributes to other international relief for refugees.

Cambodia

Few countries in modern times have endured as much hardship and upheaval as Cambodia. With the Khmer Rouge victory in 1975 began a seige of terror in which, it is estimated, more than a million Cambodians died, by torture, execution, starvation, or disease. In 1978, the forces of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam invaded and, early in 1979, installed a government under its control. Khmer Rouge forces under Pol Pot remain in remote areas of the country, periodically in battle with the Vietnamese, ancient enemies of the Cambodian people.

The Vietnamese invasion caused hundreds of thousands to flee to the border of Thailand. Some 230,000 remain, having been denied entry to Thailand.

To discourage an influx of new refugees and to preserve the option of voluntary repatriation, Thai authorities have limited consideration of third country resettlement for Cambodians who have entered Thailand and are in holding centers.

From 1980 to mid-1982, some 420,000 returned to Cambodia. UNHCR provided assistance—cloth, kitchen utensils, agricultural tools, and mosquito nets—to the repatriates.

China

Beginning in 1978, harassment by the government of Vietnam of the Chinese minority in that country caused more than one-quarter million Chinese in northern Vietnam to journey overland to China. The vast majority, about 265,000, are settled in China.

The Chinese government estimates this population to be divided as follows: first or second generation ethnic Chinese—6,000; descendants of Chinese settlers in Indochina—225,000; ethnic Vietnamese—30,000; ethnic Lao and Hmong tribespeople—3,000; and several hundred others. About 1,500 others are considered refugees by UNHCR.

UNHCR provides financial assistance toward integration of the new arrivals on state farms and in various other locations, for example, in fishing ports.

Efforts to deter pirate attacks on boat people received international assistance in 1982. UNHCR

Hong Kong

Since 1975, more than 100,000 Vietnamese boat people have sought refuge in Hong Kong. Until mid-1982, these people were treated as refugees and given temporary asylum pending their onward resettlement in other countries. In 1982, the Hong Kong government stiffened its policy in order to discourage their seeking asylum. New arrivals are placed in closed camps without access to outside employment as had been the case in previous years. "This practice," the *Country Reports* state "is expected to remove the incentive to leave Vietnam that life and work in Hong Kong offered to the refugees."

There were 12,000 Vietnamese refugees in asylum status at the end of July 1982. Approximately 6,500 refugees departed for the United States in the first ten months of FY 82, and 2,900 refugees to other countries. Hong Kong permanently resettled 108 refugees from Vietnam in 1980; 93 in 1981; and 30 in the first few months of 1982.

Indonesia

Boats carrying refugees from Vietnam arrive at many of the scattered outlying islands. The refugees are transferred to Jemaja Island for a period of quarantine, then to Galang and other sites. Galang also is the location of a refugee processing center, where 5,800 Indochinese refugees were learning the languages of their future resettlement countries.

Over a period of seven and one-half years, 78,000 refugees have landed on Indonesian islands, with 7,000 remaining there at the end of 1982. UNHCR gave $8.3 million and World Food Program $639,500 in aid in 1982.

Japan

Japan permits merchant ships and U.S. military vessels in Japan on normal business to disembark refugees rescued at sea without requiring prior guarantees of resettlement in third countries.

Japan is prepared to settle up to 3,000 refugees rescued at sea, and it provides temporary asylum for those

who wish to resettle elsewhere. At June 30, 1982, a total of 1,542 had resettled, and 1,800 were in temporary asylum.

Japan is a major financial supporter of refugee relief, in 1981 contributing $129 million, including $39.8 million to international organizations and bilateral aid to Thailand and Pakistan. Approximately the same amount was planned in 1982.

Laos

About 325,000 Lao, or 10 percent of the population, have fled since the advent of the Vietnamese-supported communist government in 1975. Of these, 275,000 have been registered as refugees in Thailand; about 76,000 remained in camps in Thailand at the end of 1982, the rest having resettled. Another 50,000 have crossed into northeast Thailand, where they have been absorbed among their ethnic cousins.

The numbers include the lowland, or ethnic, Lao and the Hmong and other hilltribe people. Departures from Laos have decreased from a 1980 level of 4,000 per month to about 750 per month in 1982.

UNHCR offers repatriation assistance, and in the year ending September 30, 1982, 1,141 people returned. There is no way to estimate the number who have returned on their own. UNHCR funds were provided for economic projects in three villages with a large number of returnees.

UNHCR has also aided repatriation of most of the 10,400 Cambodian refugees who had fled into southern Laos; 3,500 remained as of June 30, 1982.

Thailand

Since 1975, Thailand has provided camp space, and UNHCR has provided assistance, to nearly 600,000 refugees in Thailand from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. In 1981, the number of recognized refugees in camps was 190,000; at the end of 1982, the number was 169,000.

The government discourages new arrivals by border patrols and a policy of "humane deterrence," which consists of placing arrivals in austere camps with little opportunity to be considered for resettlement.

Thailand's offer of asylum to Indochinese refugees historically has been conditioned on the availability of permanent resettlement in other nations. The general decrease in resettlement opportunities, offered by the U.S. and other traditional resettlement countries has created concern about Thailand's willingness to continue to provide asylum.

Thailand received $2,838,300 from the WFP in 1982.

Malaysia

Malaysia has been a country of asylum for 181,000 boat people from Vietnam since April 1975. As of January 1, 1983, there were 8,400 in camps.

Malaysia has offered settlement to two groups of fellow Muslims. Over the past ten years, Filipino Muslims, persecuted in religious strife, have established themselves at Sabah in eastern Malaysia, 400 miles from their homes in Mindanao. Estimates of numbers range from 70,000 to 150,000. The Filipinos are supplying needed skills and labor.

Another settled Muslim group of several thousand consists of Khmer admitted to Malaysia from Thailand.

Vietnam

Departures of Vietnamese boat refugees decreased 42 percent in 1982, compared to the same period in 1981. Since August 1981, Vietnam security forces have been more vigilant, possibly because of the effect on the economy of lost fishing vessels and manpower and as a reaction to the numbers of people who have left because of the communist regime. Another factor reducing the number may be fear of pirates in the Gulf of Thailand, estimated to attack 65 percent of refugee vessels. News that resettlement countries are accepting fewer people and that arrivals in Thailand are interned may also be factors.

An added, positive, factor is the increasing cooperation of Vietnam with UNHCR in the Orderly Departure Program. This allows relatives left in Vietnam to join family members in resettlement countries. As of July 1982, 21,800 people had moved directly from Vietnam to resettlement countries.

Within Vietnam are 30,000 Cambodians who live in camps with assistance from UNHCR. In 1981, 1,400 Cambodians resettled in third countries.

Other Countries

Republic of Korea permits Vietnamese boat people picked up at sea to stay in a transit camp near the seaport of Pusan, pending resettlement elsewhere. Refugees in Korea totaled 65 at the year's end.

The Portuguese colony of **Macau** has granted asylum to several thousand since 1975. As of December 31, 1982, 1000 were in temporary asylum, receiving assistance.

In **Papua, New Guinea**, 150 refugees from Irian Jaya, Indonesia, have been settled locally, and the refugee camp closed. UNHCR continues limited assistance.

The population of Vietnamese refugees in the **Philippines** at the beginning of 1983 was 3,900. Another group is at a refugee processing center, awaiting resettlement. Like other countries of Southeast Asia, the Philippines will not allow permanent settlement.

Taiwan offers asylum and transit privileges; on December 31, 1982, there were 120 awaiting resettlement. Taiwan has admitted 13,000 refugees to settle since 1975; generally they are of Chinese ethnic origin and have relatives on Taiwan.

Europe

Austria

A neutral country, Austria's postwar governments all have upheld its humanitarian traditions and have provided facilities to refugees from Eastern Europe seeking temporary asylum.

The worldwide economic downturn has increased the burden on Austria, which in 1982 spent $11.1 million for refugee aid. UNHCR made an emergency contribution of $2 million for local settlement of Poles permitted to remain. Austria has pressed traditional resettlement countries to accept more refugees, principally Poles, and the total was greatly reduced in 1981 and 1982 by emigration.

As of August 1982, 17,700 asylum seekers were in camps in Austria; 14,600 were Poles.

Austria is also the transit point for Soviet Jewish emigres going to third countries, a movement which has been reduced severely.

France

Historically, France has been a leading country of asylum. Largely because of its former colonial ties, France has resettled 93,000 refugees from Indochina since 1975, a total surpassed only by the U.S. and China.

The number of refugees within the country remains at approximately 150,000, many of whom have lived in France a long time. During 1981-82, France adhered to a plan to accept 18,000 Indochinese refugees. The monthly rate of acceptance has been slowed by delays in departures from refugee reception centers, caused by difficulty in finding employment for refugees in France.

Federal Republic of Germany

West Germany classifies refugees in four groups: asylum seekers (8,000 in 1982); recognized asylum seekers (32,000 from 1976 to 1981); quota refugees, such as those from Vietnam, in a humanitarian program; and a large number of persons permitted to stay even after asylum requests are not approved.

Polish refugees fleeing martial law added to the population in 1982—approximately 90,000 of 200,000 Poles in Western Europe, whose intentions regarding ultimate resettlement are not known, are located in West Germany.

The presence of 4.5 million "guest workers" from other countries has turned public opinion against accepting more immigrants, including refugees. The government offers a $3,700 cash bonus to certain unemployed foreigners if they agree to return to their homelands; similar bonuses are offered to certain refugees if they leave the country.

Italy

A country of emigration, Italy does not encourage official settlement of large numbers of refugees, but provides temporary asylum and transit facilities. In practice, no one claiming refugee status has been refused admission.

Italy is also "a tolerant host" to an estimated 700,000 foreigners, many of whom are de facto refugees from North Africa and Latin America, the *Country Reports* state.

Portugal

Approximately 7,500 people claim refugee status. As of mid-1982, the new Refugee Commission had reviewed cases of 1,500 people and had approved 250. About 75 arrive each month from former Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau and from Zaire, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Few choose repatriation, and no one has been forcibly repatriated.

Spain

UNHCR representatives estimate that there are 28,000 refugees—broadly defined—presently in Spain: 15,000 Argentines, 5,000 Uruguayans, 1,000 Cubans, 1,000 Chileans, and the remainder from other Latin American countries and Eastern Europe. In addition 10,000 are in asylum status.

Spain at present has 15 percent unemployment and 15 percent inflation. Resettlement of 1,000 Indochinese who speak no Spanish and who have few job skills has been both difficult and controversial, the U.S. Department of State reports.

Turkey

In 1982, Turkey resettled 4,300 Afghan refugees of Turkic extraction who had been living temporarily in a remote area of Pakistan. Initially, Turkey will supply land and subsistence aid; in time, skilled Afghans are expected to help local rug-weaving and handicraft industries.

In addition, the *Country Reports* state, about 300 persons from Iran, Romania and Afghanistan were given temporary asylum, but it is unlikely that non-Turkish groups will be accepted for permanent settlement.

United Kingdom

It is estimated that more than 150,000 persons have found refuge in the U.K. since 1945. Among them are people from all continents, including about 17,000 Indochinese. In 1981, approximately 3,000 people applied for refugee status and 1,400 were recognized as refugees; 300 were granted asylum without refugee status.

Other Countries

During 1982, an estimated 2,100 refugees resettled in **Belgium**, where another 5,000—all Poles—were in asylum status. Unlike other countries, decisions on an individual's refugee status are referred to UNHCR, and the government generally accepts the findings.

Denmark has an annual quota of 500 refugee admissions, a figure frequently exceeded. In 1981, the government gave $14 million in aid, and the Danish people contributed $5 million in a special national campaign.

Refugees in transit make up most of the refugee population in **Greece**, which grants residence and permission to work, but not asylum. Of 3,400, a total of 3,000 are Iraqi Christians and Iranians of various minority groups. A small number of Indochinese have been resettled.

The Netherlands is one of the four leading financial supporters of UNHCR. Approximately 1,500 refugees were admitted in 1981, 1,100 being Vietnamese boat people picked up at sea by Dutch flag vessels.

The cost of **Norway's** refugee integration programs in 1982 was $23 million. Norway has resettled a total of 3,300 Indochinese since 1975. The total of refugees entering in 1982 was about 1,000—made up of Indochinese, Poles, and Latin Americans.

A refugee granted that status in **Sweden** receives the same social benefits as citizens, and is offered language and vocational training. Annual numbers are between 1,500 and 1,800. Economic pressure may force reduction of numbers.

In 1981, the federal government of **Switzerland** spent $22 million for resettled refugees: approximately 25 percent are sick or disabled—those rejected by other resettlement countries. Total population of those who entered as refugees, over a period of many years, is 40,000, mostly from Eastern Europe and Indochina.

Yugoslavia has accepted a small number of political exiles from Albania and serves as country of asylum for persons from Eastern Europe, estimated at 2,800, in transit to countries of the West.

Latin America and The Caribbean

Argentina

With the exception of 1,500 Indochinese resettled in recent years, the 12,300 refugees in Argentina have been there for a long time. UNHCR assistance is given to some—mostly elderly people of European origin—through a number of voluntary agencies. A total of 500 have requested repatriation after trying life in rural Argentina, and UNHCR is making arrangements to move them.

Costa Rica

Costa Rica is a stable and, until recently, relatively properous country; traditionally it has been a country of refuge. At present, it has 15,000 refugees, including 10,000 from El Salvador. The balance come from Cuba, Nicaragua, and other countries. In addition, an unknown number of foreigners have not sought refugee status, though most do not expect to return to their homelands.

The economic, political, and security burden of the refugees from neighboring countries is a matter of great concern to the government.

El Salvador

Civil strife resulting from repression, extremes of wealth and poverty, and insurgency has raged since 1979. A total of 36,000 non-combatants have lost their lives in assassinations and massacres committed by gunmen of the right and the left.

In all, a reported 241,000 have fled the country and are now refugees abroad. Within El Salvador, an estimated 225,000 have been displaced.

The U.S. Department of State considers people who leave the country to fall into three categories. One group is political refugees who may fear accusations of association with either the extreme left or right could target them for imprisonment or assassination. Another large group is comprised of those displaced by military action: up to 60,000, largely poor peasants, have crossed into Honduras and other countries. A third category is individuals—"as many as 650,000," state the *Country Reports*—who are considered to have left to seek better jobs. An estimated 250,000-400,000 are in the U.S., most illegally, and 175,000-250,000 are elsewhere in the region.

Refugee advocates generally criticize U.S. policy on Salvadorans in flight as politically motivated and condemn U.S. deportations of some Salvadorans who reach the U.S. UNHCR, in a report on U.S. policy regarding Salvadorans who reach the U.S., raises the possibility of the U.S. being in violation of its obligations under the international *Protocol on the Status of Refugees.*

Guatemala

Neither the government nor UNHCR has programs for assisting refugees in Guatemala. Salvadorans and Nicaraguans have found asylum there, with estimates from 10,000 to over 100,000; in December 1982, UNHCR recorded 70,000, all from El Salvador.

According to the Department of State, many of the Salvadorans in Guatemala are farmers who work as harvest hands and have decided to stay there rather than go back to El Salvador for the present. Many of the Nicaraguans are former members of the Somoza National Guard.

Fighting among left-wing guerrillas, government forces, and "death squads" continues in Guatemala. Indians in rural areas are caught in-between, and Amnesty International reports 2,600 were killed in six months in 1982. Many of their villages were razed by the army to deny support to roving guerrillas.

Estimates of displaced Indians within Guatemala range from 100,000 to 500,000. World Food Program provided $2 million in 1982 in food for 125,000 displaced. Other thousands have fled across the border to Mexico; 31,000 were in camps in Mexico at the end of the year. New arrivals were said to be suffering from numerous illnesses.

Haiti

The *Country Reports* term Haiti "a principal source of undocumented economic migrants in the Caribbean." During the past 15 years, nearly 800,000 Haitians have left in search of greater economic opportunity, principally to the Dominican Republic, the U.S., and the Bahamas, says the State Department report.

In September 1981, Haiti and the U.S. agreed that the U.S. would use warships to stop U.S.-bound ships to reduce the flow of illegal migrants. The *County Reports* state the flow was cut by 90 percent.

Refugee advocates have generally condemned the interdiction policy as contrary to the spirit of international agreements. In addition, it is charged that Haitians who reach the U.S. are

These Miskito Indian refugees receive food supplies at Mocoran camp, Honduras.
UNHCR

not provided an equitable opportunity to seek asylum and have been improperly subjected to long-term detention.

Honduras

UNHCR and other agencies have undertaken heavy expenditures in Honduras to care for a total of 29,000 refugees; an estimated 4,300 others are not receiving aid. The refugees come from Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala.

It has been costly to provide for 12,000 Miskito Indians who fled Nicaragua along the Caribbean coast to Honduras, where 20,000 Honduran Miskito Indians live.

It has also been costly to relocate many of the 20,000 Salvadoran refugees away from the border between the two countries, to protect them from fighting among guerrillas and security forces.

"Assistance to refugees has resulted in incidental benefits to local residents," reports the Department of State. Refugees have sought asylum in the poorest sections; the international agencies and the government are providing health care and other programs which frequently are the first outside help many Hondurans have ever received. Also, roads and bridges built for refugee camps aid the local population.

Mexico

Estimates put the refugee population at 140,000 with 120,000 from El Salvador and the balance from Guatemala. Only about 18,000, however, are assisted by UNHCR at the request of the Mexican government. Most Nicaraguans have returned home. Salvadorans, whom the U.S. Department of State terms "mostly economic migrants," tend to disperse or continue northwards to enter the U.S. Guatemalans—especially Indians—tend to stay in southern Mexico near the border.

The National Commission on Aid to Refugees offers basic medical aid, subsistence amounts of food, building material for temporary housing, and in some locations, schools.

"While there is some concern about the impact on local labor markets, Mexico's traditional open reception of political refugees is unlikely to be tightened greatly unless the influx grows alarmingly," conclude the *County Reports*.

Nicaragua

UNHCR spent $5.5 million between 1979 and 1981 to assist 100,000 Nicaraguan repatriates and 500,000 internally displaced. Funding came from a special appeal: principal contributors were West Germany and the three Scandinavian countries.

An estimated 40,000 Nicaraguans, including supporters of defeated President Somoza and anti-Somoza members of the middle class who grew dissatisfied with Sandinistan policies, have left the country or remain abroad. An estimated 12,000 Miskito Indians have crossed into Honduras.

Within Nicaragua are 22,500 refugees, mostly from El Salvador; the government provides work permits and treats them essentially as citizens. Approximately 5,000 receive UNHCR assistance; $131,500 was given by the World Food Program in 1982.

Other Countries

Throughout the rest of South America, UNHCR reported approximately 50,000 refugees, including Europeans—many of them elderly—and asylum seekers from other South American countries. In the northwestern section of the continent, including **Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname,** and **Venezuela**, reside 21,000 refugees. In **Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay,** and **Uruguay**, there are another 29,000.

In Central America and the Caribbean, **Belize** (formerly British Honduras) has 2,000 Salvadoran refugees receiving aid from UNHCR. The first group of families is now settled in a development project in the Balmopan River Valley where eventually there will be 200 families.

In 1982, admission to the U.S. of several hundred former political prisoners from **Cuba** then in Costa Rica and Spain was authorized. As many as 20,000 former political prisoners remain in Cuba and continue to seek freedom abroad, reports the U.S. Department of State.

Dominican Republic has offered asylum to about 5,000 individual refugees, including 60 from Haiti, who receive "self-help" assistance from UNHCR. **Panama** is the location of a rural settlement project where 1,000 from El Salvador have constructed homes and begun farming.

Middle East and South Asia

Iran

The Islamic revolution of 1979 brought many fundamental changes to Iran, causing a substantial number of Iranians to leave or remain outside the country.

Thousands of Iranians are now in the U.S., western Europe, and elsewhere, seeking asylum. In early 1983, the U.S. began to process Iranians as refugees.

The Baha'i community in Iran, whose religious views are considered a threat to Islamic purity, has been the object of oppression, with beatings and executions reported. Also threatened are Jews and the Kurdish minority, which has long sought independence.

As many as 500,000 Afghans are believed to have crossed into the country. At the start of 1983, UNHCR was negotiating with Iranian authorities over assistance to Afghans, centering on an initial plan to establish ten villages of 5,000 Afghan refugees in rural areas.

Israel

Since 1948, Israel has taken in well over one million Jews from Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. Nearly half the present Jewish population are immigrants, most of whom arrived under circumstances which could qualify them as refugees. Israel considers every Jew entitled to citizenship in the Jewish homeland.

The number of Jews allowed to emigrate from the Soviet Union in 1982 was the lowest since 1970. Only 2,688 were granted emigration visas, compared to 9,447 in 1981 and 21,471 in 1980. The proportion going to Israel declined to 27 percent in 1982, with the majority of those who chose another site opting to go to the U.S., and others going to Australia, Canada, and countries of western Europe.

Jordan

Jordan has more Palestinian refugees—an estimated one million—than

any other location. UNRWA reports that 749,000 are registered, and an additional 200,000 are believed to have moved from the West Bank.

Alone among host countries, Jordan has granted citizenship to refugees and permits them to work and own property.

Lebanon

The invasion of Lebanon by Israeli forces in 1982 resulted in casualties to an unknown number of refugees and was followed in September by a massacre in Shatila and Sabra camps by Lebanese armed militia. The massacre generated worldwide condemnation and highlighted gaps in international responsibility for providing protection to Palestinian refugee civilians.

An Afghan mother receives medical advice at Barakai camp, Pakistan. UNHCR

"Much of the work of three decades was undone in those three months of fighting," Olaf Rydbeck, head of UNRWA, told the UN in November. "The future of UNRWA's services to the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is unclear."

In June, 239,000 refugees were registered with UNRWA in Lebanon. Half lived among the Lebanese population, the others in and around camps which had been provided for them. Some 197,000 of the refugees lived in the south in the path of the invasion, or in the Beirut area.

In the fall, UNRWA sheltered refugees in tents against the seasonal rains. In the south—Sidon and Tyre—UNRWA listed 71,000 refugees who had lost their homes. Other lists were being tabulated in Beirut and Tripoli and Beqa'a areas.

Estimated cost of emergency aid for one year starting July 1, 1982, is $43.4 million. A special fund had reached $31 million by the end of October.

In addition to emergency relief, UNRWA had "forcefully raised" the question of security for refugees in camps, following the "appalling massacre" in camps in Beirut, Rydbeck told the UN.

Pakistan

By the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, more than 300,000 refugees had already fled to Pakistan. By 1982, the number in Pakistan was put at 2.8 million. A new census in 1982 may determine the number to be somewhat lower—UNHCR suggested 2.1 million—but in any event, it represents the largest population of refugees in any country.

Afghan guerrilla fighters continue to combat Soviet troops, many crossing the border into Pakistan for rest and supplies. Attempts to negotiate an end to the fighting have had no success.

Pakistan has granted asylum to the refugees but, like the refugees themselves, expects that in the long term they will return to Afghanistan. Few restrictions are placed on refugees, who have been permitted to travel freely, take employment, and, except in Baluchistan, establish businesses. Relief aid is provided only to refugees in camps in Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province.

Generally, a friendly reception has been given the Afghans in Pakistan. Some irritation is caused by pressure on water and land resources, and refugees frequently are blamed for the rising price of food and real estate and for depressed local wage scales.

The strain on Baluchistan, Pakistan's poorest province, which has over 500,000 registered refugees, is particularly severe. The Pathan refugees are seen as upsetting an ethnic balance between local Pathans and ethnic Baluchis. But even there, incidents of violence have been few and isolated, the *Country Reports* state, and authorities have dealt effectively with them.

Also in Pakistan are some 800 Iranians, in temporary refuge; many reportedly are Baha'is who are persecuted in Iran because of their religion.

Pakistan has estimated that the relief effort costs some $1 million per day, with about half that cost met by Pakistani resources. The World Food Program, numerous voluntary agencies, and multilateral donations provide approximately $130 million. UNHCR spent $83 million in 1982. The U.S. provides 30 percent of the UNHCR budget and 40 percent of the WFP total. Countries such as Japan and West Germany have made substantial donations and Arab states have also helped.

Some refugees, essentially urban in origin and often associated with pre-communist Afghan governments or western countries, have been resettled in half a dozen western democracies, including the U.S.

Syria

Thousands of Palestinians and Lebanese fled into Syria in 1982 as a consequence of the fighting between Israel and Palestine Liberation Organization forces in Lebanon. The new arrivals compounded a Palestinian population the government estimates at 288,000, and UNRWA reports is 221,000. The camp population before the invasion of Lebanon was approximately 67,000. An emergency program provided shelter in tent camps for an additional 23,000 new arrivals.

The government has provided refugees living among the population with special passports, schools, land, and other facilities and services.

North America

Canada

Since 1979, Canada has resettled about 90,000 Indochinese refugees, making it one of four leading settlement or resettlement countries along with the U.S., China, and France. The federal government works closely with provincial governments and private Canadian organizations; the latter have accounted for about half of the Indochinese resettlement.

Canada's focus shifted in 1981 to favor increased admissions from Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Africa. Canada also admitted a limited number of Salvadorans and 1,000 Polish exiles. In 1982 it was expected that the 14,000 refugees to be resettled would include a similar range. Canada also had an allotment of 500 places for "other countries" and a 2,000 "contingency reserve" for unforeseen refugee crises.

Growing unemployment in Canada has slightly affected the outlook for 1983: a quota of 12,000 has been set. Privately sponsored refugees may be admitted in addition.

Introduction of special relaxed immigration rules and continuation of the family reunion plans were announced in November 1982. Poles, Salvadorans, and Lebanese with relatives in Canada will be admitted, and visitors from these countries may apply for permanent residence.

United States of America

The U.S. is by far the largest contributor to organizations assisting refugees, although on a per capita basis it is sometimes exceeded by certain smaller countries. The U.S. also leads in total number of refugees resettled.

In an October statement to Congress, the U.S. Coordinator reported that the U.S. spent $346 million for international refugee assistance in the fiscal year ending September 30, 1982, and more than $1 billion for refugee resettlement in the U.S.

From October 1, 1974, to December 31, 1982—a period of 8 years and 3 months—the U.S. admitted 823,000 refugees from all parts of the world. In response to the crisis in Southeast Asia, the U.S. plays a leading role in offering resettlement to Indochinese: some 629,000 have come to the U.S., or three-quarters of the total.

Admissions have not reached authorized ceilings in recent years. In FY 82, provision was made for 140,000, while only 97,300 were admitted. Similarly in FY 81, a total of 217,000 was authorized, but only 159,300 were admitted.

The Coordinator's report comments: "Proposed admissions numbers are ceilings and not goals. To the extent possible the program will be managed to admit fewer than the authorized ceiling."

For FY 83 the authorized admissions figure is 90,000, allocated among five geographic regions. Actual admissions markedly below approved ceilings are once again expected.

A Letter Home

Dear Mom and Dad,

Today, we spotted a boat in the water and we rendered assistance. We picked up 65 Vietnamese refugees. It was about a two-hour job getting everyone aboard and then they had to get screened by Intelligence and checked out by Medical and fed and clothed and all that. But now, they are resting on the hangar deck and the kids—most of them seem to be kids—are sitting in front of, probably, the first television set they have ever seen, watching "Star Wars." Their boat was sinking as we came alongside. They had been at sea five days and had run out of water. All in all, a couple of more days and the kids would have been in pretty bad shape.

I guess once in awhile, we need a jolt like that for us to realize why we do what we do and how important really it can be. I mean, it took a lot of guts for those parents to make a choice like that—to go to sea in a leaky boat in hope of finding someone to take them from the sea—so much risk. But, apparently, they felt it was worth it, rather than live in a communist country. For all of our problems with the price of gas and not being able to afford a new car or other creature comforts this year, I really don't see a lot of leaky boats heading out of San Diego, looking for the Russian ships out there.

After the refugees were brought aboard, I took some pictures. But, as usual, I did not have my camera with me for the real picture—the one blazed in my mind. As they approached the ship, they were all waving and trying as best they could to say, "Hello, America sailor; hello, freedom man." It is hard to see a boat full of people like that and not get a lump somewhere between chin and belly-button. And it really makes one proud and glad to be an American. People were waving and shouting and choking down lumps and trying not to let other brave men see their wet eyes. A lieutenant next to me said, "Yea, I guess it's payday in more ways than one." We got paid today and I guess no one could say it better than that.

It reminds us all of what America has always been—a place a man or woman can come to for freedom. I know we are crowded and we have unemployment and we have a real burden with refugees. But I honestly hope and pray we can always find room. We have a unique society, made up of cast-offs of all the world's wars and oppressions and, yet, we are strong and free. We have one thing in common—no matter where our forefathers came from, we believe in that freedom. I hope we always have room for one more person—maybe an Afghan or a Pole or someone else looking for a place where he does not have to worry about his family's starving or a knock on the door in the night—and where all men who truly seek freedom and honor and respect and dignity for themselves and their posterity can find a place where they can, finally, see their dreams come true and their kids educated and become the next generations of doctors and lawyers and builders and soldiers and sailors.

Love, John.

Letter from Ordnance Man, First Class, John Mooney from the aircraft carrier Midway. Read by President Ronald Reagan as part of his radio address to the nation, Christmas Day 1982.

Directory of Organizations

International Organizations

Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM), P.O. Box 100, CH-1211 Geneva 19, Switzerland. Director: James Carlin. Representatives: New York—Richard Scott, 60 E. 42nd St., Suite 2122, New York, NY 10165. (212) 599-0440; California—William Anderson, Building 50C, Rm. 42, Hamilton AFB, CA 94934. (415) 883-0561; Washington—Gretchen S. Brainerd, 1346 Connecticut Ave. NW, Suite 711, Washington, DC 20036. (202) 785-1909.

Established in 1951, arranges for processing and transportation of refugees to resettlement countries in cooperation with international organizations, governmental and non-governmental agencies concerned with refugees. Implements programs for transfer of specialized human resources to developing countries.

International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), 65 rue de Lausanne, CH-1203 Geneva, Switzerland. Secretary General: Dr. Elizabeth Winkler.

Links Catholic assistance agencies in both first asylum and refugee resettlement countries, providing logistical and sometimes financial support for their emigration processing activities. Since 1951, has administered a series of travel loan funds for refugees and migrants. Acts as Joint Voluntary Agency representative in five countries. Administers the U.S. component of the Orderly Departure Program.

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 17 Avenue de la Paix, CH-1211 Geneva, Switzerland.

Private Swiss organization that protects and helps civilian and military victims of armed conflicts worldwide. Includes medical aid, relief supplies, a tracing agency for missing persons, and a program of civilian internees and visitors to prisoners of war.

International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), 13 Rue Gautier, 1201 Geneva, Switzerland. 31 66 02 (Cable: VOLAG (Geneva), Telex: 22891 icva ch.). Executive Director: Anthony Kozlowski.

Independent and neutral international association of voluntary agencies established in 1962 as a permanent liaison structure for consultation and cooperation. Presently composed of 60 international and national voluntary agencies.

International Disaster Institute, 85 Marylebone High St., London W1M 3DE. Administrative Director: Ms. Christine Hogg.

Researches all aspects of disaster, including refugee communities. Runs briefing and training courses for field staff and acts as an information center. Also publishes reports and a quarterly journal on disaster-related topics and has set up a famine research unit in association with the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.

International Refugee Integration Resource Center (IRIRC), 13 rue Gautier, 1201 Geneva, Switzerland. 41-22-31-15G1.

International information and documentation center concerning resettlement and integration of refugees; publisher of *Refugee Abstracts*; establishing a computerized information data bank for external access covering refugee origins, exodus, asylum, resettlement, and integration. A project of UNHCR, the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration, and the International Council of Voluntary Agencies.

League of Red Cross Societies, 17 chemin des Crêts, P.O. Box 276, 1211 Geneva 19, Switzerland. 60 E. 42nd St., Suite 1438, New York, NY 10165. (212) 661-5714. Secretary-General: Hans Hoegh.

Coordinates international Red Cross relief actions on behalf of refugees and displaced persons, and other emergency situations.

Minority Rights Group, 36 Craven St., London WC2N 5NG, U.K. (01) 930-6659. Director: Ben Whitaker. New York Branch: Sue Nichterlein, 35 Claremont Ave., Suite 4S, New York, NY 10027. (212) 864-7986.

International human rights information and education body. Publishes reports on minority groups worldwide.

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland. High Commissioner: Poul Hartling. Regional Office: UN Headquarters, Rm. C-301, UN Bldg., New York, NY 10017. (212) 754-7600. Washington Liaison Office: UNHCR, 1785 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20036. (202) 387-8546.

Established in 1951 to provide international protection to refugees who fall within the scope of its statute; and to seek permanent solutions for the problem of refugees. Also coordinates assistance programs for displaced persons in accordance with various subsequent General Assembly resolutions. Representation in some 80 countries.

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 866 UN Plaza, New York, NY 10017. (212) 754-1234. Executive Director: James Grant.

Since 1946, has cooperated with developing countries in providing child assistance programs involving nutrition, primary health care, water and sanitation, and education. Provides humanitarian assistance to emergency victims of natural and man-made disasters.

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), Vienna International Centre, Box 700, A1400 Vienna, Austria. Commissioner-General: Olof Rydbeck. New York Liaison Office: John Miles, UN Bldg., Rm. 937, New York, NY 10017. (212) 754-4214.

Since 1950 has provided assistance to registered Palestinian refugees, now numbering almost two million, in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Offers basic health and relief services to eligible refugees, education services to children up to the lower secondary level, and vocational or teacher training centers.

U.S. Government Offices

Department of Education, Office of Bilingual Education and Minority Language Affairs, Refugee Children Assistance Staff, Reporters Building, 400 Maryland Ave. SW, Suite 510, Washington, DC 20202. (202) 472-3520. Branch Chief: James H. Lockhart.

Administers federal grants to states for educational services to refugee and entrant children in public and private (nonprofit) local schools.

Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement, 330 C St. SW, Room 1229, Washington, DC 20201. (202) 245-0418. Director: Philip Hawkes.

Provides assistance to refugees after initial placements in U.S. communities with federal funding through existing federal programs which are administered by states.

Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 425 Eye St. NW, Washington, DC 20530. (202) 633-2000. Commissioner: Alan C. Nelson.

Administers immigration and naturalization laws relating to the admission, exclusion, deportation, and naturalization of aliens.

Department of State, Bureau for Refugee Programs, Room 5214, 2201 C St. NW, Washington, DC 20520. (202) 632-5320. Director: James N. Purcell, Jr.

Formulates policy for and directs U.S. refugee and migration programs; assists refugees abroad and during reception and placement in the U.S.

House Judiciary Committee, 2137 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515. (202) 225-3951. Chairman: Peter W. Rodino, Jr. Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law Chairman: Romano L. Mazzoli.

Studies and makes recommendations on immigration and naturalization, citizenship, admission of refugees, treaties and international agreements, and other appropriate matters.

Office of the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, Department of State, (S/R) Rm. 7526, 2201 C St. NW, Washington, DC 20520. (202) 632-3964. Coordinator: Ambassador H. Eugene Douglas.

Formulates policy and plans for U.S. refugee and migration programs; acts as clearinghouse for information on refugee affairs.

Senate Judiciary Committee, 226 Dirksen Senate Office Bldg., Washington, DC 20510. (202) 224-5225. Chairman: Strom Thurmond. Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy Chairman: Alan K. Simpson.

Studies and makes recommendations on the problems of refugees; has jurisdiction over immigration and naturalization legislation.

U.S. Resettlement Agencies

Following are selected U.S. voluntary agencies that participate in programs to resettle refugees. Readers may contact such agencies for information on sponsorship.

American Council for Nationalities Service, 20 W. 40th St., New York, NY 10018. (212) 398-9142. Executive Director: Wells C. Klein.

With its member agencies, assists immigrants, refugees, and the foreign-born in adjusting to American society and works for the acceptance of all citizens as equal participants in American life. Since 1975, actively engaged in the resettlement of refugees and entrants from Indochina, Cuba, Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia, and Ethiopia and other African countries.

American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees, 1790 Broadway, Room 710, New York, NY 10019. (212) 265-1919. President: Dr. Jan Papanek.

Organized in 1948 to help resettle Czechoslovak, and Central and Eastern European refugees. Since 1975, AFCR has participated in the resettlement of Indochinese refugees.

Buddhist Council for Refugee Rescue and Resettlement, City of 10,000 Buddhas, Box 217, Talmage, CA 95481. (707) 468-9155. Executive Director: Bhikshu Heng Ch'i.

Composed of Buddhist organizations and Asian-American civic associations in the U.S. Resettles Indochinese refugees and operates an English language and acculturation training program for newly arrived refugees.

Church World Service/Immigration and Refugee Program, 475 Riverside Dr., New York, NY 10115. (212) 870-2164 Director: Dale S. de Haan.

Relief and development arm of the National Council of Churches. Provides immigrant, migrant, and refugee services in the U.S. and responds to human need around the world. Works closely with regional ecumenical colleague agencies, including the World Council of Churches.

Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, Inc. (HIAS), 200 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10003. (212) 674-6800. Executive Vice President: Leonard Seidenman. The refugee and migration agency of the organized American Jewish community. Assists Jewish refugees and migrants from Eastern Europe, Middle East, North Africa, and elsewhere. Also assists Indochinese, Ethiopian, Afghan, and other non-Jewish refugees through programs in cooperation with the U.S. government. Global network of offices and affiliated organizations in 47 countries on six continents. Provides for pre-migration planning, visa documentation, reception, transport, etc.

International Rescue Committee, 386 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10016. (212) 679-0010. Executive Director: Charles Sternberg.

Nonsectarian, nonpartisan voluntary agency providing relief and resettlement services for refugees and displaced victims of war.

Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service/Lutheran Council in the U.S.A., 360 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10010. (212) 532-6350, (800) 223-7656. Director: Ingrid Walter. Director for Policy and Program: Rev. Franklin Jensen.

Provides a full range of services to refugees and their sponsors from pre-arrival through initial resettlement, with a nationwide network of local offices, congregations, and community groups. Also provides immigration counseling. Since World War II, has resettled refugees from Eastern Europe, Indochina, Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Africa on behalf of Lutheran church bodies in the U.S.

Migration and Refugee Services (MRS): United States Catholic Conference, 1312 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20005. (202) 659-6618. Executive Director: John McCarthy.

Responsible for all immigrant, migrant, and refugee activities conducted at the national level by the Catholic Church of the U.S. Coordinates with agencies in public and private sectors in resettlement and assimilation of individuals and families in American society.

Presiding Bishop's Fund for World Relief/Episcopal Church, Episcopal Church Center, 815 Second Ave., New York, NY 10017. (212) 687-9454 or 55. Executive Director: The Reverend Canon Samir J. Habiby. Assistant Director for Migration Affairs: Marion M. Dawson (Mrs. Robert J.).

Official channel through which the Episcopal Church responds to human need around the world, providing funding for Episcopal, Anglican, and ecumenical projects in relief, rehabilitation, development, and refugee migration. Conducts a program for refugee resettlement in the U.S. through Episcopal dioceses.

Rav Tov, Inc., International Jewish Rescue Organization, 125 Heyward St., Brooklyn, NY 11206. (212) 875-8300. Executive Director: Rabbi David Niederman.

Through its network of overseas offices, has provided pre-migration planning, visa documentation, care and maintenance, and medical assistance to thousands of refugees while in transit. In countries of resettlement, provides a full range of services including reception, transportation, housing, medical care, language training, employment counseling, and maintenance assistance.

Tolstoy Foundation, Inc., 250 W. 57th St., Suite 1101, New York, NY 10107-0144. (212) 247-2922. Executive Director: Teymuraz Bagration.

Founded in 1939 to assist Russian refugees. Scope has broadened to assist other refugees. Has a cultural center and field and regional offices in the U.S., operational offices in Europe and Latin America, and correspondents in the Middle East.

World Relief Corporation/Refugee Services Division: National Association of Evangelicals, P.O. Box WRC, Nyack, NY 10960. (914) 268-4135. Associate Executive Director for Refugee Services Division: Donald Bjork.

Assists churches, community groups, families, and individuals who wish to sponsor Indochinese, Afghan, African, and Eastern European refugees, as well as Cuban and Haitian entrants.

U.S. Aid & Information Organizations

Following are selected U.S. voluntary agencies and human rights and educational organizations that provide assistance to or information about refugees.

Afghan Community in America, 139-15 95th Ave., Jamaica, NY 11435. (212) 658-3737. Chairman: Habib Mayar.

Provides non-military assistance to those made needy by the present war in Afghanistan. Solicits contributions and gifts of any kind.

Afghanistan Relief Committee, Inc., 345 Park Ave., Suite 4100, New York, NY 10154. (212) 355-2931. Executive Director: Jenik Radon.

Provides charitable, educational, humanitarian, and benevolent assistance to the people of Afghanistan wherever they are located, either directly or through organizations with similar purposes. Solicits funds and in-kind medical donations.

Africare, Inc., 1601 Connecticut Ave. NW, Room 600, Washington, DC 20009. (202) 462-3614. Executive Director: C. Payne Lucas.

Carries out more than 30 development assistance projects in Africa, including supporting water supply systems and food production, health care and sanitation, agriculture, construction, and refugee assistance in Somalia.

Aid for Afghan Refugees (AFAR), 1052 Oak St., San Francisco, CA 94117. (415) 863-1450. Executive Director: John Schaecher.

A group of Americans and Afghans organized to raise money for Afghan refugees in Pakistan and to raise the awareness of Americans about the Afghan refugee situation.

American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, Inc., 200 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10003. (212) 777-8210. Executive Director: Leon O. Marion.

Established in 1943 to provide a means for consultation, coordination, and planning to assure the maximum effective use of contributions of the American community for the assistance of people overseas. Its Committee on Migration and Refugee Affairs coordinates plans and activities for refugee assistance at home and abroad. Voluntary agencies in refugee resettlement are members of the committee.

American Friends Service Committee, 1501 Cherry St., Philadelphia, PA 19102. (215) 241-7000. Executive Secretary: Asia Bennett.

Quaker organization that provides food, shelter, and supplies, especially in response to needs created by war, disaster, and gross violations of human rights, where provision of relief may lead to constructive community development.

American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, Inc., 60 E. 42nd St., New York, NY 10165. (212) 687-6200. Executive Vice President: Ralph I. Goldman.

Established in 1914, serves as the overseas arm of the organized American Jewish community and provides for the rescue, relief, and rehabilitation of Jewish communities around the world. Current programs in more than 30 countries are largely funded by the campaigns of the United Jewish Appeal. Nonsectarian activities have benefited people in Thailand, Italy, Romania, Yugoslavia, Tunisia, Lebanon, and elsewhere.

The American Jewish Philanthropic Fund, 386 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10016. (212) 684-1525. President: Charles J. Tanenbaum.

Provides relief, resettlement, and retraining services to Jewish refugees in Europe and the U.S. through programs administered by the International Rescue Committee.

American National Red Cross, 17th & D Sts. NW, Washington, DC 20006. (202) 737-8300. President: Richard Schubert. Refugee affairs and Tracing Service: Thora Frank. (202) 857-3351.

Assists refugees in cooperation with other National Red Cross Societies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the League of Red Cross Societies. Assists refugees in locating missing family members through its international tracing service. Also provides guidance and assistance in reuniting refugee families.

American Near East Refugee Aid, 1522 K St. NW, Suite 202, Washington, DC 20005. (202) 347-2558. President: Dr. Peter Gubser.

Works to increase total assistance in cash and kind from Americans to Palestinians and Lebanese in villages, towns, and refugee camps. Seeks to increase American understanding of the plight of the Palestinians. Efforts directed toward social and economic development in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, and reconstruction in Lebanon.

American Refugee Committee, 2110 Nicollet Ave., Suite 210, Minneapolis, MN 55404. (612) 872-7060. National Director: Stanley B. Breen.

Works with Indochinese refugees both in the U.S. and in refugee camps in Southeast Asia. Sends medical teams to refugee camps in Thailand. Participates in resettlement of Indochinese.

CARE, 660 First Ave., New York, NY 10016. (212) 686-3110. Executive Director: Dr. Philip Johnston.

An international aid and self-help development organization, responds to needs of refugees in emergency situations through various repatriation and camp feeding programs. Has ongoing programs in Chad, Somalia, and Thailand. Designed programs for Afghans in Pakistan and Vietnamese boat people.

Catholic Relief Services-USCC (CRS), 1011 First Ave., New York, NY 10022. (212) 838-4700. Executive Director: Most Rev. Edwin B. Broderick, D.D.

Founded in 1943 under the sponsorship of the Catholic Bishops of the United States. Cooperates with local social welfare agencies in over 75 countries to provide emergency and disaster relief, refugee resettlement, rehabilitation support for the disabled and infirm, and self-help development projects.

Center for Applied Linguistics, 3520 Prospect Street NW, Washington, DC 20007. (202) 298-9292. Director: G. Richard Tucker.

The Center offers refugee education guides, including a bibliography of teaching materials and dictionaries, through the ERIC system's clearinghouse on languages and linguistics. Provides both language and cultural orientation information and assistance for a fee.

Citizens' Committee for Immigration Reform, 1424 16th St. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036. Executive Director: Nina K. Solarz. (202) 387-3238.

National, bi-partisan, educational organization of individuals dedicated to the reform of immigration and refugee policy. Publishes monthly newsletter and periodic reports and studies.

Cultural Survival, Inc., 11 Divinity Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138. (617) 495-2562. President: David Maybury-Lewis.

Provides research and analysis concerning the survival of indigenous peoples and ethnic groups. Involved in maintaining the land and health care necessary for the survival of threatened groups.

Direct Relief International, P.O. Box 30820, Santa Barbara, CA 93105. (805) 687-3694. Executive Director: Dennis Karzag.

Receives and donates contributions of pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and equipment to assist victims of natural and man-made disasters. Recruits, screens, and arranges overseas assignments for volunteer doctors, nurses, and related personnel in developing countries.

Emergency Relief Fund International, P.O. Box 7703, San Francisco, CA 94120. (415) 864-3734. Executive Director: Arlene Muzio.

A Bay Area-based agency that relies on volunteer help and individual contributions to alleviate sickness and sufferings around the world. Nonsectarian, nonpartisan with emphasis on medical assistance and aid to children. Current projects in Africa, Central America, and the Middle East.

Eritrean Relief Committee, Inc., P.O. Box 1180, Grand Central Station, New York, NY 10163. (212) 866-4293. Executive Secretary: Tesfa A. Seyoum.

Founded in 1976, aids Eritreans displaced as a result of war and natural disaster, with major focus on emergency and development project assistance through the Eritrean Relief Association, based in Sudan. Program of assistance includes funds and material aid for food, medicine, clothing, and the provision of education in food production and agriculture.

Freedom House, 20 W. 40th St., New York, NY 10018. (212) 730-7744. Executive Director: Leonard R. Sussman.

Publishes a survey of freedom; distributes books to students in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; monitors compliance with the Helsinki Accords; publishes writing from individuals in countries where there is oppression; and has information and analysis programs on the Caribbean Basin, Afghanistan, Poland, and other countries.

Georgetown University Center for Immigration Policy and Refugee Assistance, CIPRA, 307 ICC, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057. (202) 625-3545. Director: Fr. Harold Bradley, S.J.

Objective is to influence the choices which will be made in developing a humane, reasonable, and enforceable immigration policy for the U.S. Sponsors lectures, seminars, an annual public meeting on refugee admissions and policy, and educational programs such as internships in refugee assistance, medicine, dental care, and nursing.

Holt International Children's Services, Inc., 1195 City View, Box 2880, Eugene, OR 97402. (503) 687-2202. Executive Director: David H. Kim.

Provides assistance in the tracing and documentation for Amerasian children of Vietnam for the purpose of reunification with birth parents or resettlement in the U.S. under sponsorship, foster care, or adoption, as appropriate. In the past, provided care for unaccompanied minors in Cambodian refugee camps in Thailand.

Indochina Refugee Action Center (IRAC), 1424 16th St. NW, Suite 404, Washington, DC 20036. (202) 667-7810. Executive Director: Le Xuan Khoa.

Provides technical assistance to refugee self-help groups and community service providers, and information and program development services to persons and programs involved in resettlement.

International Christian Aid, A Division of Inter-Aid, 5189 Verdugo Way, Camarillo, CA 93010. (805) 987-8888. President: Joe Bass. Contact: Dale Dobson, Director of Communication.

Aids refugees and displaced persons with food, clothing, special training, self-help programs, and emergency disaster aid. Currently operating refugee programs in Thailand, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, and Lebanon. Operates flight service out of Nairobi, Kenya, serving over 30 agencies in East Africa.

Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights, 136 W. 44th St., New York, NY 10036. (212) 921-2160. Executive Director: Michael Posner.

Legal resource center for human rights activities. The Political Asylum Project provides legal representation for individual asylum applicants through the use of volunteer attorneys.

Lutheran World Relief, 360 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10010. (212) 532-6350. Executive Director: Norman E. Barth.

Serves as the overseas development and relief agency on behalf of most U.S. Lutherans to assist with long-term and emergency help for people especially in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Refugee assistance is often channeled through programs of Lutheran World Federation. Aid to Somali refugees is provided through the Inter-Church Response for the Horn of Africa in partnership with Catholic Relief Services and Church World Service.

Mennonite Central Committee, 21 S. 12th St., Akron, PA 17501. (717) 859-1151. Executive Secretary: Reg Toews.

Cooperative relief and service agency for Mennonites and Brethren in Christ in North America. Provides material aid and development assistance to refugees from man-made and natural disasters. Current work includes assistance to refugees in the Horn of Africa, Central America, Southeast Asia, and Lebanon. Arranges resettlement for refugees in the U.S. and Canada.

National Immigration, Refugee, and Citizenship Forum, 533 8th St. SE, Washington, DC 20003. (202) 544-0004. President: Rick Swartz.

Stimulates and coordinates policy-focused working relationships and information networks spanning the range of issues and interest groups involved in immigration, refugees, and related foreign policy. Comprised of more than 90 groups, the Forum adopts no position on policy questions.

Operation California, 336 Foothill Rd., Beverly Hills, CA 90210. (213) 858-8184. Telex 295252 OPCAUR. Executive Director: Richard Walden.

Founded in 1979, a tax-exempt, nonprofit organization. Objectives are to collect and transport high-priority emergency relief supplies to areas of need. Has been active in Somalia, Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Honduras, Mexico, Lebanon, and Poland.

Oxfam America, 115 Broadway, Boston, MA 02116. (617) 482-1211. Executive Director: Joe Short.

Funds small-scale agricultural and technical assistance projects in Asia, Africa, and Latin America designed to

increase self-reliance and promote lasting economic and social development.

Polish-American Immigration and Relief Committee, 119 East 15th St., New York, NY 10003. (212) 254-2240. Executive Vice President: Janusz Krzyzanowski.

Nonsectarian voluntary agency founded in 1947 to help displaced persons and political refugees. Field offices in Europe. Activities include resettlement, adjustment of status, family reunification, and social services.

Refugee Materials Center, U.S. Department of Education, 324 E. 11th St., 9th Floor, Kansas City, MO 64106. (816) 374-2276.

Provides bibliographies of free educational and resettlement materials for refugees.

Refugee Policy Group (RPG), 1424 16th St. NW, Suite 401, Washington DC 20036. (202) 387-3015. Executive Director: Dennis Gallagher.

Serves as an independent center of policy analysis and research on domestic and international refugee issues. Houses a refugee resource library and provides auspices for policy analysts, researchers, and program developers to meet and conduct their work.

The Salvation Army World Service Office (SAWSO), 1025 Vermont Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20005. (202) 833-5646. Director: John W. Wiggins.

Provides relief and assistance within its capabilities to refugees anywhere in the world.

Save the Children Federation, 54 Wilton Rd., Westport, CT 06880. (203) 226-7272. President: David L. Guyer.

Provides humanitarian aid with an emphasis on making life as normal as possible under the adverse conditions to which refugees from political strife or natural disaster are exposed. Education, health maintenance, potable water supply, sanitation, family gardens, and social services are all components of its program in the refugee camps in Thailand and Indonesia. Organizes language and cultural orientation classes for U.S.-bound refugees.

Spanish Refugee Aid, Inc., 80 E. 11th St., Rm. 412, New York, NY 10003. (212) 674-7451. Director: Nancy Macdonald.

Founded in 1953 to aid refugees of the Spanish Civil War, 25,000 of whom remained in France. Provides economic and moral aid to the old and sick.

Technical Assistance Information Clearing House (TAICH), American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, Inc. 200 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10003.

Serves as a center of information on the socioeconomic development programs abroad of U.S. nonprofit organizations, including voluntary agencies, church missions, and foundations. Issues publications and responds to inquiries.

United Lithuanian Relief Fund of America, Inc., 2558 W. 69th St., Chicago, IL 60629. (312) 776-7582. President: Mary Rudis.

Nonsectarian organization founded in 1944. Provides refugee aid, immigrant assistance, educational aid, and social welfare to the sick and needy.

U.S. Committee for Refugees, 20 W. 40th St., New York, NY 10018. (212) 398-9142. 815 15th St. NW, Suite 610, Washington, DC 20005. (202) 667-0782. Executive Director: Wells C. Klein. Director: Roger P. Winter.

Program of the American Council for Nationalities Service involved in information activities on behalf of refugees worldwide. Participates actively as refugee advocate in development of U.S. policy with respect to refugees in U.S. and abroad. Supports specialized UN agencies working to alleviate world refugee problems.

U.S. Committee for Somali Refugee Relief, Inc., 1900 L St. NW, Suite 707, Washington, DC 20036. (202) 833-9542. Director: Martin R. Ganzglass.

Formed in 1979. Major goals are to raise money to provide medicine and related medical supplies to refugees in Somalia, publicize the plight of refugees there, and bring about greater awareness that Somalia has Africa's largest refugee population.

U.S. Committee for UNICEF, 331 E 38th St., New York, NY 10016. (212) 686-5522. President: James R. Shefheld.

Established in 1947; informs Americans about UNICEF's efforts to meet the needs of the developing world's children, and raises funds for UNICEF through greeting card sales, group fund-raising events, direct contributions, and special events.

World Vision International, 919 W. Huntington Dr., Monrovia, CA 91016. (213) 357-7979. President: Dr. Ted W. Engstrom.

Founded in 1950. A Christian humanitarian organization active in 85 countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America, the South Pacific, and U.S. Involved chiefly in community development, emergency relief, child care, and Christian outreach programs.

World Concern International, P.O. Box 33000, 19303 Fremont Ave. North, Seattle, WA 98133. (206) 546-7201. President: Arthur L. Beals. Refugee Director: Fred Gregory.

Provides emergency relief and long-term development assistance to refugees in Asia, Africa, and the Americas. Provides financial grants, emergency supplies, medicine shipments, medical teams, public health workers, and economic development assistance. Can respond quickly to developing situations.

YMCA Refugee Resettlement Services, 101 N. Wacker Dr., Chicago, IL 60606. (312) 977-0031. Director: Boris Kazimiroff.

Directs national YMCA services for refugees. Acts as liaison for local YMCAs. Cooperates with other national voluntary agencies and appropriate government agencies.

Books, Reports, Bibliographies

American Council for Nationalities Service. *Interpreter Releases.* Newsletter reporting on legislative, administrative, and judicial developments affecting aliens. Published 50 times a year. New York.

American Council for Nationalities Service. *Refugee Reports.* Biweekly newsletter providing current information on U.S. policy and domestic developments regarding refugees. New York.

Behavioral Sciences Research Institute. *Demography, Social Status, Housing and Social Needs of the Haitian Population of Edison-Little River.* Coral Gables, Florida. 1983.

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Further information about the world refugee situation may be obtained from: **U.S. Committee for Refugees**, 20 West 40th St., New York, NY 10018 (212) 398-9142; or 815 15th St. NW, Suite 610, Washington, DC 20005 (202) 667-0782; or from one of the following local agencies affiliated with the American Council for Nationalities Service:

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International Institute
207 East Tallmadge Avenue
Akron, OH 44310
(216) 376-5106

ALBANY
Albany International Center
Wellington Hotel—Room 202
136 State Street
Albany, NY 12207
(518) 436-9741

BINGHAMTON
American Civic Association
131 Front Street
Binghamton, NY 13905
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287 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02115
(617) 536-1081

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Buffalo, NY 14209
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327 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, IL 60604
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Cincinnati, OH 45202
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4433 Broadway
Gary, IN 46409
(219) 980-4636

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Hawaii Refugee Resettlement Organization (formerly VIVA-II)
100 N. Beretania Street, Room 201A
Honolulu, HI 96819
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Refugee Program
YMCA of the Greater Houston Area
2903 W. Dallas St.
Houston, TX 77019
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